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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

IMAGE/TEXT AND TEXT/IMAGE:
REIMAGINING MULTIMODAL RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH DISSOCIATION
W.J.T. Mitchell has famously noted that we are in the midst of a “pictorial turn,” and images are
playing an increasingly important role in digital and multimodal communication. My dissertation
addresses the question of how meaning is made when texts and images are united in multimodal
arguments. Visual rhetoricians have often attempted to understand text-image arguments by
privileging one medium over the other, either using text-based rhetorical principles or
developing new image-based theories. I argue that the relationship between the two media is
more dynamic, and can be better understood by applying The New Rhetoric’s concept of
dissociation, which Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca developed to demonstrate how
the interaction of differently valued concepts can construct new meaning. My dissertation
expands the range of dissociation by applying it specifically to visual contexts and using it to
critique visual arguments in a series of historical moments when political, religious, and
economic factors cause one form of media to be valued over the other: Byzantine Iconoclasm,
the late medieval period, the 1950’s advertising boom, and the modern digital age. In each of
these periods, I argue that dissociation reveals how the privileged medium can shape an entire
multimodal argument. I conclude with a discussion of dissociative multimodal pedagogy,
applying dissociation to the multimodal composition classroom.
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Chapter One
Introduction: Dissociation and Multimodal Arguments

I. A Question of Interpretation: The Problematic Relationship between Texts and Images
High in the apse of the Cappella Palatina in Sicily, a Byzantine mosaic icon of Jesus
Christ glitters. The icon dominates the visual field of the apse, overshadowing the inscription in
the mosaic: “IC” is inscribed to the left of Christ’s head and “XC” to the right (Fig. 1.1). The
letters seem marginal next to the figure, yet the inscription is of the utmost importance. It is a
monogram representing the first and last letters of the Greek rendering of Jesus Christ: ιησους
χριστος.

Figure 1.1. Byzantine apse mosaic in
the Cappella Palatina. Photo by the
author.
There are two ways of understanding the interaction between the mosaic’s text and
image. The inscription might be seen as a label for the text, explaining the subject of the image.
Roland Barthes observes in Image-Music-Text that “in every society various techniques are
developed intending to fix the floating chain of signifieds in such a way as to counter the terror of
uncertain signs; the linguistic message is one of these techniques” (39, italics original). Faced
with the apse mosaic of the Cappella Palatina, Barthes would most likely have assumed that the
inscription is intended to “fix” the image, making certain its meaning. In that case, a viewer
1

would interpret the image through the lens of the inscription. Barthes’s approach is similar to that
taken by many Western rhetoricians over the centuries: Western rhetoric often has privileged
words over images, assuming that images take their meaning from the surrounding texts.
But there are other ways of understanding images like the Byzantine mosaic. In the
Eastern Orthodox Byzantine tradition that gave rise to the mosaic, icons speak for themselves.
The properties of these images were defined by a theological debate that played out and is
largely preserved in texts from the Eastern Orthodox Church Fathers and Ecumenical councils in
the eighth and ninth centuries. These documents state that icons are themselves a theological
decree, a visual proclamation that the uncreated God became incarnate in the form of a man,
sanctifying the material world. The mosaic image is not simply a picture of Christ, but an
argument for an entire worldview that has been largely preserved in Eastern Orthodox Christian
theology today. Contemporary Eastern Orthodox scholar Vladimir Lossky notes that in the
Byzantine tradition, icons are the equivalent of texts, for “iconography sets forth in colours what
the word announces in written letters” (22). Icons are not floating signifieds waiting to be given
meaning by inscriptions; instead they share the same powerful potential to carry meaning as
texts. As such, the sacred images garner the same protection afforded to sacred texts. The Greek
Orthodox Archdiocese, an arm of the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church, asserts that “an image
changed to suit an individual’s taste is as dangerous as a doctored Scriptural text” (Yiannias par.
31). Images thus have equal rhetorical standing with texts. In the Byzantine tradition, the
meaning of the image in the Cappella Palatina mosaic is not determined by the letters. The case
is quite the opposite: the icon’s message is reinforced by the text.
I open by discussing two possible approaches to the Cappella Palatina apse mosaic to
demonstrate that the interaction between texts and images is not static. Barthes wrote in a society
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on the brink of post-modernism, a culture that — as his words reveal — valued texts more than
images. Over thirty years later, with the advent of the Internet and other digital technologies, that
paradigm is changing. Today we are in the throes of what W.J.T. Mitchell calls a “pictorial turn”
(9). New technologies are disrupting long-standing practices of linear print-based
communication. Images, video, and other forms of media are emerging from the shadows of text
and beginning to carry a heavier share of the communicative burden. Rhetorical scholars are
starting to realize the importance of understanding how these media combine with texts to create
multimodal arguments and compositions.
The multimodal relationship between texts and images has gotten a good deal of attention
from scholars like W.J.T. Mitchell, Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, James Elkins, and
Anne Wysocki, who have been grappling with the increasing importance of images.1 Along with
other scholars of visual rhetoric, they have been attempting to theorize how images
communicate. As the Cappella Palatina icon example demonstrates, this is no simple task. And
neither is understanding multimodal relationships beyond text-image interactions. What is clear
is that in order to comprehend the ways that rhetorical meaning is made in today’s world, it is
crucial that scholars develop more nuanced theories of multimodal and visual rhetoric.
By focusing on the relationship between texts and images, this dissertation offers
rhetoricians another tool for understanding how multimodal arguments and compositions make
meaning. More specifically, I propose that The New Rhetoric’s theory of dissociation is a useful
model for studying the interaction between texts and images when they are combined in
multimodal arguments.

See Mitchell’s Picture Theory, Kress and van Leeuwen’s Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design,
Elkins’s Visual Studies: A Skeptical Introduction, Wysocki’s “Impossibly Distinct: On Form/Content and
Word/Image in Two Pieces of Computer-Based Interactive Multimedia.”
1
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This Introduction begins by offering some clarifications about the terms that I will be
using and the parameters of my project. I then trace various theoretical approaches to multimodal
text-image interactions found in Western rhetoric, both past and present, before turning to Chaim
Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's concept of dissociation and explaining what the theory
and its Jewish roots contribute to multimodal — and more specifically, visual — rhetoric.
Finally, I preview the case studies undertaken in the subsequent chapters. Each case study
examines a multimodal argument that utilizes both texts and images to convey its message,
chosen to demonstrate a particular implication of the dissociative relationship between texts and
images. Taken together, these case studies show dissociation’s potential not only for explaining
text-image arguments, but also for explaining other multimodal arguments and laying the
groundwork for multimodal pedagogy.

II. Clarifications: Establishing Terms and Parameters
Before I proceed any further, I want to establish some working definitions of the terms
that I’ll be using. First, I want to clarify my use of the term "argument." Within the sphere of
rhetoric and, more specifically, argumentation studies, argument can take on a variety of
meanings based on a variety of criteria. Normative pragmatics applies expression-based criteria,
insisting that "arguments are fundamentally linguistic entities" (Jacobs 264). Informal logic
emphasizes content and requires an argument to contain identifiable premises linked to
conclusions (Govier 22). On the more narrow end of the spectrum, pragma-dialectics limits
argument to "a discourse taking place between people" with the intent of "resolving a difference
of opinion...by means of a critical exchange of argumentative moves between the protagonist of
the standpoint at issue and an antagonist who has doubt as to the acceptability of this standpoint

4

or even rejects it" (van Eemeren 4). This approach focuses on expression and content, offering an
even more restricted definition of argument than normative pragmatics or pragma-dialectics.
In comparison with these three approaches, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New
Rhetoric project2 offers a more broad view of argumentation. They define argument as the
"discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the theses
presented for its assent" (4). This approach focuses on the audience, rather than primarily on the
mode of delivery or content of the argument. Argument as conceived in the New Rhetoric project
can thus include a wider variety of types of communication than the definitions offered by
normative pragmatics, informal logic, or pragma-dialectics. It is the New Rhetoric project’s
approach to argumentation that I adopt.
Granted, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca focus their discussion on "printed texts" (6),
directly limiting their treatise to text-based interactions: “[A]ny action designed to obtain
adherence falls outside the range of argumentation to the degree that the use of language is
lacking in its support or interpretation…We are interested in such procedures only when they are
emphasized by way of language” (8). Although they clearly state that their treatise focuses on
language-based communication, their acknowledgement that the adherence of minds can be
influenced by other factors points to additional possibilities for argumentation. The New
Rhetoric project’s audience-based criteria leave room for forms of argument that are not entirely
text-based, such as multimodal arguments combining texts and images. After all, language is
often involved to some degree in the “support or interpretation” of multimodal arguments,
particularly those that involve texts, even if text is not the dominant medium in the argument. For

2

I take this term from David Frank, Michelle Bolduc, and James Crosswhite, using it to represent the broader
approach to rhetoric found in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s numerous articles and books. See Frank and
Bolduc’s “Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric” and Crosswhite’s “Rhetoric in the Wilderness: The Deep
Rhetoric of the 20th Century.”
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these reasons, it is the New Rhetoric project's definition of argument that I am invoking when I
use the term.
When I write about “multimodal arguments,” I am referring to arguments that are
composed of more than one medium. By “medium,” I mean text, image, video, or audio. In a
multimodal argument, one medium may be more dominant, but more than one medium is in
some form present and working toward Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s goal of the adherence
of minds. Printed advertisements with pictures and words are multimodal arguments, as are
television documentaries with audio. A research report with diagrams can be a multimodal
argument, and so can an Internet meme mocking the latest political candidate with a goofy photo
and a sarcastic caption.
The multimodal arguments that I primarily focus on in this dissertation combine texts and
images, so it’s important to define those media. Like the argumentation scholar J. Anthony Blair,
I will be using the term “text” to refer to word-based communication, generally written but also
oral. By “image” I mean picture-based communication: snapshots, sketches, paintings, and more
(Blair 25). I realize that these terms are not entirely unproblematic: as Anne Wysocki has pointed
out, text and image are not easily separated (“Impossibly Distinct”). Fancy fonts and non-linear
word arrangement have blurred the line between texts and images in what William Endres calls
“vital spaces,” encompassing medieval illuminated manuscripts as well as today’s digital
environments. In these spaces, it is difficult to separate meaning made in written language from
that stemming from elements of visual design (Endres par. 2). The categories of text and image
are thus to some extent artificial constructs. Nevertheless, I want to make a distinction between
texts and images. The former are mediated by a sound-based system, and the latter somewhat
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bypass this system.3 Talking about the ways that texts and images interact necessitates drawing
some distinction, however inadequate it may be.
It is worth mentioning that not every combination of text and image is an argument. A tshirt printed with the word “ocean” and a picture of a wave is not trying to cause the viewer’s
mind to adhere to any defensible position. On the other hand, the same image paired with the
word “polluted” takes a clear stance. Under the New Rhetoric project’s conception of
argumentation, this latter pairing would be considered an argument. For much of the history of
Western rhetoric, however, scholars have focused on text’s role in argument and paid less
attention to how other media, like images, might contribute to argumentation. In the next section,
I look at the role that images have played in some of the canonical Western rhetorical texts, as an
example of the ways that multimodal relationships and arguments have been considered in the
field.

III. Text and Image in Western Rhetoric
In many of the canonical works of Western rhetoric, written and spoken texts have been
the preferred medium for communication and argumentation. George A. Kennedy and other
scholars of classical rhetoric have pointed out that during the classical period, the Greek — and
later Roman — study of rhetoric developed out of the need to train citizens to participate in

3

I realize that this statement is also somewhat problematic. It can be argued that written words communicate
meaning without the direct involvement of sound, or that images may be comprehended by being translated into
words. For example, this footnote is text-based. As you read it, you may not be speaking the words out loud, so how
is it still mediated by sound? I would argue that written words are often mentally translated to sound before we
comprehend them. Images do not always require this. As I look out the window into my back yard, I need not
overtly name each thing I see to comprehend the scene: grass, flowers, tree house, tree, dog chasing chipmunk. I can
comprehend the scene without linguistic intervention. On the other hand, as I read and write the footnote, I soundout the words, albeit silently.
Chinese characters and calligraphy also complicate the distinction between images and words, for the
characters that make up words are themselves pictures.
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public discourse and the law courts.4 Consequently, classical treatises on rhetoric like Plato’s
Gorgias and Phaedrus and Aristotle’s On Rhetoric deal primarily with speeches. These early
treatises consider the ethics of rhetoric, word choice, arrangement, and delivery, while images
are incorporated in the form of either props or verbal descriptions. In the Institutes of Oratory,
Quintilian notes the potential effectiveness of props, such as murder weapons or scars (VI.I.30).
He offers the example of Caesar’s bloody tunic, which “excited the populace of Rome almost to
madness” when displayed in the forum (VI.I.31). Indeed, the appearance of the tunic was so
powerful that it brought Caesar’s murder to life: “Caesar seemed not to have been assassinated,
but to be subjected to assassination at that very moment” (VI.I.31). At the same time, Quintilian
firmly gives precedence to words, for he disparages the use of pictorial representations in a trial:
“For how conscious must a pleader be of his inefficiency, who thinks that a dumb picture will
speak better for him than his own words?” (VI.I.32).
Unlike Quintilian, Aristotle does not directly address the use of props, but he allows for
the efficacy of image-evoking figures of speech. In Book 3, chapters 10 and 11 of On Rhetoric,
Aristotle makes reference to the practice of pro ommaton poiein, a bringing-before-the-eyes or
visualization that can be achieved through metaphor. Certain metaphors carry energaia, “making
the lifeless living” and thus more memorable (3.11.2). In addition, the anonymous Rhetorica ad
Herrenium lists metaphor as an effective figure of speech “used for the sake of creating a vivid
mental picture” (IV.XXXIV). Quintilian also suggests that images can be evoked through verbal
descriptions. In a list of tropes and figures in Book IX of the Institutes, he cites Cicero’s De
Oratore and includes hypotyposis, defined as “a representation of things so fully expressed in
words that it seems to be seen rather than heard” (IX.II.40). Pseudo-Longinus’s On the Sublime

4

See Kennedy’s Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times.
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offers the Greek equivalent: phantasia. The term applies to passages “where, inspired by strong
emotion, you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of your
audience” (sec. 15). Nevertheless, while the use of props and image-evoking figures was an
important skill for speakers to master, it was decidedly not the main emphasis of classical
treatises on rhetoric.
During the Middle Ages,5 the oratorical exigence that gave rise to classical rhetoric
changed, and images took on new roles. The classical lists of tropes and figures were expanded
in treatises on perceptive grammar, and images were given new life through illuminated
manuscripts and the rhetorical canon of memory. As Michael Camille notes in Image on the
Edge, images often filled the borders of illuminated manuscripts, dancing around and at times
even interfering with the text. These images occasionally were bold enough to mock the text, as
in the case of monkeys scampering through the borders of a prayer book (11-26). At other times,
images in an illuminated manuscript clarified the meaning of the text, strengthening its
argument. An example of such image-text interaction is the border image of Geoffrey Chaucer
appearing in Thomas Hoccleve’s The Regiment of Princes, which I examine in the third chapter.
In the text of the manuscript, Hoccleve invokes Chaucer and speaks of the power of images to
bring back memories. Chaucer’s portrait is included to aid the viewer’s memory of the great
poet. Nevertheless, the images on the borders of manuscripts like these still draw their meaning
from the texts.
Images could also serve as the inspiration for medieval texts. For example, Naoë Kukita
Yoshikawa suggests that Margery Kemp's visions were inspired by illustrations in the mystic's
prayer book as well as art in the churches she frequented (1-10). Despite the important role that

5

In Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, James J. Murphy defines the medieval period as the fifth century through the
fifteenth century (44-88).
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images played in medieval rhetoric, it is the texts that have gotten the most scholarly attention
and not the images behind them.
The system of mnemotechnic memory is another important site of image-text interaction
in medieval rhetoric. This approach to memory was initially laid out in classical treatises like the
Rhetorica ad Herrenium, although medieval theorists expanded on it. Mnemotechnic memory is
a way of memorizing a text by creating and memorizing a series of images attached to each
syllable, word, or passage. To be easily recalled, the image needs to be striking in some manner,
either amusing or grotesque. These images are then placed in a carefully designed background,
which itself has strict limitations: not too dark, uncluttered, familiar, and within a certain visual
distance. Even though this system was highly visual, the images were created to aid in the
memory of text. Once again, images played a secondary role.6 7
Medieval memorial images took an interesting developmental turn during the
Renaissance and early Enlightenment. As Francis Yates writes in The Art of Memory, cabbalists
and hermetics used the images to represent universal truths. They believed that when configured
in certain ways within a universal stage, images could capture elemental realities. During the
Reformation, Peter Ramus took a similar route, asserting that the arrangement of dialectical word
pairs could represent universal truths. He treated the words much as the earlier cabbalists treated
images. As a converted Protestant, however, Ramus rejected the use of images. His position

See Frances A. Yates’s The Art of Memory and Mary Carruthers’s The Book of Memory for a more in-depth
exploration of the mnemotechnic approach.
6

7

It is worth noting that the Middle Ages were a highly visual time, and that more rhetorical emphasis was perhaps
placed on visuals during this period than during any other, excepting the contemporary period. This could perhaps
have been due to the fact that a large portion of the population was illiterate, so religious institutions often resorted
to images to communicate their beliefs. Caroline Walker Bynum’s Christian Materiality paints a complicated
picture of how material objects (and by extension, visuals) were understood during this period. Despite this, were
images generally considered secondary to texts.
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points to the general rejection of religious images that took place during the Reformation,
resulting in images being more firmly settled in a subordinate position to text (234-5).
Following the Enlightenment, the framework for comprehending images began to change
rapidly. The development of photography and film demanded new theories, while the Internet
and digital media have further complicated the proverbial picture. Rhetorical scholars have paid
more attention to images and how they interact with texts over the past two centuries, with the
field of visual rhetoric in particular expanding rapidly in the last fifty years. Since the
Enlightenment, there have been four general approaches to theorizing images and their
relationship to texts, each with its own strengths and drawbacks.
The first approach is to draw a distinct line between images and text by way of the arts of
poetry and painting. Clemena Antonova traces this distinction in the first chapter of Space, Time,
and Presence in the Icon, claiming that it is most clearly expressed in Lessing's 1766 Laocoon
(6). Lessing theorized that poetry is a time-based art because the text is experienced over time,
while painting is experienced spatially. Antonova notes that W.J.T. Mitchell and Ernst Gombrich
have both drawn on the time-space difference to explore the nature of texts and images,
generalizing from their respective art forms (poetry vs. prose) to the media through which they
are comprehended (text vs. images). Gombrich, in particular, has used this distinction to note the
differences between texts and images (5-8). In the twentieth century, however, the space-time
distinction was challenged by theorists like Etienne Sourien, John Dryden, and Lewis Andrews,
who pointed out that experiencing art also requires time (Antonova 8-10).8 While helpful, the
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Antonova notes that within the arts approach, a separate tradition dating back to Horace argues the opposite
perspective. This second strand asserts that artistic aesthetic unites the various forms of art, rendering their
differences irrelevant (7-8).
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space-time distinction has not proven definitive for theorizing images because the objections of
Sourien, Dryden, and Andrews are convincing.
A second approach to theorizing images uses text-based rhetorical terms. Roland
Barthes’s attempt to apply structuralist principles to images in Image-Music-Text is one example.
Barthes asserts that images have a denotative meaning, found in what they represent, as well as a
connotative meaning, found in their cultural associations. But he also identified a third meaning,
called the “obtuse meaning” (54), which he couldn’t quite quantify or fully explain. The obtuse
meaning is something beyond the denotative and connotative senses of an image, “a signifier
without a signified” (61). This third meaning “is outside (articulated) language while
nevertheless within interlocution. For if you look at the images I am discussing, you can see this
meaning, we can agree on it ‘over the shoulder or ‘on the back’ of articulated language” (61).
Yet Barthes is never able to do more than verbally gesture at this meaning. The language of
structuralism here fails him.9
Other attempts to theorize images using textual terms are evident in the Summer 1996
edition of the journal Argumentation and Advocacy. This edition debated the effectiveness of
using the terms of classical Ciceronian argumentation to describe images. David Fleming’s “Can
Pictures be Arguments?” posits that images cannot argue in classical terms for two reasons: first,
they do not clearly make a claim and offer evidence; and second, they cannot be refuted. Fleming
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In This is Not a Pipe, Michele Foucault uses the nature of the relationship between texts and images to critique the
structuralist principles that Barthes draws on. Foucault references the paintings of Magritte to mount an attack on the
structuralist correlation between signified and signifier, showing that there is an infinite gulf between text (signifier)
and image (signified), one that cannot be bridged. Although we may attempt to bridge it, launching ideas across the
gulf, Foucault argues that the two sides are infinitely separated. Gilles Deleuze later critiques Foucault’s approach
using Foucault’s own work. In “The Visible and the Sayable,” Deleuze argues that Foucault’s explanation of
discourses made them visible to readers. In other words, once the discourses became sayable, they became visible.
In light of this, images – that which can be seen – are dependent on words. Deleuze nevertheless agrees with
Foucault's stance that images and text are inherently separate, for he asserts that images cannot be reduced to the
terms of text.
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holds that these two criteria are required for classical argumentation. David Birdsell and Leo
Groarke counter Fleming in their introduction to the volume, asserting that images considered in
context do make arguments (“Toward a Theory of Visual Argument”). J. Anthony Blair’s
contribution to the volume, “The Possibility and Actuality of Visual Argument” directly counters
Fleming's first criteria, declaring that images can make claims and offer evidence. Nonetheless,
Blair notes that claims made by images are not as clear as those made through text. A few years
later, the second part of Fleming's argument was addressed by Randall Lake and Barbara
Pickering in “Argumentation, the Visual, and the Possibility of Refutation.” Through an analysis
of anti-abortion and pro-choice videos, Lake and Pickering posit that images can be refuted
through substitution or reframing.10
By the time that Argumentation and Advocacy dedicated a second issue to visual rhetoric
in 2007, whether or not text-based rhetorical terms could apply to images was no longer the
focus of the discussion. The emphasis was instead on applying traditional rhetorical principles to
visual arguments across cultures and academic disciplines. The 2007 issue contained articles
from scholars like Melanie Joy McNaughton and Michelle G. Gibbons, and looks at the
mechanics and implications of visual arguments in a variety of contexts, ranging from prison
tattoos to brain scans. Between the 1996 and 2007 volumes, scholars had made progress in
establishing a vocabulary for explaining visual arguments, one which borrows from the language
of traditional text-based rhetoric; at the same time, as Blair points out, these terms were often not
fully adequate.
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Significantly, the arguments that Birdsell and Groarke and Lake and Pickering offer as examples are often
multimodal arguments, combining written and/or spoken texts with images.
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A third approach to theorizing images examines them on their own terms and not through
those of textual rhetoric. When the New London group produced their manifesto “A Pedagogy of
Multiliteracies: Designing Social Futures” in 1996, they posited that comprehending images
requires a different sort of literacy from comprehending texts, a literacy also different from that
needed for aural compositions. Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, two members of the New
London group, draw from the sociolinguist Michael Halliday to lay down some tenants of visual
literacy in Reading Images. They propose that text is read sequentially, while images are read
spatially, harkening back to the time-space distinction that Antonova traces (Kress and van
Leeuwen 1-20). Beyond this, Kress and van Leeuwen provide a “grammar” for comprehending
images in Western societies,11 including guidelines for interpreting the sort of information
encoded in an image and the viewer’s stance toward the subject of the image. For example,
information found in the upper left quadrant of an image is “given ideal” information, that found
in the lower left quadrant is “given real” information. Information located in the upper right is
“new ideal” information, while that in the lower right is “new real” information (179-93).
Molly Bang’s Picture This takes a similar position and uses the paradigm of illustrating
children’s books to offer grammar-like guidelines for understanding images. Rounded shapes are
more hospitable than prickly ones, Bang posits, and horizontal lines indicate stability (70, 42).
Vertical lines show power, while diagonal ones demonstrate motion (44-6). In contrast to the
approach that tries to explain images through text-based terms, the approach taken by Bang and
the New London Group offers a different challenge: it draws too much of a distinction between
the ways that texts and images create meaning, and it does not provide a clear space for overlap
between the two media.
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Kress and van Leeuwen’s work applies to Western societies that read texts left to right, top to bottom.
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The fourth and final way of theorizing images that I want to discuss is that of a
continuum. In recent years, a virtual litany of theorists have argued — contra Deleuze — that
images and texts cannot be completely separated. In Understanding Comics, Scott McCloud
posits that images and texts exist on a continuum, and that various styles of comics fall within
this continuum. Some comics rely more heavily on images, using pictures to drive their stories,
while others are more word-based (52-53). But regardless of where a particular comic falls on
the continuum, the interaction between the words and images is so complex in a comic that it is
nearly impossible to separate the rhetorical work of the two media. In the same vein, W.J.T.
Mitchell argues that images and text have an infinitely reciprocal relationship, and presents the
concept of the “imagetext,” a rhetorical construct that has the properties of both an image and a
text (9, 83). The illustrated manuscripts (or perhaps captioned images) of William Blake are
offered as an example (109-150). Kristie Fleckenstein presents a similar concept in her
“imageword,” which also captures the properties of texts and images (4). Fleckenstein notes that
because images and words operate reciprocally, it is necessary to teach composition from an
embodied perspective, allowing students to move fluidly between images and text at all stages of
the process (22-30). In the same vein, Anne Wysocki advocates for the inseparability of text and
image in “Impossibly Distinct,” using digital representations of art galleries to show that there is
no clear distinction between content/text and form/image. Wysocki’s “awaywithwords” launches
an attack on Kress and van Leeuwen’s assertion that text and image require separate literacies.
Images can be read sequentially, Wysocki demonstrates, and text requires spatial consideration.
(Is her title “a way with words” or “away with words”?) In problematizing Kess and van
Leeuwen's work, Wysocki sides with those who collapse the time-space distinction between the
arts (59-61). Maureen Goggin’s “Pens of Steel and Inks of Silk” concurs, presenting
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embroidered samplers as an inseparable nexus of text and image (87-110). This list of scholars
who argue for the conflation of texts and images is far from complete, but it is important to also
mention Jacques Ranciere, whose The Future of the Image posits the existence of the “sentenceimage” that combines the function of a sentence (linking actions conceptually) and that of an
image (giving presence to an idea). Taken together, these theorists argue that images and words
create rhetorical meaning using very similar strategies.
While the continuum approach does recognize the inherent rhetoricality and overlap of
texts and images, it fails to account for the disparate ways that the two media can behave when
combined in a multimodal argument. Although there is a great deal of overlap between the two
media, their contributions to a particular argument are often unequal. The continuum approach to
texts and images does not fully account for this difference, and so it cannot adequately explain
how text and image create meaning both individually and as a pair when they appear together in
an argument.
Each of the approaches that I mentioned above advances the fields of multimodal and
visual rhetoric, yet each also has its blind spots. I would like to propose another method of
considering multimodal arguments like those that incorporate texts and images, an approach that
provides perspective on some of these blind spots: Chaim Perelman and Lucie OlbrechtsTyteca’s theory of dissociation as laid out in The New Rhetoric. I argue that dissociation allows
us to see how images and texts both contribute to a multimodal visual argument. It accounts for
their overlap, yet it preserves the differences between the two media. A dissociative framework
shows how the media create meaning individually and as a pair, while calling attention to the
ways that the two media change each other. Dissociation allows rhetoricians to approach
multimodal arguments through a framework that is flexible enough to account for changing,
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context-dependent nature of text-image interactions. Much of the concept’s ability to do this
comes from its roots in Jewish rhetoric. For this reason, before discussing dissociation in detail, I
want to look more closely at how the Jewish intellectual tradition shaped the New Rhetoric
project’s approach to argumentation.

IV. The New Rhetoric: Justice and Jewish Thought
In 1958, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric (TNR)
introduced a ground-breaking approach to argumentation whose implications are still being
explored. The two authors began their scholarly collaboration following the Second World War,
which affected both authors. Perelman, a Belgian academic with doctorates in both philosophy
and law, was an adherent to logical positivism before the war began (Frank and Bolduc 144).
During the war, he was one of the leading members of the Comité de defense des juifs, and was
personally involved in rescuing many Belgian Jews from the Nazis (Frank and Bolduc 144,
Frank 313). These experiences led him to embrace his Jewish heritage more publically, and the
Jewish intellectual tradition, particularly Talmudic thought, became a strong influence on his
later work (Frank 312). By the mid 1940s, he was beginning to question the efficacy of logical
positivism (Frank and Bolduc 145), and by the time his collaboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca
began in 1948, he had abandoned logical positivism in search of a philosophy of justice that
elevated ethics and pluralism and precluded violence like that seen in the Holocaust (Frank 31314).12
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Justice and cultural Judaism were not only the guiding forces of Perelman’s intellectual program; they were also
the hallmarks of his life. Frank records that when the Perelmans were given the title of Baron in 1983, the family’s
coat of arms included the Star of David and the phrase “Tsedek Tsedek Tirdof” – “Justice justice you shall pursue.”
The same emblem and phrase are also found on Perelman’s gravestone (Frank 313).
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Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca came to the project from a different background. Frank and
Bolduc report that she first encountered Perelman while working with his wife in the Belgian
resistance during WWII; her efforts later earned her the designation as one of the “Righteous of
the Nations” (145-6). Olbrechts-Tyteca was married to an academic at the Free University of
Brussels, where Perelman was also employed, and she herself had the equivalent of a master’s
degree in the social sciences (146). She was not a published scholar or even a public figure on
the campus before their collaboration began, but became interested in working with Perelman
after having a discussion with him at a dinner party (147). In contrast to Perelman, much less is
known about Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s past and her ultimate fate. According to Frank and
Bolduc, she did not participate in the international academic circles where Perelman advocated
for the New Rhetoric project and further developed their ideas, yet her contribution to the project
was nonetheless significant (142).
In their analysis of the collaboration between Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Frank and
Bolduc conclude that Perelman, an established scholar long before meeting Olbrechts-Tyteca, set
the “agenda and framework” the New Rhetoric project (146). Olbrechts-Tyteca herself reported
that Perelman’s dissatisfaction with the logical positivism’s ability to account for the logic of
value judgements was the catalyst for their work (147). Warnick asserts that Olbrechts-Tyteca
served as an “analyst and conceptualizer” who brought broad literary knowledge to the project
(82), helping to shape its ultimate trajectory. It is Olbrechts-Tyteca who is largely responsible for
the great number of literary examples and references throughout The New Rhetoric (Frank and
Bolduc 146). She can also be credited with directing Perelman’s attention to the literary theorist
Jean Paulhan, whose Les Fleurs des Tarbes introduced the pair to ancient rhetoric, setting the
path for the New Rhetoric project (148). Olbrechts-Tyteca herself “developed an independent
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trajectory of thought within the larger constellation of the New Rhetoric Project,” publishing four
articles and a book on her own, most of which have not been translated into English (146). In
contrast, Perelman individually published over 150 articles and several books (144). Although
Perelman is responsible for the majority of the effort to publicize their work, the two
collaboratively produced seven articles and two books, the most important of which is arguably
The New Rhetoric.
The New Rhetoric project was motivated by Perelman’s desire to theorize a justice that
accounted for values, ethics, universals, and particulars, and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
began their work in ancient rhetoric (148). Rhetoric’s give-and-take became a site for working
out a universal approach to justice that was flexible enough to respond to individual situations.
As a result, the New Rhetoric project developed a contextualized approach to argumentation.
The project was also impacted significantly by Talmudic thought, an influence that David Frank
explores in great depth. Frank notes that Perelman had an established interest in Jewish
philosophy and the Talmud, for he referenced them in numerous works, including Justice;
Justice, Law, and Argument; The New Rhetoric and the Humanities; and “Judicial Ontology and
Sources of Law” (312). Perelman’s background in Talmudic thought supported the value of a
flexible and contextualized approach to argumentation, and it also contributed emphases on the
audience’s responsibility and the process of debate to the New Rhetoric project.
Just like the justice that Perelman sought, the Jewish intellectual tradition is shaped by
general principles but responds primarily to unique particulars. Frank notes that “Jewish reason
and logic oscillates between and among polarities, using argument and debate as vehicles of
decision making” (313). He cites the Talmudic story of Oven of Akhnai and the rabbinic
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interpretive rule of kal ve-chomer as two sources of guiding principles for audience
responsibility and debate in Jewish thought (314-20).
The Oven of Akhnai is a story found in the Babylonian Talmud of a rabbinical debate
over the ritual cleanliness of an oven (Frank 314). The story pits Rabbi Eliezer, who claims that
the oven is pure, against the rest of the rabbis in the council, who decree it impure. Rabbi Eliezer
calls forth numerous divine signs in support of his position: he asks heaven to uproot a carob
tree, and the tree is thrown a great distance; he requests that a stream’s flow be reversed, and it
is; he calls the walls of the building to crumble, and they do. The council of rabbis is unmoved.
Finally, Rabbi Eliezer requests more overt divine intervention, and a voice speaks from heaven
in his defense. Still unconvinced, Rabbi Josue declares on behalf of the council, “The Torah is
not in heaven.” He claims for the rabbinic council the right of interpretation, denying God the
right of intervention following the giving of the Torah on Mt. Siani (Frank 315-16).
Perelman drew on this story to emphasize the value of human negotiation and to preclude
ultimatums. Even the story’s surprising coda points to humanity’s responsibility to debate and
interpret, rather than to follow a set of divinely-delivered ultimatums. In the story, when God is
asked for a response to the events, God laughs, saying “My children have defeated me, my
children have defeated me” (Frank 316). Even the divine yields to the rhetorical imperative of
discussion. The story also points to the importance of audience and the will of the majority.
Despite the divine signs in Rabbi Eliezer’s favor, his position did not win out because it was not
the will of the majority. Theoretically, the majority of the council could have decided in the
opposite direction and been equally correct, regardless of God’s stance on the matter. These
same ideas of contextualization and the audience’s responsibility to interpret appear in the New
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Rhetoric project: decisions are placed in the hands of the people, and not made through
unassailable logical deduction.
Perelman also drew the idea of rhetoric as a process from the Jewish interpretive
principle of kal ve-chomer. Susan Handelman writes that kal ve-chomer is the primary
interpretive rule in the systems of Hillel and R. Ishmael, and the phrase may be translated as
“from the light in weight to the heavy” (Slayers 52). Unlike syllogisms, which are based on what
Handelman terms “is logic,” kal ve-chomer is based on the principle of how much more so (53,
italics original). Syllogisms work though the logic of classes: If A is B and B is C, then A is C.
The goal is to show that A belongs to a particular class (B) of which certain properties (C) are
true. Kal ve-chomer, on the other hand, works through juxtaposition. Handelman writes, “[T]he
minor is raised by juxtaposing it with the major” (53). She cites the biblical passage Deut. 31:27
as an example of the principle, when Moses says to the Israelites, “[F]or I know thy rebellion and
thy stiff neck; behold while I am yet alive with you this day, ye have been in rebellion against
me; and how much more after my death?” (52). The two situations — during Moses’s life and
after his death — are not considered of the same class, but related through a different logic. If
rebellion happens in the first, how much more so in the second?
It is important to note that the relationship underlying the elements juxtaposed is not
absolute. The second element does not take on the categorical properties of the first, but takes on
resemblance instead. Handelman clarifies:
[T]he important intermediary step is not to show that Y belongs to class X, but that Y is
like X (only more so), and therefore if X has Z, then Y has Z also, not that Y is X is Z.
The how much more so depends on perception of resemblance despite difference (not a
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collapse of difference) and leads not to statements of predication, where the copula is is,
but to inclusion without identity. (53-4, italics original)
Kal ve-chomer arrives at conclusions through association, thus preserving the differences in the
two elements while acknowledging similarity.
The influence of kal ve-chomer can be seen both implicitly and explicitly in the New
Rhetoric project. Rabbinic thought offers a process and not a product (Handelman 56); it
emphasizes a way of arriving at conclusions, rather than the conclusions themselves, just as kal
ve-chomer offers a principle and not a prescribed decision. Kal ve-chomer responds to the
particular and local, making it an ideal guideline for the type of justice Perelman was pursuing.
Many of these same values appear in the Ovens of Akhnai, but kal ve-chomer takes them further
by adding the preservation of difference. This reflects the New Rhetoric project’s preservation of
minority viewpoints in ethical rhetoric.
The New Rhetoric project again borrows from the structure of kal ve-chomer when it
organizes arguments not by their logical patterns, but through association and dissociation.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce two main types of arguments: arguments by liaison
and arguments by dissociation. Arguments by liaison connect ideas by forming links or
associations between them. Perelman subdivides this type into “quasi-logical arguments,
arguments which are based on the structure of reality, and arguments which establish this
structure” (RR 50). Dissociation, on the other hand, is a type of argument that involves breaking
the links between related ideas by changing the ways that the ideas are associated with each
other. Once these associations are changed, the ideas become uncoupled, creating possibilities
for new and different associations, and thus new and different ideas. Dissociation mirrors the
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principle of kal ve-chomer by placing ideas or values in juxtaposition and letting the audience
work out the consequences. As with Talmudic thought, it offers a process and not a product.
As I show in the next section, the concept of dissociation brings together some of the
important values of the New Rhetoric project, many of which I have demonstrated have roots in
Jewish rhetorical traditions. These values include the audience’s responsibility to debate and
arrive at conclusions, the idea that rhetoric is a process and not a set of principles, the
preservation of lesser-valued viewpoints and concepts, and the contextualized nature of
rhetorical conclusions. It is these properties that make dissociation a valuable tool for
understanding multimodal relationships. In multimodal relationships, different media are brought
together into one argument, but they do not lose their individual properties. When texts and
images are combined in multimodal visual arguments, they are not collapsed into one medium;
instead, they make meaning both individually and in combination. They are changed by the
process of their interaction. Dissociation can thus help rhetoricians take a closer look at
multimodal relationships.

V. Dissociation and Multimodal Visual Arguments
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce the argumentative concept of dissociation in
The New Rhetoric in 1958, and Perelman followed up their tome with the more concise The
Realm of Rhetoric (RR) in 1982, where he further elaborated the theory. Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca
advanced the discussion of dissociation in her 1979 article “Les Couples Philosophiques.” She
questioned why so little attention had been paid to the concept in the twenty years since it had
been introduced, for she considered it the most original part of The New Rhetoric (81). I have to
wonder along with her. In the last thirty years, more scholars have taken note of dissociation,
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many focusing on its usefulness for understanding how definitions are formed and changed.13
More recently, Janice W. Fernheimer has looked at the inventional possibilities when the
dissociative process breaks down.14 Nevertheless, the full potential of dissociation’s theoretical
contribution remains to be seen, partially because it has never been considered beyond text-based
rhetoric. As I have said, the concept has much to offer to multimodal and visual rhetoric.
Dissociation is, to begin with, a concept that visually represents a rhetorical process.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca characterize the relationship between two dissociating concepts
using the form of a ratio, which they name a “couple philosophique,” or a philosophical pair:
Term I
Term II
In The Realm of Rhetoric, Perelman writes that term II, the base term of the philosophical pair, is
“normative” in comparison to term I: “Term II provides a criterion, a norm which allows us to
distinguish those aspects of term I which are of value from those which are not” (RR 127). Term
II is also considered the more stable of the two terms; it does not change, but serves as the
constant against which term I is judged and refined.
There is an inherent valuation in the way the terms are laid out in a philosophical pair:
“Terms II of the philosophical couples will normally, if possible, be related to that which has
positive value…while terms I will be related to that which has negative value” (TNR 422).

See Zarefsky, Miller-Tutzauer, and Tutzauer, “Reagan’s Safety Net for the Truly Needy: The Rhetorical Uses of
Definition;” Schiappa, “Dissociation in the Arguments of Rhetorical Theory;” Olson, “The Role of Dissociation in
Redeeming Knowledge Claims: Nineteenth-Century Shakers’ Epistemological Resistance to Decline;” Grootendorst
“Innocence by Dissociation: A Pragma-dialectic Analysis of the Fallacy of Incorrect Dissociation in the Vatican
Document ‘We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah;’” Crosswhite’s “Rhetoric in the Wilderness: The Deep
Rhetoric of the Late 20th Century;” and M.A. van Rees, “Indicators of Dissociation.”
13

See Fernheimer’s "Black Jewish Identity Conflict: A Divided Universal Audience and the Impact of Dissociative
Disruption."
14
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Because term II is the more ideologically valued concept in the pair, it follows that term II is the
criterion for judging the relative merit of the less valued term, term I.
Nevertheless, term I plays an important role in the dissociation process. In “Les Couples
Philosophiques,” Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca explains why the terms were assigned their respective
numbers: “Pourquoi <<terme I>> alors que c’est celui qui sera subordonné à l’autre? Parce que
c’est lui qui est au point de depart de l’entreprise. C’est lui qui était connu en premier lieu”
(82).15 Term I may be the dependent term, but it is the one that we are first aware of and the one
from which the dissociative pair begins. Term II is the underlying principle or value that impacts
the way we view the first term, although we are often unaware of a difference between the terms
until an incompatibility appears.
Drawing on a Western philosophical framework, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca use the
philosophical pair
appearance
reality
as a prototype for these ratios (TNR 416). Reality, as term II, is the norm against which some
schools of Western philosophy compare appearance, or term I. The relative values assigned to
terms I and II also apply to this philosophical pair, for within this framework, we value reality
more highly than appearance.16 Further, Olbrechts-Tyteca’s observation that term I is the
originating term also holds: generally, we are more aware of the appearances around us than of
our concept of reality. In fact, we are often not aware of the distinction between appearance and

I want to thank Michelle Bolduc for letting me look at her unpublished translation of “Les Couples
Philosophiques.” It was incredibly helpful for understanding Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work on dissociation.
15
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Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca acknowledge that the relationship between appearance and reality is not as
simplistic as the philosophical pair makes it out to be. They nevertheless use this pair as an example of what a
philosophical pair could look like. For a more extended discussion of the relationship, see chapters 90 and 91 of
TNR.
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reality until we are faced with an appearance that is not consistent with our concept of reality. Up
to that point, appearances and reality seem to be united. When an incompatibility between the
two arises, however, appearances that do not conform to our concept of reality are labeled
erroneous through the process of dissociation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write that “the
effect of determining reality is to dissociate those appearances that are deceptive from those that
correspond to reality” (TNR 416). Dissociation is thus the process of changing and winnowing
out term I — deciding which appearances are true and which are not — so that the value of term
II is maintained.
Olbrechts-Tyteca also notes that terms I and II can have various types of relationships
within the dissociative framework (83-5). Term I might be related to term II through the structure
of the real. Further, term I could be a particularization of term II, a relativization of term II, a
fragment of term II, or the “banalisation” of term II. Term I can also be the alteration of term II,
the expression of term II, or even the representation of term II (83-5). The appearance/reality pair
discussed above is an example of terms that are related through the structure of the real, akin to
the examples of accident/essence, and consequence/cause that Olbrechts-Tyteca lists under this
same relationship type (83). She asserts that the various types of relationships are like rhetorical
commonplaces (89), and that “le number de couples possible est sans limite assignable” within
the particular types (92).
The freedom of play between the two terms in a dissociative relationship supports the
type of justice that Perelman sought to realize in the New Rhetoric project. Handelman notes that
dissociative pairs counteract irrefutable binaries and absolutism because they create a
relationship of negotiation between the terms. These terms “undercut[] any claims to the
possession of unquestionable, unarguable truth independent of the varying social and historical
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situations of human life” (Fragments 246). Instead, dissociation places two unequally valued
concepts in a transformative relationship. There are no predetermined outcomes for the ways that
term I will be altered; instead, the term is changed through a process that is rooted in the
audience’s understanding of both term I and term II. The dissociative relationship is a
contextualized process, much as Perelman believed justice should be.
As I have already noted, when Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca drafted The New Rhetoric
and first introduced the idea of dissociation in the 1950s, they focused primarily on text-based
arguments: “Our treatise will consider only the discursive means of obtaining the adherence of
minds,” they state in the introduction (8). Their exclusion of arguments involving other media
may have been rooted in their individual text-focused academic training (Perelman as a
philosopher and Olbrechts-Tyteca in the humanities), or as a way of making the project more
manageable. Since their work was published, however, much has changed, and as I mentioned
above, rhetoricians are now seeking frameworks for understanding multimodal and visual
arguments.
Despite this shift, very few scholars have attempted to apply The New Rhetoric’s
principles to images. Certainly, there are exceptions: Robert N. St. Clair proposed that Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s approach to argumentation gives the visual metaphors found in oral
cultures the same knowledge-expressing capabilities as written rhetorical strategies (85). In
2004, Charles Hill was perhaps the first to suggest using Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s
concept of presence to examine the ways that images call attention to particular bits of
information (27-30). More recently, Alan G. Gross followed Hill’s lead and used presence to
explain the visual argument in Darwin’s treatise Structure and Distribution of Coral Reefs.
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Despite the success of these theorists’ work, most multimodal and visual rhetoricians have
sought their theoretical frameworks elsewhere.
I propose that dissociation's philosophical pairs are a useful tool for understanding how
texts and images work together in multimodal arguments. If text and image are placed together in
a dissociative pair, as
text or image
image
text
the two concepts are held together in one entity, just as they often appear together in multimodal
arguments. Similarities between the two terms are preserved, while their differences are
highlighted. The valuative properties of dissociative pairs are also helpful for indicating the
unequal contributions that texts and images may make to multimodal arguments. In some cases,
the weight of an argument may rest on the text, while in others, the image may carry the
communicative burden. The difference in value does not erase the differences between the
media, but instead offers insight into the structure of the multimodal argument. In some cases,
the text and image in a multimodal argument are dissociatively related by one of the types of
philosophical pairs that Olbrechts-Tyteca's article lays out, with one term acting as an expression
or realization of the other. Not every instance of a multimodal argument clearly fits one of these
categories, but when the categories apply, we gain additional understanding of the relationship
between the two media. I examine the properties of this relationship in more depth in the various
case studies of the subsequent chapters.
As Western society moves through Mitchell’s pictorial turn, opening up to the
communicative potential of images and other types of media, it is important that scholars have a
framework for understanding how multimodal arguments work. The Cappella Palatina apse
mosaic demonstrates the need for flexible approaches to multimodal argumentation. In rhetorical
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approaches that privilege text, the mosaic is simply a captioned picture. A dissociative
framework, on the other hand, allows viewers to consider the mosaic’s broader communicative
potential.

VI. Chapter Overviews
The second chapter examines a series of ads for Levy's rye bread from the late 1950s and
early 1960s to demonstrate the implications for a multimodal visual argument where text is
preferred. Through the combination of a slogan and a picture, the Levy's ads present a
dissociative argument that draws on conceptions of Jewish ethnicity to redefine the audience for
rye bread. Even more important, the ad relies on the dissociative relationship between the picture
(image) and the slogan (text) to make its argument. Because text is more highly valued in the
scheme of the argument, the image follows the logic of a text-based argument, neatly filling in
the enthymeme. In this case, the image and text also fall within Olbrechts-Tyteca's categories for
dissociative pairs. This chapter suggests that when multimodal arguments are considered in
dissociative terms, the element that is preferred can set the framework for understanding how the
argument will operate.
The third chapter of this dissertation takes up the poetry of the medieval bureaucrat
Thomas Hoccleve to complicate ways that images and texts interact in multimodal visual
arguments. Although not all poetry makes an overt argument, some of Hoccleve’s works attempt
to gain the adherence of the reader’s mind through combining texts and images. The poet
employs manuscript illuminations to increase his poetic ethos, using the images as part of a
dissociative image/text pair. Hoccleve also questions the nature of the relationship between texts
and images by probing the possibilities and limitations of mental imagery. Drawing on the
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language and ideas of medieval mnemotechnic memory, the poet struggles with the relative
importance of text and image, and he locates the mind as the site of overlap between the two
media. Hoccleve’s poetry shows us that when a text-based argument evokes a mental image, the
image can become a powerful part of the argument. The result is an image/text dissociative pair,
where the image’s persuasive power is limited by the framework of the text.
The fourth chapter uses Byzantine icons to explore the influence a preferred medium has
within a dissociative multimodal argument. Although Byzantine icons contain few words, their
meaning is defined by text-based theological debates. Icons are thus multimodal arguments, even
if the role of the texts is not always overt. Depending on their context, however, the image and
texts can change their relationship: sometimes Byzantine icons are image/text pairs and other
times they are text/image pairs. In this chapter, I draw on Danielle de Voss and James Ridolfo's
concept of rhetorical velocity to show how the preferred medium limits an icon’s circulation and
reproduction in material and digital spaces. I also use Roxanne Mountford’s concept of rhetorical
space to examine how an icon’s context determines which medium is given preference.
I conclude by proposing how dissociation can be incorporated into the multimodal
classroom. The resulting dissociative multimodal pedagogy can be used to create and analyze
arguments combining more than one medium, helping students focus on the relationships
between the media. I also offer suggestions for exercises to teach students how those
relationships shape multimodal arguments. Finally, I consider the limitations of dissociation as
well as opportunities for further exploring how the concept will help us better understand
multimodality.
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VII. Looking Ahead
The Pantocrator mosaic in the Sicilian chapel can be considered alongside a 1950s
advertisement for rye bread and medieval poetry because of the collaboration between images
and text. While these multimodal visual arguments have different purposes, each offers a
glimpse of what a dissociative framework might have to offer to multimodal rhetoric. Even
more, a dissociative framework encourages scholars both in rhetoric and other disciplines to
reconsider the ways that they both view and interpret images. Rhetoric scholars might consider
how a bias toward text or image influences both the composition and delivery of an argument,
while composition scholars could use the dissociative framework to better understand students’
brainstorming and composition practices. In particular, the dissociative framework would help to
explain the ways students’ multimodal compositions draw on texts and images to make
meaning.17 Beyond this, art historians could reflect on how a bias towards text might influence
the interpretation and theorization of art. Communication scholars might begin to explore how an
audience’s bias toward either text or image would change the way a message is perceived, and
how this bias might affect data collection practices. Historians might question how this bias has
impacted the ways past events are recorded. The dissociative framework is also useful for those
outside the academy, particularly professionals working in advertising and communications.
Advertisers and brand managers could draw on a dissociative framework to understand how their
ads and logos utilize texts and images to convey a brand’s identity, as well as how those ads and
logos might be received by the intended audience. Communications workers and PR managers
could draw on the framework to make their messages more clear. This is just the beginning of

17

Kalantzis and Cope touch on this in Literacies, but there is still much work to be done. Literacies focuses on the
multiple media involved in composition practices of elementary-aged students. They do not, however, look at how
these media influence each other. I discu’ss this in more detail in the conclusion.
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some of the possible ways that the dissociative framework might be useful both within and
outside of the academy for understanding multimodal relationships.
Scholars have barely begun to scratch the surface of what dissociation can do, and they
have much to learn about multimodal and visual rhetoric. Exciting insights can come from the
overlap of Perelmanian studies with multimodal rhetoric.

Copyright © Amy Anderson 2014
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Chapter Two
Dissociation and Levy’s Real Jewish Bread: A Rye Analysis

VII.

Introduction

During the late 1950’s, a small Jewish bakery in New York aspired to sell more rye
bread. Levy’s Bakery approached the Madison Avenue advertising firm Doyle Dane Bernbach
(DDB), beginning a lucrative partnership that lasted over twenty years and yielded the iconic
“You don’t have to be Jewish” ad campaign (Fishburn 47). As a result of this campaign, Levy’s
quickly became the top seller of rye in the entire state of New York, and DDB solidified their
reputation as a top advertising agency (Fishburn 47).
DDB’s approach to selling Levy’s bread was straightforward: the campaign consisted of
a series of subway posters featuring people of various ethnic phenotypes eating deli sandwiches
on rye bread from none other than Levy’s bakery. The images are literally sandwiched by the
tagline “You don’t have to be Jewish…to love Levy’s real Jewish rye,” as illustrated in the ads
below. The earliest ads featured a Black child, a Native American man, and a Chinese man (Fig.

Figure 2.1. The earliest ads in DDB's "You Don't Have to Be Jewish" campaign
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2.1), but later ads branched out to represent other groups, such as Italians. The ads quickly
entered the modern pop culture canon, and some of the original “You don’t have to be Jewish”
posters currently reside in the Smithsonian’s permanent collection (“Posters”). Today, parodies
of the ads continually surface, marketing everything from a Heeb magazine subscription to
Offlining Inc’s 2010 No-Device Day.
DDB’s campaign is rhetorically masterful, as evidenced by its success and longevity.
Indeed, the combination of words and images in these ads was so persuasive that it transformed
Levy’s from a niche bakery into the rye breadbasket of New York. The campaign is thus an ideal
case study of a successful multimodal argument incorporating images and texts
In this chapter, I begin by examining the dissociative logic in the Levy’s advertisements,
and then consider what the relationship between the ads’ text and images reveals about visual
argumentation and the properties of multimodal visual arguments. I argue that the preferred
medium in a dissociative multimodal argument becomes the framework through which the other
medium is interpreted. Next, I consider the role that stereotype images play in the ads, as well as
the possibilities and limitations of visual enthymemes in multimodal visual arguments. I will
finally turn to the implications of the use of Jewish stereotypes in the Levy’s ads, considering the
possibilities that are opened up when the dissociative process is disrupted in a multimodal visual
argument.

II. Looking at Levy’s: The Dissociative Logic of the Levy’s Ads
Doyle Dane Bernbach created the Levy’s ads to address a purely economic problem: not
enough people were buying Levy’s rye bread. But before the agency could increase sales, the
ad’s creators had to first deal with what might be considered an ethnic problem: Levy’s was
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known as Jewish bread.18 Public perception of the brand in the 1950s was such that if you were
Jewish, you loved Levy’s, or at least knew about the bread. Beyond the Jewish community,
however, the bread had limited appeal.
DDB had two options to increase the sales of the bread: they could either expand the
current Jewish market to create a larger pool of potential customers, or they could redefine the
market. The agency chose the latter. DDB’s advertisements attempted to sell more bread by
altering viewers’ idea of the sort of person who buys rye bread. They did so by using dissociative
logic to redefine the concept of Levy’s customers.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca dedicate chapter 95 of The New Rhetoric to examining
ways that dissociative logic can be used to establish or change definitions (444-50). As an
example, they point to Adam Smith, who proposed a new definition of commodities by
“rejecting existing criteria by which the value of commodities was ‘commonly estimated’ as
unreliable” and proposed instead that “[l]abour… is the real measure of the exchange value of all
commodities’” (445). Smith changed the value criteria, or the concept that would be placed in
term II if the definition of commodities is determined by a philosophical pair. In a dissociative
philosophical pair, term II “provides a criterion, a norm which allows us to distinguish those
aspects of term I which are of value from those which are not” (RR 127). Term II serves as the
constant against which term I is judged, and it is the framework through which term I is
understood. If term II is the value through which a definition of term I is understood, then
changing term II alters the definition of term I. When Smith changed the criteria by which

I am consciously using the term “ethnic” here. There has long been deliberation over whether Jewishness should
be categorized as a race or a religion. The Levy’s ads purposefully avoided entering into this debate, as I will discuss
later in the essay. “Ethnic” is a more neutral term that also avoids the race/religion dichotomy, and so is useful for
discussing the ads.
18
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commodities were valued, the definition of a commodity was thus also changed. The advertising
team at DDB’s used a similar type of dissociative logic to redefine Levy’s customers.
The following philosophical pair could be used to represent the pre-campaign definition
of a Levy’s customer:
Levy’s rye bread lovers
Jews
Because the basis for the bread’s market was the Jewish ethnic group, “Jews” is the more valued
term in this pair. It therefore earns the position of term II. “Levy’s rye bread lovers” sits in the
more tenuous position of term I because the Levy’s lovers are a subset of the larger group. The
relationship would therefore fall into Olbrechts-Tyteca’s category of fragmentaire, listed in “Les
Couples Philosophiques” (84), with term I being a fragment of term II. The ad agency might
have opted to re-envision the market by substituting “everyone” for “Jews” in term II of the
equation, thereby downplaying the brand’s Jewish connection. Instead, they decided to capitalize
on the association and take advantage of the growing multicultural awareness of the late 1950s
and early1960s.
Multicultural awareness was a lucrative choice. As Lawrence H. Fuchs writes in The
American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and Civic Culture, “The Levy’s ad aimed at selling
more rye bread by tapping into the growing multiethnic consciousness of Americans. An
invitation to cross boundaries was reckoned to enhance profits” (325). Advertisers at this time
were becoming increasingly aware of the power of ethnic images: some of the first studies
demonstrating a positive correlation between ethnic ads and sales in ethnic markets were
released in the early 1960s (Brumbaugh 972). Few firms, however, were actually using ethnic
images in their ads. DDB was an exception. One of the first accounts the firm took on was for El
Al Israel Airlines (“Omnicon” 396), and when the firm was establishing itself in the early 1950s,
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many of its initial customers were small Jewish-owned businesses (Willens 11). The decision to
include ethnic images in the Levy’s campaign pushed the advertising envelope slightly, but it
was in line with DDB’s creative trajectory and the cultural climate of the late 1950s.
Once DDB decided to capitalize on Levy’s Jewish connection, they challenged the
dissociative relationship between Jews and Levy’s bread lovers. Olbrechts-Tyteca notes that
inverting a pair is one means of combating it (94-5), and this is exactly what DDB did. The text
of the ad – “You don’t have to be Jewish to love Levy’s” – changes the relationship between the
two terms by flipping the philosophical pair that represents Levy’s customers. Levy’s lovers
becomes the broader, more inclusive term, while Jews become a subset of the Lovers – just one
of many groups who can enjoy the bread. Jews are thus term I, while Levy’s lovers move into the
space of term II:
Levy’s rye bread lovers
Jews

becomes

Jews
Levy’s rye bread lovers

This new pair also reflects a change in the value of the terms. From a marketing perspective, a
customer’s ability to spend is more important than his or her ethnicity, so Levy’s lovers logically
fits in the more valued position of term II. At the same time, Olbrechts-Tyteca’s relationship of
fragmentaire is maintained because the ad agency hoped to expand the customer base beyond
Jews. The type of dissociative relationship wasn’t changed; the pair was simply inverted.
Once the words do the work of flipping the terms in the philosophical pair, the image in
the ad steps in to complete the argument. As I mentioned earlier, the first series of ads from the
early 1960s contained phenotype images of a young Black19 boy, a Native American man, and a
Chinese man. These ethnic groups, the ads argue, can also enjoy Levy’s rye bread. When the
campaign ads are viewed together, it seems at first that these images simply allow viewers to

19

I am choosing to capitalize “Black” to emphasize the phenotype of the child in the ad.
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substitute other ethnicities for term I in the dissociative pair. In addition to Jews, Blacks, Native
Americans, and the Chinese can all enjoy Levy’s:
Jews , Blacks, Native American Indians & the Chinese
Levy’s rye bread lovers
In reality, however, the assumptions underpinning the ads are more problematic.
The images that DDB’s ads employed reflect the complicated nature of Jewish ethnicity.
In The Family Flamboyant: Race Politics, Queer Families, Jewish Lives, Marla Brettschneider
offers this critique of the campaign’s approach:
At the same time that the ad campaign appeared a tribute to the newly
celebrated diversity and ethnic boundary crossing characteristic of the 1960s-70s,
it simultaneously reinforced essentialist and static notions of those very same
identities … The ad campaign worked because it assumed consumers would see
the face of an African-American looking boy and presume that he was not Jewish.
(41).
While the campaign encouraged consumers to look (and buy) beyond stereotypically Jewish
bread, it relied on stereotyped phenotypes to make its argument. Brettschneider’s observation –
that viewers must infer the Black child can enjoys Levy’s even though he is not Jewish – is in
perfect accord with the ads’ slogan: “You don’t have to be Jewish to love Levy’s.” The logic fits
into a syllogism that would make Aristotle proud:
Non-Jews can love Levy’s.
The Black child is a non-Jew.
The Black child can (and does!) love Levy’s.
The same syllogism underpins the ads depicting the Native American and Chinese men. Native
Americans and the Chinese can also enjoy Levy’s even though they are not Jewish.
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We can set up these philosophical pairs for representing the ways that the ads represent
the ethnicity of Levy’s customers:
Black
Jew

Native American
Jew

Chinese
Jew

The juxtaposition between the terms reveals, however, that they are false pairs. The ads’
designers assumed that consumers would recognize that the dissociative relationships between
these pairs are not correct. The Black child is not an example of a Jew, just as the Native
American and Chinese men also are not Jewish. Viewers would then dissociate term I from term
II, recognizing that term I does not fit. In fact, the entire ad campaign hinges on viewers’ ability
to recognize that Jews are not Black, Native American, or Chinese, and to dissociate these ethnic
groups from Jews. The philosophical pair that DDB used to represent Levy’s customers now
becomes more complicated, and term I is replaced by a pair within the larger pair:20
Black, Native American, or Chinese
Jew
Levy’s rye bread lovers
Recognizing the dissociative logic behind these ads is important because it points to a
problematic ethnic essentialism that was prevalent in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In a 2001
interview with the New York Times, Howard Zieff, the photographer for the Levy’s ads,
discussed his approach to choosing the ads’ models. Zieff recalls the criteria for his search: “We
wanted normal-looking people, not blond, perfectly proportioned models” (Weinraub). He
instead selected models based on their ability to phenotypically represent various ethnicities.
Zieff was indeed working in the spirit of a growing multicultural awareness, but the
phenotypic characteristics of his models reveal an essentialized view of ethnicity. Brettschneider
observes that “all of the figures [in the ads] presupposed a multiplicity of individually fixed

20

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call this a “fan-type” dissociation (TNR 431).
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ethnic/racial groups” (41 italics original). The Black child had to be easily recognized as Black
so that he was not mistaken for a Jew; the Native American and Chinese men likewise had to be
easily identified as a Native American and Chinese to distinguish them from Jews. As a result,
the ethnic groups represented are reduced to a few dominant phenotypic characteristics. In these
ads, there is no room for diversity within ethnic groups.
The Black and Chinese models were even found in stereotypical locations: “The Chinese
guy worked in a restaurant near my Midtown Manhattan office. And the kid we found in
Harlem,” Zieff said (Weinraub). The Native American model, on the other hand, came from a
less stereotyped setting: Zieff recalled, “I saw the Indian on the street; he was an engineer for the
New York Central” (Weinraub). It is interesting to note that the ad with the Native American
required more staging to emphasize the model’s ethnicity. His hair is gathered in two pigtails,
and a head feather tops his hat. These visual cues highlight the fact that Zieff purposefully
designed the images to present essentialized stereotyped phenotypes that viewers could
immediately identify.
Even though Jews are not directly visually represented in the ads, they, too, are
phenotypically stereotyped by the campaign. Brettschneider points out that rye bread is Eastern
European, so the Levy’s brand was connected with “Euro/Ashkenazi Jew(s)” (40-1), the
predominant Jewish group in New York in the 1950s and 60s, which was often characterized by
dark hair and pale skin. DDB’s ads ignore the actual wide range of Jewish phenotype
characteristics and instead focus on an essentialized Euro/Ashkenazi (E/A) Jew who is
recognizably not Black, Native American, or Chinese. The philosophical pair that represents
Levy’s customers thus becomes:
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Black / Native American / Chinese
E/A Jew
Levy’s rye bread lovers
For viewers to follow the argument of the Levy’s ads, they must practice a double
dissociation. Not only must they dissociate Blacks, Native Americans, and the Chinese from
Euro/Ashkenazi Jews (represented by the pair taking the place of term I), but they must also
dissociate those results from the larger grop of Levy’s bread lovers (term II). When the ad
campaign is considered as a whole, viewers are left with the idea that Blacks, Native Americans,
and Chinese can love Levy’s even though they are not Ashkenazi Jews. In fact, the actual
ethnicities of the people in the images matter less than the fact that they are not Ashkenazi Jews.
The relationship between the terms in this top equation is now essentially
not-an-E/A-Jew
E/A Jew
As long as this dissociative relationship is maintained, viewers can substitute any ethnicity for
term I, and the message of the ad is unchanged. Indeed, later iterations of the ad simply swapped
in stereotyped phenotype images of models from other ethnic groups. The campaign as a whole
thus represents Levy’s customers as
not-an-E/A-Jew
E/A Jew
Levy’s rye bread lovers
Using this dissociative framework, the ads make a distinct Toulmin-style argument with a
claim and supporting data. The claim: You (the viewer) can love Levy’s bread. The support or
data: Everyone – even those who are not Jews – can love Levy’s bread. The warrant
underpinning the argument is that viewers can identify with the non-Jews enjoying the bread
because the viewers themselves are not Jews. After seeing the ads, DDB hoped that non-Jews
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who saw the ads would be prompted to stop by the nearest store and purchase a loaf of Levy’s
rye for themselves.

III. An Image/Text Argument
The Levy’s campaign offers insight into the relationship between texts and images in
multimodal visual arguments like advertisements, as well as into the ways that images do and do
not argue. These advertisements at first seems to be a unified whole, with text and image
blending into a seamless statement. A closer look reveals, however, that the two elements
contribute separate information.

Figure 2.2. The text of Levy's ads

The essence of the Levy’s ads’ argument is contained in the text (Fig. 2.2). Indeed, the
text does the majority of the work by making a claim about a particular product (Levy’s rye
bread) and a particular audience (non-Jews). The slogan “You don’t have to be Jewish to love
Levy’s” in and of itself redefines the bread’s target market. Standing alone, the text expresses the
bulk of the ad’s argument.
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Figure 2.3. An image from one
of the Levy's ads
In comparison, when the ads’ images stand alone, they simply show a series of people
enjoying sandwiches. Consider the image of the Black child (Fig. 2.3). The bread is still a
spatially significant feature of the image, but the specific characteristics of the bread – the
identity of the brand and the flavor – are altogether lost when the text is removed. By itself, the
image could take on any number of meanings. The picture could be a reminder for parents to be
sure their children eat lunch. It might demonstrate the benefits of feeding children healthful food.
It could be a reminder that growing, active children often need larger portions. It might also be a
promotional image for a church picnic, or even a depiction of an ornery younger brother. There
are numerous possibilities because the image does not make a clear argument apart from the
contextualization of the text.
Support for this uneven division of argumentative labor can be found in a March 2012
NPR interview with George Lois, one of the art directors at DDB shortly after the Levy’s
campaign was created. Although Lois was not personally involved in the development of these
ads, he remarked that the campaign was successful because it combined a strong tag line and
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interesting visuals. At the same time, Lois emphasizes the idea that words and visuals are not
created equal. He says, “When I talk...to young people I say that when you want to create
advertising, you should think in words first. They look at me stunned. They say, ‘No, no, you
create these powerful visual images. Why would you think of copy first?’ I say because a line, a
slogan, should be famous” (‘Damn Good’). Lois reasserts his preference for texts in his recent
book Damn Good Advice (For People with Talent!), claiming that a good tagline drives the
surrounding images (‘Damn Good’). His comments reveal that the creative culture at DDB
focused more heavily on the slogan of an ad than on its visuals, which explains why the text is
the more valued medium in the image/text arguments of the Levy’s campaign.
Lois’s claim about the secondary status of images is limited to the field of advertising,
but it points to larger questions about images in general: Can an image bear the weight of an
argument? And what role do images play in multimodal arguments involving text? The 1996
edition of Argumentation and Advocacy, which I mentioned in the first chapter, was dedicated to
exploring these very questions. The first article in the volume is David Fleming’s “Can Pictures
be Arguments?”, which sets out to prove that images cannot make arguments. Fleming points to
numerous theorists who require a linguistic basis for argumentation, including Toulmin, Rieke
and Janik; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger; Kneuper; Balthrop; and Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca (Fleming 12). Fleming does not adapt linguistic criteria, but he proposes that
argument, in its essence, “is an intentional human act in which support is offered on behalf of a
debatable belief. It is characterized first and foremost by reasonableness” (12).
Reasonableness, for Fleming, requires two criteria. First, it calls for a “two-part relation”
between the proof and the claim, whereby “one part (evidence, data, proof, support, reason, etc.)
support[s] the other (position, claim, assertion, conclusion, thesis, point, argument, proposition,
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etc)” (13). Second, reasonableness requires that an argument must be “contestable” (13). In other
words, it should be possible to negate the argument; an opposite perspective should exist.
What happens when images are subjected to these criteria? Fleming flatly states that they
are incapable of arguing (13). He asserts that it is impossible to distinguish between evidence and
claims in a picture, pointing to the gestalt nature of images to support his argument: “[A] picture
typically functions as a simultaneous whole rather than a sequence of bits. It lacks, in other
words, the internal linear arrangement that characterizes verbal discourse” (14). Because
“argument requires a structure in which conceptually-distinct ideas can be sequentially linked,”
an image is not capable of argument (14). Fleming also posits that it is not feasible for an image
to represent a contestable position: “The picture is only refutable if first translated into language”
(13). Pictures only offer a glimpse of what is, for “what the picture cannot do…is provide
viewers with access to its opposite” (17).
Fleming nevertheless does not entirely exclude images from the domain of
argumentation. He holds open the possibility that an image might play a role in a larger
argument, perhaps by providing evidence for a text-based claim, conceding that “the visual can
serve as support for a linguistic claim. This is not, it should be said, a minor role. In
photography, for example, the picture can still carry the brunt of the communicative function, but
its meaning is now argumentatively ‘anchored’ by a verbal caption” (19). In a conclusion that
hearkens back to Barthes’s observation about the need to verbally “fix the floating chain of
signifieds” (39), Fleming decides that images are too nebulous and open to interpretation to
make a clear statement without surrounding text (15). In other words, he believes that when texts
and images are joined in a multimodal argument, the relationship is dissociative and texts are the
preferred medium
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Fleming’s argument was successfully countered by David Birdsell, Leo Groarke, and J.
Anthony Blair’s contributions to the same issue of Argumentation and Advocacy, but it is worth
considering some of the strengths and weaknesses of Fleming’s points. Fleming’s definition of
argumentation is drawn from the definitions of the various other scholars that he cites —
Toulmin, Rieke and Janik; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger; Kneuper; Balthrop; and
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca — all scholars who deal primarily with text-based arguments.
Indeed, the field of argumentation in the 1990s was focused on linguistic arguments. The
standards that Fleming chooses are thus not general standards for the concept of argumentation,
but standards developed to describe text-based arguments. It is no wonder that images can not
argue under these standards.
At the same time, Fleming’s argument points to some interesting properties of images.
First, we see that images, like text, have a range of argumentative ability. Fleming is correct to
note that it can be difficult to locate a claim and support within an image without additional
context. The image of the Black child eating the sandwich offers no definitive argument on its
own, and additional context is required to evoke each of the interpretations that I proposed.
Fleming is right to posit that a claim and support are not inherent in all images, but the same
could be said of text. Not every phrase or sentence meets Fleming’s criteria for argument. ,
Birdsell and Groarke make this very point in “Toward a Theory of Visual Argument,” their
introduction to the volume containing Fleming’s article (2). Blair concurs in his refutation of
Fleming’s argument in the same volume, “The Possibility and Actuality of Visual Arguments.”
He notes that not all images make a clear statement: “[T]he great advantages of visual argument,
namely its power and its suggestiveness, are gained at the cost of a loss of clarity and precision”
(39). Blair reiterates the point in the later article “The Rhetoric of Visual Arguments” (46). The
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potential vagueness of images does not, however, disqualify them from argumentation. Blair
observes that while many visuals operate though persuasion, some examples of visual persuasion
are actually arguments with clear, contestable premises and conclusions (“Rhetoric” 42-3). He
cites the “Daisy” political advertisement from the 1964 presidential election as one example of a
visual argument (49-51).When taken together, the insights of Fleming, Birdsell, Groarke, and
Blair indicate that images, like words, can play a range of roles in argumentation.
The second property of images that Fleming’s critique points to is the importance of
context. Context complicates Fleming’s use of the gestalt nature of images as evidence for their
inability to argue. Fleming suggests that images are perceived as a whole. Depending on the
context surrounding the image of the Black child, however, different parts of that image can be
given more presence21 in different circumstances. The sandwich will nearly always play a role in
the message of the image due to its relative size, but the child’s apparel becomes more
significant if the image is used to advertise a church picnic. On the other hand, the child’s race
takes on presence in the Levy’s ads, while his clothes recede into the background.
The fact that different elements of the images can be emphasized and deemphasized
indicates that there is not one static, gestalt mode of image comprehension. Images again
function similarly to language in this sense. The sentence “That shirt is green” can be either a
neutral observation or an argumentative challenge (“No, it’s blue. You’re color blind!”),
depending on its larger context. So, too, can images take on different meanings in different
contexts.22

21

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain presence as the way a rhetor shows the audience which information is
relevant to his or her message: “By the very fact of selecting certain elements and presenting them to the audience,
their importance and pertinency to the discussion are implied. Indeed, such a choice endows these elements with a
presence” (TNR 116, italics original).
22
Fleming’s suggestion that images can not suggest their opposite is also challenged by the Levy’s ads. When
presence is given to the Black child’s phenotype, the opposite Jewish stereotype is evoked. The importance of the
images in the ads is that they can and do evoke their opposites without directly naming them. In this way, perhaps
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David Groarke and Leo Birdsell also object to Fleming’s position against visual
argumentation on the grounds of context. They suggest that images rely on context just as much
as text-based messages, and they propose that an image should be considered in light of three
aspects of context: “immediate visual context, immediate verbal context, and visual culture” (6).
The inclusion of verbal context is important because it acknowledges that images often occur
alongside text in multimodal arguments. Blair concurs, noting that “[a]lthough there can exist
purely visual arguments, most communications that are candidates for visual arguments are
combinations of the verbal and the visual. The words might be in print (as in cartoons), or voiced
(in the case of television or film)” (“Rhetoric” 49). Blair goes so far as to make no distinction
between purely visual arguments and arguments that involve visuals and text, calling both types
“visual arguments” (49).
The example images that Birdsell and Groarke use to support their contention that
pictures can argue are both part of multimodal arguments. The first is an anti-smoking poster
from the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the second is a 1926 editorial
cartoon from The Daily Worker, a Chicago socialist newspaper. Birdsell and Groarke are clear
that the relationship between the image and the text is different in the two examples, and indeed
it is. The fact that they only show images making arguments in concert with texts suggests that
the context provided by the words facilitates images’ ability to argue.
The main examples of visual argument offered by Blair’s article in the 1996 volume of
Argumentation and Advocacy are also primarily multimodal visual arguments. Blair adopts
O’Keefe’s definition of argument, requiring a claim and reasons in the argument, but only
necessitating that they be “linguistically explicable” (“Possibility” 25). The claim and reasons

they are contestable. Nevertheless, this property is only possible because of the larger context of the images. Once
again, Fleming’s challenge to images does not always bear out.
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need not be in the form of text in the original argument; they need simply to be potentially
expressible in words. Blair cites a forthcoming article by Groarke which analyzes the argument
in a painting by Jacques-Louis David, so he agrees with the possibility of a purely visual
argument (28-9). Nevertheless, the bulk of the article is Blair’s analysis of a Benetton magazine
advertisement, which utilizes both text and image (29-33). Blair asserts that the weight of the
ad’s message comes from the images, and he is correct. There is minimal text to clarify the
message. Blair also considers the possibility of visual arguments in television commercials and
political cartoons, both of which contain verbal elements. This brings me to the third important
property of images indicated by Fleming’s critique: images’ ability to argue can be augmented
when they are combined with texts in multimodal arguments.
Because this chapter looks at the series of Levy’s advertisements, it is worth noting that
Blair treats advertisements as a unique subcategory of multimodal visual arguments. He claims
that ads often operate in the psychological realm of persuasion instead of an overtly
argumentative plane, and that claims and reasons may be hidden to discourage viewers making
an active choice (“Possibility” 33). Blair notes,
[V]iewers transfer our identifications with the commercials to the brand or product. We
want this brand or product because we think of ourselves as like the person in the
commercial, doing the kinds of things done in the commercial. No reasoning occurs here
at all…So my view is that although TV commercials and other kinds of visual advertising
might seem to represent the epitome of visual argument, in reality they constitute a poor
case for their existence. (58-9)
I disagree. While many ads persuade, some actually do argue. The Levy’s posters present a
cogent argument that can be expressed Toulmin-style, with a claim, supporting data, and a
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warrant. The campaign even requires the viewer to actively participate in its logic, moving
between the text and the image. The text provides the main claim of the argument: even nonJews can love Levy’s bread. It sets up the framework for the argument, and the image steps in to
provide evidence of non-Jews enjoying the bread. In other words, the image fits into the logical
framework that has already been established by the text, filling in as an enthymeme: This child
enjoys Levy’s bread, so non-Jews (like the viewer) can enjoy Levy’s bread. What enables the
viewer to fill in the missing logical step (that the child is not Jewish) is the fact that the image is
a stereotype. Stereotypes play a critical role in the Levy’s ads, and their use points to some
further properties of image/text arguments. Before I turn to stereotypes in the next section, I want
to emphasize that the logic behind the Levy’s ads shows that images can and do take part in the
arguments, particularly when combined with texts.

IV. Stereotype Images: Rhetorical Commonplaces and Enthymemes
Stereotypes and the images that represent them are an effective tool in visual
argumentation. Blair notes that such pictures “affect their viewers in predictable ways,” as in the
case of “photographs of adults in different garb or uniform (physician, police officer, teenager)
[that] evoke standard responses according to stereotype” (“Possibility” 25). Because of this
predictable effect, stereotype images act as shortcuts to a predetermined set of information.
Nevertheless, they are clearly problematic.
Carol Nathanson-Moog discusses the complexities behind the use of advertising
stereotypes in a 1984 brochure connected to the Ethnic Images in Advertising exhibition, which
was co-sponsored by the Jewish Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, and included the
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Levy’s campaign. In her assessment of the Levy’s ads, Nathanson-Moog addresses the nuanced
role that visual stereotypes play in advertising:
[S]tereotyped images of ethnics dotting ads resonate with and reinforce
perceptions people have of each other’s ethnic identities. There is an
inherent dilemma here. While the enlightened position has always been to
abhor stereotyping as a caricatured representation of many by the qualities
of a few, to some degree advertising must present stereotypes in order for
specific market segments to be recognizable as distinct groups, even to
themselves. (19)
Advertisements, particularly print ads like the Levy’s posters, have a limited amount of space
and time in which to convey their message. The use of stereotypes condenses the argument,
allowing viewers to follow the ads’ logic more quickly.
In contexts like the Levy’s ads, stereotype images act as rhetorical commonplaces. They
are locations for numerous possible arguments, much as Aristotle’s common topics – degrees of
magnitude, relationships between entities, division, etc – serve as tools of rhetorical creation.
The interpretive range of such stereotype images is, however, limited by their context. Barbara
Warnick proposes that the differences in argument loci given by Aristotle and Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric Project demonstrate the context-dependent nature of
argumentation (108), and visual stereotypes are no exception. Warnick notes Aristotle’s
inclusion of the loci of tradition, which is absent from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work
(116-7). This is not surprising, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were working in the aftermath
of World War II and questioning how traditional logic could have led to the Holocaust.23 On the
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See Frank "A Traumatic Reading of Twentieth-Century Rhetorical Theory: The Belgian Holocaust, Malines,
Perelman, and de Man," "The New Rhetoric, Judaism, and Post-Enlightenment Thought: The Cultural Origins of
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other hand, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca include a locus for weights, measures, and
probabilities, which Warnick asserts is not explicitly a part of Aristotle’s scheme. The locus
indicates a post-Enlightenment respect for statistical and numerical evidence that was not as
pressing in Aristotle’s day. Like these commonplaces, stereotype images are context-based: their
degree of functionality depends on the audience (Does the viewer buy in to the concept of the
stereotype?), the context of the argument (Which aspects of the stereotype are invoked?), and the
kairos of the argument (What prevailing public opinions and/or recent historical events impact
the possible associations that a stereotype image offers access to?). When a rhetor uses a
stereotype, he or she evokes a universal audience24 that will understand that stereotype. As a
result, stereotype images can be both a useful and a tenuous part of a visual argument.
Because the interpretation of a stereotype image depends on the audience and the context,
these images are visual enthymemes. Numerous scholars have examined the properties of visual
enthymenes. M. J. Medhurst and M. A. DeSousa identify political cartoons as enthymemes, for
readers use their political knowledge to fill in unstated premises (cited in Fleming 11). Birdsell
and Groarke note that scholars have “accepted since Aristotle the influence of acculturation in
the production of verbal enthymemes. We are now arguing that the same allowances must be
made for visual commonplaces as well” (7). Cara Finnegan recognized the enthymematic
properties of images when she identified the “naturalistic enthymeme” through which
photographs are assumed to have a degree of authenticity (134). Finnegan asserts that “the

Perelmanian Philosophy," “The Jewish Countermodel: Talmudic Argumentation, the New Rhetoric Project, and the
Classical Tradition of Rhetoric," "Arguing with G-d, Talmudic Discourse, and the Jewish Countermodel:
Implications for the study of Argumentation.” See Handelman, "Facing the Other: Levinas, Perelman, Rosenzweig"
and Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in Benjamin, Schalem, and Levinas. See also
Fernheimer “Black Jewish Identity Conflict: A Divided Universal Audience and the Impact of Dissociative
Disruption.”
24

See TNR 30-35.
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enthymeme leaves space for the audience to insert its own knowledge and experience; it assumes
an audience of judges capable of ‘filling in the blanks’” (143). In 2004, Blair advocated for the
possibility of visual enthymemes, claiming, “Visual arguments are typically enthymemes—
arguments with gaps left to be filled in by the participation of the audience” (“Rhetoric” 52).
This places an argumentative burden on the argument’s creator, for “the arguer has to be able to
predict the nature of the audience’s participation. Given the vagueness of much visual imagery,
the visual arguer must be particularly astute in reading the audience” (52). As enthymemes,
stereotypes thus help viewers move more quickly through an argument, but they also involve the
audience in the creation of the argument.25
The stereotype images in the Levy’s ads are no different, for they require the audience to
help complete the enthymeme. The surrounding context lets the viewer know which elements of
the stereotype are important for the larger argument, and the viewer completes the argument.
When the viewer sees the Black child in the context of the Levy’s text, the potential information
that the image might convey is limited to that which is relevant to the text, namely Jewishness.
The child’s individual characteristics — such as age — become irrelevant, and all that matters to
the viewer is what the image has to say in relation to the criteria of Jewishness. In Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s terms, the text gives “presence” to the criteria of Jewishness, calling that
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When Argumentation and Advocacy returned to the topic of visual rhetoric in a 2007 double issue, Valerie J.
Smith’s “Aristotle’s Classical Enthymeme and the Visual Rhetoric of the Twentieth Century” explores the
implications of visual enthymemes. She begins by complicating the notion of the Aristotelian enthymeme, stating
that in contrast to popular use of the term (and, I might add, the manner in which previous proponents of visual
enthymemes have used the term), an enthymeme is more than a syllogism with a missing component (115-16). As
Aristotle envisioned the term, enthymemes were syllogisms that dealt with probabilities rather than certainties (116).
Smith identifies three salient features of the enthymeme which follow from Aristotle’s definition and make the
concept useful for visual argumentation. First, because enthymemes deal with probabilities, their premises and
conclusions are not definitive (116-17). Second, because enthymemes do not rely on air-tight logic, they embrace all
three modes of proof: ethos, pathos, and logos (117). Finally, enthymemes depend on the agreement of the audience.
If the audience does not agree to the probabilities, the enthymeme is not successful. As a result of these properties,
enthymemes are a useful frame for comprehending visual arguments. “Probabilistic visual enthymemes consisting of
probable premises and conclusions comport well with our everyday existence,” Smith writes (120).
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information to the fore. The picture is thus interpreted with Jewishness in mind, and the viewer
pushes aside other information that might be associated with stereotypes of Blacks. What is
important for the argument of the ad is the idea that Blacks are stereotypically not Jewish. When
the image of the Black child is viewed in the context of the ad’s slogan, the viewer fills in the
missing piece of the enthymeme.
Eric J. Mason has complicated the idea of the visual enthymeme by introducing the role
of emotion. Mason preferences the sophistic definition of an enthymeme as an event in which
viewers make a decision felt in the heart, as opposed to the Aristotelian definition of the term as
a type of logical pattern (1-5). He proposes that visual enthymemes are “images that work by
engaging the thumos, or emotional capacity, of the viewer” (5). Mason connects the emotional
approach with a rhetorical approach, and asserts that previous scholars who connected
enthymemes to visuals missed the emotional components of the term because the scholars were
from communication, philosophy, and speech departments (5). Mason’s approach to the
enthymeme undercuts Blair’s distinction between persuasion and argumentation because it
asserts that “individuals experience arguments as enthymemic events in which they are called to
produce and identify with a number of propositions both spoken and embodied in emotions and
images” (149). Viewers respond emotionally to these propositions, becoming a crucial part of the
meaning-making process. Mason concludes that the enthymeme is uniquely suited to accounting
for visual argumentation because it encompasses the range of ways that images evoke the
audience’s response to make meaning (137-38, 160-73).
Although Mason is clearly at odds with some of Blair’s points, he and Blair take a similar
position on the audience’s involvement in the enthymeme. Blair posits that visual enthymemes
“draw[] the viewer to participate in completing the construction of the argument and so in its
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own persuasion” (“Rhetoric” 59). Not only do the properties of the enthymeme draw the
audience into the meaning-making process, they also make the audience partially responsible for
its own persuasion. When visual enthymemes are used in advertising, the work that the audience
does to fill in the enthymeme is work toward recognizing and remembering the brand. As the
audience becomes actively engaged in the logic of the ad, they make an intellectual investment
that, marketers hope, will pay off in the purchase of the advertised product. In the case of the
Levy’s ads, DDB hoped that the audience’s engagement with the ads would lead to a positive
connection with the bread — a connection with logical and emotional dimensions that would
result in a bakery purchase.

V. The Cultural Work of the Levy’s Ads
While the enthymematic properties of stereotype images make them a useful tool in
visual arguments, there are certainly drawbacks. In the case of the Levy’s campaign, the
complicated nature of Jewish identity is sacrificed in favor of a highly suggestive image so that
the ads’ argument can flow more smoothly. Tracing out the ads’ argument and use of stereotype
images brings to light the irony behind the campaign: although at the outset, the campaign seems
to celebrate ethnic diversity and encourage ethnic boundary-crossing through the purchase of rye
bread, all ethnicities except for Euro/Ashkenazi Jews are essentialized out of the equation. They
are all defined in contrast to Euro/Ashkenazi Jews, and this group of Jews is itself essentialized
by the line “You don’t have to be Jewish…” to represent all Jews.
The importance of context has already been established, and the cultural context of the
campaign played heavily into the effectiveness of its argument. In The Price of Whiteness, Eric
Goldstein notes that “[t]hroughout the 1950s and during the first half of the 1960s, American
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Jews largely maintained the integrationist approach to self-definition and the policy of racial
liberalism that they had forged during the World War II era” (212). Many Jews at this time were
hesitant to identify themselves as a distinct racial group and preferred to integrate into white
society. It is interesting, then, that the Levy’s ads encourage viewers to identify themselves as
non-Jews, strengthening the line between Jews and everyone else.
The ads seemed to look forward to a cultural shift that began in the next few years.
Goldstein writes that in the “mid-1960s…the American Jewish approach to group identity and
racial politics began to change…[D]uring these years the drive for integration began to give way
to very different concerns, ones that stressed the need for greater Jewish distinctiveness in
American life” (212). The exact nature of this distinctiveness was shifting, relying solely on
neither race nor religion. When the Levy’s ads were created, Jews in New York were wary of
racial designations, yet moving towards a desire for some sort of group identity. The ads reflect
this transition and capture the group’s emerging ethnic character.

Figure 2.4. Later Levy's ads

The first three Levy’s ads, which showed the Black child, Chinese man, and Native American
man, were developed during the late 1950s and early 1960s and depict Jewishness as a racial
designation. As I mentioned above, the models are identified as non-Jews based primarily on

56

phenotype, a fact that leads the viewer to assume that Jews are also a racial group with a distinct
phenotype. The later ads in the Levy’s campaign complicate the designation. A poster from 1967
depicts an Italian woman surrounded by props that distinctly mark her as Italian, such as salami
and a red-and-white checkered table cloth (Fig. 5). Her phenotype alone is not sufficient to label
her as non-Jewish, which suggests that Jewishness goes beyond visual appearances and may be
tied to cultural culinary traditions. A later ad shows a young child in a white robe with a red bow,
the garb of a Catholic choir boy (Fig. 5). The child in this ad is marked religiously, which calls
on viewers to associate Jewishness with religion. These later ads work together to show that
Jewishness is more than a racial designation because it involves cultural and religious traditions.
When the campaign is taken as a whole, Jewishness emerges as a rather nebulous ethnic
construct.26
Nevertheless, Brettschneider believes that the ads were socially constructive because they
changed the way people saw Jewish culture. “The Levy’s ad suggested that non-Jews can
participate in and enjoy some of the more worthwhile contributions of the Jewish culture in the
United States…This meant that non-Jews were being invited into a Jewish world. It also meant
that Jewish things can be a part of life beyond the Jewish community,” she writes (40). The ad
campaign not only allowed viewers to see Levy’s rye as something those outside the Jewish
community could enjoy, but it also made the ethnicity more accessible by allowing consumers
access to a piece of “real” Judaism. Even though the ads reinforced the line between Jews and
non-Jews, they offered Levy’s bread as a vehicle for crossing the line.
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The ambiguous representation of Jews in these ads may also have been influenced by Bill Bernbach, the creative
director at DDB during the campaign, who had a reputation for being heavily involved in the firm’s conceptual
work. Willins writes that Bernbach was raised in an Orthodox Jewish family, but was ostracized because he married
outside the community. He did not publically practice Judaism, and only rarely identified himself as Jewish (Willins
17, 21-3). Bernbach’s ambiguous relationship to his own identity may have spilled over into the depiction of
Jewishness in the campaign that he helped to supervise.
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Brettschneider’s analysis agrees with that of Nathanson-Moog. In the same pamphlet
concerning the use of stereotypes in advertisements, Nathanson-Moog observes the following:
On the way to the bank, the Levy’s series did an extraordinary bit of
public relations work for Jewish ethnic identity. In the unconscious, the
psychological message of this ad translates as ‘You don’t have to be
Jewish to love Jews.’ Moreover, by using clearcut ethnic images of other
groups, such as the Native American … the negative stereotype of Jews as
an exclusive, clannish lot is blasted apart. At the same time, the product,
like the Jewish people themselves, insists on retaining its ethnic identity as
‘real.’ This ad models a process of ethnic identification which sells more
than bread; it sells a perception of openness and mutual respect for
differences. (21)
Rather than focusing on the problems with the essentializing stereotypes that the ads rely on,
Nathanson-Moog highlights the negative Jewish stereotypes that the ads break down. She sees
the possibilities that the dissociative process opens up.
It is not surprising that the dissociative logic and shifting nature of Jewish identity
presented in these ads created new ways for the public to perceive Jews. Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca note that dissociation is a transformative process with both destructive and
constructive properties: “The dissociation of notions brings about a more or less profound
change in the conceptual data that are used as the basis of argument. It is then no more a question
of breaking the links that join the independent elements, but of modifying the very structure of
these elements” (TNR 412). Concepts that undergo dissociation do not emerge unscathed, but are
fundamentally altered. What they once were is redefined, and something new takes their place.
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Dissociation opens possibilities for building future ideologies. Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca also note that “on the theoretical level, it [the dissociation of notions] leads to a solution
that will also be valid for the future, because, by remodeling our conception of reality, it prevents
the reappearance of the same incompatibility” (413). Dissociation is thus also productive, for it
constructs new future possibilities and offers an alternative to our past mistakes. In the words of
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, what Brettschneider and Nathanson-Moog notice is the ways
that the ads “remodel our conception of reality” (TNR 413).27 The ads’ reliance on the text to
convey the main message, coupled with the associative possibilities opened up by the stereotype
images, invites viewers to participate in the visual enthymeme. When viewers open themselves
up to the ads’ logic, they are also opened to the conceptual remodeling which dissociative logic
allows. Not only are the viewers likely to consider the possibility of purchasing rye bread, but
their negative stereotypes of Jews have been challenged, and they are also open to building new
perceptions of the group. Parodies of the Levy’s ads pick up on this dissociative potential and
use it to open further possibilities for Jewish identity.

VI. Levy’s Parodies and Dissociative Disruption
Over fifty years after the Levy’s campaign first appeared, parodies of the ads still crop
up. The majority of them are also linked to ethnic identity. One such parody can be found in the
2002 inaugural issue of Heeb magazine. Subtitled “The New Jew Review,” this hipster
publication takes on all aspects of urban Jewish life and includes articles ranging from an
interview with a porn star to an undercover look at Jews for Jesus. Interspersed throughout the
articles of the first issue were tongue-in-cheek ads for stereotypically Jewish products, such as

Granted, the ads’ commodification of Jewish identity is problematic. However, Brettschneider and NathansonMoog, believe that this issue is outweighed by the positive associations the ads created.
27
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Manischewitz kosher wine. In the midst of the publication was a full-page ad for Heeb itself
(Fig. 2.5). “You don’t have to be Jewish…to love Heeb,” the ad reads. In the center is a picture
of a middle-aged man of vaguely African American or Middle Eastern ethnicity. He wears a
button up shirt, a vest, and a cap cocked to one side; and he is reading an issue of Heeb.
Brettschneider calls attention to the man’s ambiguous phenotype: he could be Black, Middle
Eastern, or of mixed descent. He could be Jewish or he could not. His clothes slightly resemble
those of a stereotypical Jewish shopkeeper, but he has no other visual markers of a Jew

Figure 2.5. Heeb advertisement
Brettschneider 41-2). The ambiguity is not lost on the ad’s audience: Heeb is targeted to modern,
young adult Jews who know that their ethnicity cannot be represented by a single phenotype.
This parody ad represents those who enjoy Heeb through the following philosophical pair:
Ethnically ambiguous male
Jew
Heeb readers
.

Admittedly, when I first saw the ad, I was confused. This is probably because I was
unable to complete the dissociation required by the top philosophical pair (ethnically ambiguous
male/Jew) before I could dissociate that result from term II (Heeb reader). I didn’t know where
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the man fit in relation to stereotypical concepts of Jewishness. Is he supposed to be an example
of a modern Jew? The ad’s copy would suggest no, but there is something faintly Jewish about
his appearance. This ambiguity disrupts the ad’s dissociative process. I was unable to fill in the
logical step required by the visual enthymeme, so the dissociation process failed. This does not,
however, mean that the ad’s argument failed. In fact, Janice W. Fernheimer’s concept of
“dissociative disruption” is yet another avenue of meaning-making using philosophical pairs (6372).
In “Black Jewish Identity Conflict: A Divided Universal Audience and the Impact of
Dissociative Disruption,” Fernheimer notes that dissociative disruption is rooted in The New
Rhetoric’s notion of the universal audience, an theoretical audience constructed by a rhetor that
shares certain assumed beliefs. When the audience in reality does not share the beliefs of the
universal audience, space is opened up for dissociative disruption (64). Fernheimer writes that
“some conceptions of the universal audience carry more weight because they embody hegemonic
values that are privileged and accepted by a dominant group; therefore other groups’ alternative
understandings or interpretations by default are less likely to be accepted” (64). When the values
of an actual audience differ from the dominant values of the rhetor’s presumed universal
audience, the actual audience’s interpretations of the rhetor’s message may differ from the
rhetor’s intentions. The creators of the Heeb ad assumed that it would be viewed by a primary
audience of hip young Jews who are aware of the multicultural side of Judaism. Because I fall
outside that target audience, I failed to interpret the ad as they intended and the visual
enthymeme was left incomplete. Yet by leaving open the possibility of dissociative disruption,
the ads’ creators accounted for audiences like me as well.
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Fernheimer notes that the space opened up by dissociative disruption permits alternative
readings: “Dissociative disruption allows for new concepts or revised understandings of already
accepted concepts to enter the discursive imagination” (68-9). At times, as in the example of
Israeli Black Jewish identity that Fernheimer presents, these alternative readings can be
productive because they open up new interpretations of national citizenship and Jewish identity
through the new concepts that they introduce. In the case of the Heeb ad, dissociative disruption
forces a reconsideration of Jewish identity. Being faced with the phenotypically ambiguous man
made me broaden my conception of what it means to be Jewish so that I could attempt to finish
the visual enthymeme. The man in the image could be a non-Jew, but then again, he could also
be a Jew because Jews can be from all ethnic groups, or so the ad argues. The complicated
dissociation process created by the Levy’s ads and their parodies are particularly prone to
disruption, and this is ideal for the hip Jewish identity recreation that Heeb engages in.
When DDB ran the Levy’s ads nearly fifty years ago, their intent was to sell bread, but
they accomplished something much more powerful. The ad paradigm created by the campaign
reflected the shift that Jewish identity was undergoing in the early 1960s. Although they relied
on a problematic essentialism, DDB’s posters allowed both Jews and non-Jews to see Jewishness
in a new light. The ads’ clever use of dissociation makes it an ideal forum for Jewish identity
politics, so the ads and their parodies can accomplish much more than selling bakery goods.
Perhaps this is the reason for the popularity of parodies of the Levy’s campaign: the ads’ format
allows the parodies to use humor to comment on or critique phenotypic stereotypes. At the same
time, examining the structure of the argument behind the ads points to the complexities of visual
— and by extension, multimodal — argumentation.

62

VII. Drawing Conclusions about Visual Arguments
In conclusion, there are many reasons for tracing the roles that text and image
respectively play in image/text arguments like the Levy’s advertisements. The dissociative logic
in these ads works on the same theoretical model as the logic behind the image-text interactions
in multimodal arguments. More generally, however, this analysis of the Levy’s ads points us to
several principles for understanding multimodal visual arguments.
First, we see that the communicative burden is not always evenly shared in multimodal
arguments. In the Levy’s ads, the bulk of the message lies in the text, rendering it an image/text
argument. The text conveys the main point of the ads: that non-Jews can enjoy Levy’s bread.
This is not necessarily the case for all multimodal visual arguments, as text/image possibilities
also exist. The anti-smoking ad that Birdsell and Groarke cite is one possible example. The
image of the fish smoking a cigarette attached to a fish hook carries the weight of the message
that smoking can get you ‘hooked.’ The words of the ad caution against getting hooked, but the
danger of getting hooked is also evident in the image. The words, then, don’t introduce any
additional information. They also do not make a clear argument on their own. Just as the Levy’s
images could have various meanings without the context of the ads’ text, the phrase “don’t you
get hooked” has many possible interpretations without the context of the image. ‘Hooked’ could
stand for addiction or attraction to numerous things. When texts and images occur together in a
multimodal visual argument, the communicative burden of the argument often falls more heavily
on one medium over the other, be it the words or the pictures.
Second, we see that when the communicative burden falls on one medium (as opposed to
the other), the secondary medium is interpreted in the argumentative logic laid out by the
preferred medium. In other words, the medium which bears the communicative burden sets the
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context and the logical frame in which the other medium is interpreted. In the Levy’s ads, the
text tells the viewer that Jewishness and bread are the important details in the image. Within the
context of the slogan, the relative Jewishness of the figures and what they think of bread become
the most pertinent elements. Other interpretations of the images are possible in different
contexts, but the context provided by the slogan bestows presence on certain details. The
medium that bears the weight of the message thus determines which parts of the secondary
element are given presence.
Birdsell and Groarke’s anti-smoking ad also bears witness to this principle. The relatively
ambiguous text takes on anti-smoking meaning in light of the context of the image. The fish is
connected to the fishing line by way of the cigarette. If the fish releases the cigarette, it might
swim away freely. The fish is thus condemned by being “hooked” to the cigarette and not to a
piece of metal, pointing to the dangers of smoking. When the text enters into the context of the
image, the image becomes the frame that the viewer uses to make meaning of the text.
It is important to note that neither texts nor images are in themselves necessarily
definitive modes of argumentation. As Blair, Fleming, Birdsell and Groarke point out, images
may be open-ended and unclear, and texts can be ambiguous. When the two media are found
together in a multimodal argument, ambiguity in one medium can be overcome by clarity in the
dominant medium.
Third, we see that ambiguity is not a sign of weakness in an argument, but a place for
creating new arguments and involving the audience in the logic of the argument. Often in
multimodal arguments, one medium has a more ambiguous meaning than the other so that the
argument draws in the audience. When stereotype images are used in the Levy’s ads, these
images make the ads’ visual enthymemes which require the participation of the audience.
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Viewers must fill in the logic of the argument, exposing themselves to new ideas. When
dissociative logic is used, as in the Levy’s campaign, the viewer is opened to a reconstruction of
reality, should the viewer fail to complete the enthymeme. In the case of Birdsell and Groarke’s
anti-smoking ad, the ambiguity in the term “hooked” is resolved when viewers link the term to
paradigms of fishing. Viewers fill in the ad’s enthymeme, creating a new association between a
trout thrashing at the end of a fishing line and the menacing possibilities of cigarette addiction.
Multimodal visual arguments do not challenge traditional text-based definitions of
argument. Instead, when we approach them through a dissociative framework and consider how
the two media interact, we better understand how the audience participates in argument, and we
perhaps gain some insight into how advertisers (and other rhetors) influence us.

Copyright © Amy Anderson 2014
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Chapter Three
Text, Images, and the Mind: Dissociation and the Poetry of Thomas Hoccleve

I. Introduction
Sometime during the late 1380s, a statue of St. Catherine was burned in Leicester,
England, causing a local scandal. According to the medieval chronicler Henry Knighton, the act
of iconoclasm was committed by William Smith and Richard Waytestathe, who were looking for
fuel to cook their supper (Aston 167). The two men had Lollard leanings, and they questioned
the efficacy and use of religious images. Finding a statue of St. Catherine in the corner of a
chapel, Smith and Waytestathe took the opportunity to satiate both their intellectual and physical
hungers. They chopped off the statue’s head, reasoning that if the statue behaved like any other
statue, their iconoclast leanings would be verified and their supper heated. On the other hand, if
the statue bled, its holy nature would be proven and they would stand doctrinally corrected. In
that case, supper could wait. Either way, they figured that there was nothing to lose (except
perhaps for St. Catherine’s statue). The statue was decapitated without miraculous incident, and
Smith and Waytestathe enjoyed a warm dinner, confirmed in their iconoclast beliefs (Aston 16769).
Their actions did not go unnoticed. Knighton reports that Smith was required to do
extensive public penance for damaging the saint’s reputation, leading a procession through
Leicester while bearing an image of St. Catherine. Smith was ordered to kneel three times
throughout the procession, and the process was repeated on three separate occasions to be sure
that the public witnessed his repentance (Aston 167-69).
Smith’s punishment for defacing an image may seem extreme by America’s current
standards, but images — particularly those connected to holy matters — were understood
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differently during the Middle Ages. Carolyn Walker Bynum argues that images were linked to
materiality, which was itself a complicated concept during the medieval period (44-52). There
was a great deal of theological debate over the extent to which spiritual realities could be
manifested in physical substances, including relics, statues, pictures, and other forms of art.
Indeed, Biblical teachings — recorded in texts — were deeply enmeshed in the material world in
numerous ways, including various forms of church art. Images and texts also intermingled in
illuminated manuscripts, working together to make meaning. The visions of mystics such as
Margery Kemp and Julian of Norwich further pushed the boundaries of the spiritual and physical
realms, overlapping them through language and pictures. Images were a portal through which the
spiritual crossed over into the material, often in unpredictable and uncontrollable ways. Outside
of the religious realm, images were also a part of medical and philosophical discourses. Medieval
scholars believed that the mind was a place where images and text overlapped: image-based
phantasms shuttled between various compartments of the brain and into the memory (Carruthers
67-8). It was in the midst of this context that the Lollard movement began an ideological — and
often physical — assault on images, leading to exploits like Smith and Watestathe’s. It is also in
the midst of this context that the English bureaucrat Thomas Hoccleve began writing poetry.
Not surprisingly, the debate over images found its way into Hoccleve’s work. His poems
reflect the complicated relationship between texts and images in the early fifteenth century,
questioning how the two media should be interpreted and examining the physical and mental
spaces in which they interact. While Hoccleve was not a part of the Lollard movement, the
public debate over religious images may have been a catalyst for his examination of the overlap
between texts and images. The rise of the Gutenberg press in the latter half of the fifteenth
century is often considered the watershed point after which text gained prominence over images
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in the West.28 Hoccleve’s work, however, indicates that the relationship between the two media
was becoming more complicated half a century earlier.
Thomas Hoccleve has long been considered at best a minor late medieval poet,
overshadowed by his more accomplished contemporaries: Geoffrey Chaucer, John Lydgate, and
even William Langland. His second-class status is somewhat understandable, for Hoccleve was
by no means an excellent poet: he often neglects meter, his poetic persona is strange, and at
times his choice of subject matter is downright odd. Over the last few decades, however,
Hoccleve’s fortune has begun to change. Literary scholars and medieval historians have begun
examining connections between his poetry and his role as a clerk in the royal bureaucracy, and
selections of his work have even recently been included in the Norton Anthology series.
Hoccleve ought to be of interest to rhetoricians as well. Scholars of rhetorical history will find
that the poet’s verses reveal a thorough knowledge of medieval rhetoric, and multimodal and
visual rhetoricians will be interested in the way these poems reflect the fraught relationship
between texts and images over a century before the Reformation. The illuminated manuscripts of
some of Hoccleve’s poems are effective multimodal visual arguments, bringing together images
and texts in a dissociative relationship. But Hoccleve’s work also calls attention to the role of the
mind and memory in multimodal arguments. Text-based arguments using figurative language
evoke mental images, and these images bring a multimodal dimension to the original text.
Hoccleve’s poems often use figurative language to create mental images, and the resulting
dissociative image/text arguments demonstrate that just as texts give life to mental images, they
can also control those images.

28

Sven Birkerts’s Gutenberg Elegies is perhaps the most popular monograph that makes this claim.
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While Hoccleve’s poems are at times entertaining, they were not all composed merely to
amuse. Indeed, his work often makes overt arguments about political, social, and economic
problems, attempting to effect Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s adherence of minds in his
readers. The poet realizes that a combination of texts and images can strengthen his propositions,
so his poems are often multimodal arguments. These multimodal arguments are not always what
one would expect, however, for they exist in both physical and mental spaces. At times, the
images that the poet employs appear as manuscript illuminations, physical spaces where texts
and images collaborate in making meaning. Yet Hoccleve also consciously uses descriptive
language to create mental images, which he marshals in defense of his arguments. Sometimes
these mental images are connected to a manuscript illumination, but more often than not, they
stay in the reader’s mind. Occasionally, the mental images that Hoccleve evokes become unruly,
acting beyond the poet’s control. They probe the line between words and images, questioning
where one medium begins and the other ends. Hoccleve finds the two media difficult to separate,
but he does not equally value them. As a poet and a bureaucrat, Hoccleve believes that while
words can be used to call forth helpful images, those same words should also be used to control
images, both on the page and in the mind. He ultimately asserts that texts should be the lens
through which images are viewed, taking a stance similar to that which would be argued on
religious grounds in the forthcoming Reformation.
In this chapter, I examine the way that Hoccleve’s poetry draws on manuscript
illuminations and mental images to make multimodal arguments. I first provide a glimpse into
the context from which Hoccleve wrote, including the poet’s experience with medieval rhetoric,
what he would have known about the Lollards, and some of the ways that he would have
encountered texts and images in medieval society. Then, I explicate a series of Hoccleve’s
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poems, which follows a rough trajectory of first exploring multimodal text-image interactions in
the physical context of illuminated manuscripts, then turning to the intriguing space of the
medieval mind. Mental imagery and mental spaces become a liminal testing ground to see
whether, for Hoccleve, texts or images are more powerful.
In The Regiment of Princes, the poet explores how images and text might be profitably
paired in an illuminated manuscript. To Sir John Oldcastle, he critiques the Lollards’ approach to
images and complicates the relationship between the texts and images by presenting the problem
of mental imagery. The poet pursues this problem in La Male Regle de T. Hoccleue and “My
Complainte” from the Series by drawing on rhetorical theories of memory to make a multimodal
argument. Finally, a later text from the Series, the “Ars Vtillissima Sciendi Mori” argues for the
supremacy of texts over images in mental spaces and the multimodal arguments that play out in
these spaces. Ultimately, the poet argues that texts become the dissociative framework through
which images are understood in mental spaces, and he proves his point by verbally sacrificing an
image to forward his poetic career. In this way, Hoccleve’s ultimate preference for texts over
images looks forward to the sixteenth-century Reformation iconoclasm.

II. The Medieval Context: Rhetoric, Lollards, and Images
Thomas Hoccleve worked in an occupation dominated by words. He served as a clerk in
the Office of the Privy Seal for nearly forty years, from the late 1380s until a few years before
his death in 1426 (Burrow 2-3). T.F. Tout notes that it is not “likely that the limited career of the
privy seal often attracted men of higher education, or graduates of the universities. In the
chancery such men were rare; in the modest privy seal they were even more exceptional…
Probably, as we have already had occasion to suggest, most of them received their training by
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apprenticeship under one or other of the four clerks” (105-06). There are no records to indicate
that Hoccleve had a university education, but his clerical occupation and training under another
clerk makes it likely that he had some knowledge of the various medieval rhetorical arts. In
particular, his duties necessitated that he be knowledgeable of the ars dictaminis, the art of letter
writing, which James J. Murphy posits is one of the three branches of medieval rhetoric (194).
As a clerk, Hoccleve spent much of his adult life copying and distributing correspondence on
behalf of the king. Murphy notes that while England did not contribute a great deal to the ars
dictaminis, there were numerous dictimina, or collections of sample letters, circulating during the
medieval period. Letters contained in these collections and used by in the royal bureaucracy were
written in cursus, a high prose style particular to the ars dictaminis (239).
Hoccleve understood the usefulness of dictimina, for he compiled one himself before his
death. Burrow reports that the poet’s Formulary contains 1,110 letter templates, organized by
document type and ranging from bureaucratic petitions to diplomatic correspondence. It even
includes a selection of Latin proverbs for ornamenting and personalizing letters (Burrow 4-5), in
keeping with the cursus style. Nevertheless, Hoccleve knew that there were limits to what the ars
dictaminis could accomplish. When he faced economic and social difficulties during his career,
he turned to poetry to find a rhetorical solution. Hoccleve also looked to images in the forms of
manuscript illumination and mental imagery to get his message across, two tools that were not
available when working in the ars dictaminis. The ars dictaminis primarily relied on formulaic
language because it dealt with diplomatic and business matters. Beyond the occasional use of a
proverb, the letters were not visually evocative. They also did not utilize illumination, which was
costly and time-consuming. The ars dictaminis was a text-reliant form of communication, which
Hoccleve’s poetic endeavors allowed him to transcend.
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Hoccleve’s use of images was likely influenced by the Lollards, for the group was active
during his tenure in the royal bureaucracy.29 Anne Hudson argues in The Premature Reformation
that the Lollards were a proto-Reformation group whose views looked ahead to the Protestant
Reformation, even though their reform movement failed by the mid-fifteenth century. The group
drew its doctrine from the Christian Oxford academic John Wyclif, whose teachings were
condemned at the Blackfriars Council in 1382 (Hudson Premature 76). Following the
condemnation, the Lollard movement began to gain momentum. When the Lollard’s Twelve
Conclusions were posted in London in 1395 (92), they caused a stir that Hoccleve could not have
missed, for he was already established as a clerk at the Office of the Privy Seal in London at that
time (Burrow 32). Burrow believes that Hoccleve’s La Male Regle appeared in 1406 (15), a year
before Archbishop Arundel’s Constitutions further condemned Lollard teachings. The Lollard
John Badby was burnt in 1410, an incident that Hoccleve references in The Regiment of Princes,
which Burrow argues that the poet wrote in 1411 (8). Although there is no apparent connection
between the events, the Lollard knight Sir John Oldcastle began his revolt in 1414, the same year
that Hoccleve fell into the deeply distressing illness that he would later recollect in My
Complainte, likely written 1419-21 (Burrow 32). Following his illness, Hoccleve composed To
Sir John Oldcastle in 1415, admonishing the knight for his rebellion and advising him to return
to the orthodox fold. Although Lollard sentiments were still simmering in the 1420s, Hoccleve
no longer wrote about them. His final literary efforts were mainly focused on compiling his
Formulary, a collection of clerical draft documents.

29

The Lollards were not a well-organized group with codified principles, despite the publication of various
theological treatises and the Twelve Conclusions. Actual viewpoints varied widely within the group. When I refer to
them as a group, I want to keep this variety in mind. For the sake of ease and clarity, I am using the term “Lollard”
to represent the broad dissenting group that was active in the early fifteenth century.
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Thomas Hoccleve was by no means a Lollard or even a Lollard sympathizer. As a royal
bureaucrat, it was important that he follow orthodox church doctrine, which included reverencing
religious images and visiting both images and relics on church-sanctioned pilgrimages.
Nevertheless, the image-related theological questions that the Lollards raised provided a
powerful context for the poet’s exploration of the interaction between texts and images.
Understanding the Lollards’ position on images is thus useful background for considering the
way that Hoccleve thought about the medium.
The Lollards had strong doctrinal opinions about a number of religious issues, but their
opposition to images came to be one of the defining beliefs of the movement (Hudson 38). John
Wyclif had not himself been overly preoccupied with images, although he warned that
excessively honoring images of saints and religious scenes could break the first of the Ten
Commandments, which prohibits idolatry (Aston 141). At the same time, he was aware of the
usefulness that images could have for conveying religious truths to the illiterate and so did not
forbid them outright (142-3). On the other hand, many of his Lollard followers were much more
suspicious of images and took an extreme approach to pictures, statues, paintings, and other
forms of depicting religious figures or stories. The eighth conclusion of the early Lollard
manifesto, the Twelve Conclusions of the Lollards, criticized both the medieval practice of
pilgrimage and the worship of images:
Þe viii conclusion needful to telle to Þe puple begylid is [Þat] Þe pilgrimage, preyeris and
offringis made to blynde rodys and to deve ymages of tre and of ston, ben ner of kin to
ydolatrie and fer fro almesse dede. And how Þis forvodin ymagerie be a bok of errour to
Þe lewid puple... (Hudson English 27)
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Many Lollards feared that instead of educating the illiterate, images could lead them into error.
They worried that viewers would worship of these “blind” and “deaf” images, when only the
Christian God deserved worship. This conclusion goes on to add a moral imperative, arguing that
instead of giving honor to blind crosses and deaf images, people ought to care for the poor, “for
Þei ben Þe ymage of God in a more liknesse Þan Þe stok of Þe ston” (27). The Lollard dislike of
images was thus based in a concern that the honor given to them came at the expense of basic
care for the poor.30
An interesting corollary to the Lollard stance on images is the movement’s position
favoring vernacular texts. A fifteenth-century Lollard manuscript argues that
eche nacioun may lefully haue holy writ in here moder tunge. SiÞen Þat Þe trouÞe of
God stondiÞ not in oo langage more Þan in anoÞer, but who so lyueÞ best and techiÞ best
plesiÞ moost God, of what langage Þat euere it be, Þerfore Þe lawe of God written and
tauƺt in Englisch may edufue Þe commen pepel, as it doiÞ clerkis in Latyn…” (Biblical
Translation ln. 1-6)
Because those who live according to the Bible and teach its doctrine please God, it is important
that people have access to the Bible in the vernacular. Significantly, the impulse behind this
belief is the same one that Wyclif used to approve of the limited use of images: laypeople should
be given every tool to better understand the Bible. It is interesting to note that as Lollard doctrine
developed, the promotion of vernacular text was accompanied by the condemnation of images,
revealing the preference for texts over images that was also prevalent in Reformation thought.
In practice, Lollards took a range of positions toward images. Hudson points out that
although Lollard statements on the subject range from skepticism to outright iconoclasm, by the

30

The Lollards here reveal an intriguing fear that images will be treated the same as or better than humans, a fear
may be rooted in the attribution of human characteristics to images.
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late 1300s, the group came to be associated with the rejection of all religious images (Premature
307). They seemed to have little to say about the use of secular images, but focused their
criticism on religious images. Indeed, this was backed up by some rather extreme cases of
Lollard religious image-breaking during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, such as
the burning of the St. Catherine statue.
The Lollards’ objections to images came at a time when the line between texts and
images was often blurry. Numerous scholars have studied the ways that the two media often
synergistically combine to make meaning in medieval manuscripts and church art. For example,
Michael Camille proposes that images on the edges of illuminated manuscripts often undermined
the texts themselves and were conduits for social resistance (11-12), while Bill Endres asserts
that images act as glosses on the text of the ninth-century illuminated gospel collection, the Book
of Kells (Echoes and Light 3-5). Jessica Brantley examines MS Additional 37049, a latemedieval illuminated Carthusian miscellany, and argues that the manuscript’s text-image
combinations facilitate performative reading (1-25). Robert Deshman claims that the placement
of images relative to text in the Galba Psalter, a ninth-century Carolingian manuscript, reflects
the success of King Alfred’s cultural and religious revival (35-57). In the same vein, Richard
Marks proposes that text and images act as a “mutual gloss” in ecclesiastical art, such as stained
glass windows and prayer tables (172). Scholars have also noted the ways that physical images
inspired and shaped written texts from female mystics: Kathleen Kamerick claims that viewing
holy images inspired the vision and writings of Margery Kempe and Julian of Norwich (132),
and Naoe Yoshikawa argues that Kempe’s visions were influenced by the art in the churches she
visited and her personal prayer book (1-10). This list of scholars just begins to scratch the surface
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of the issue, for images and texts often overlapped in medieval contexts, drawing meaning from
each other.

Figure 3.1. Image of a five-cell mind, from
Cambridge University Library Ms. Gg 1.1
The synergy between the two media is not surprising, given that the medieval theorization of the
mind and meaning-making processes drew from the two media. Mary Carruthers explains the
popular five-part concept of the mind, using a diagram from a fourteenth-century British
manuscript, Cambridge University Library Ms. Gg 1.1 (Fig. 3.1) (67-8). In this model, sensory
information is taken in through the eyes and deposited in an area of the brain called the sensus
communis. The data is then channeled to the imagination, or the vis formalis, which compiles it
into mental images, called phantasms. These phantasms are acted on by the estimativa, which
associates them with likenesses of other images and assigns beliefs and attitudes to them. The
phantasms then move on to the cogitatio, or the vis imaginativa, which forms them into mental
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concepts and passes them along to the vis memorativa, where they are stored (67-8). Carruthers
notes that memories and mental images began in the five senses, and she emphasizes that their
resulting somatic nature is context-dependent, for the sensory data on which the images rely stem
from a particular time and place (75-6).31
In medieval neuropsychology, images are the basis of knowledge; they are the medium
through which the world is comprehended and information is stored for later recollection. Kolve
points out that this approach makes the mind the site of overlap between texts and images (20-1).
Simpson makes a similar observation, noting that “just as the imagination divides the sensual and
the abstract, so too does it mark the boundary line between the popular and the learned, between
image and word” (“Rule” 10). The image-based mnemotechnic system of memory is a natural
extension of such a neuropsychological system, for it translates texts into images for storage in
the memorativa.32 The text-image combinations in illuminated manuscripts were designed to
work with this concept of the mind, for they aided memory by providing images for the mind to
associate with the words (30).
Language practices additionally reflect the multimodal text-image interactions in the
medieval mind. Kolve observes that Geoffrey Chaucer uses the word “portrey” to “describe the
activity of those who paint pictures on walls, those who make verses, and those who think about
something previously seen” (69). The word “image” likewise has a fluid definition: it

31

A second popular neuropsychological conception of the brain gives it three cells, but combines many of the
properties of the five-cell model. V.A. Kolve details this model, noting that the first cell contains the properties of
the sensus communis and the imaginativa, and serves as the location where sensory data is collected and combined
into images. The second cell serves a logical function, and contains the phantasia and the aestimativa. In this
compartment, the images are judged as to their reliability and accuracy. The third and final section, the memorativa,
stores and recalls images for future reference (21-3). Clearly, there is a great deal of overlap between the models,
and it is important to note that both models use images as the basis for memory.
32

A more extensive discussion of the mnemotechnic system of memory will follow in section V.B.
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represented “the products of the visual imagination in any medium whatsoever, including stone,
glass, paint, poetry, and thought” (69). Perhaps this vagueness is behind the varying approaches
that Lollards took to images. If the term itself was difficult to narrow down, opposition to images
understandably was difficult to codify.
Given the medieval conception of how images and texts interact, it is little wonder that
Thomas Hoccleve drew on both forms of media to make the argument in some of his poems
stronger. His examination of the ways that images work in relationship to texts begins with
references to the Lollards’ position on images in two of his poems, The Regiment of Princes and
To Sir John Oldcastle. In the former, he makes a multimodal argument for his reliability as a
poet, using manuscript illuminations to strengthen his position. Hoccleve also obliquely
references Lollard doctrine as part of his argument, and in the latter poem he addresses this
doctrine head-on as part of an argument addressed to Oldcastle. To Sir John Oldcastle is not a
multimodal argument, but is instead word-based. As such, it would seem to be outside the
purview of this chapter. I include it here nevertheless because it offers insight into Hoccleve’s
examination of the interactions between text and image, a relationship that is at the heart of this
dissertation. When considered together, these two works reveal a poet who begins to question the
nature of his verbal medium.

III. The Regiment of Princes: Pairing Text and Image
The Regiment of Princes is one of Hoccleve’s earliest works, written probably around
1411 (Burrow 8). It shows the poet beginning to explore the ways that images might be
dissociatively paired with manuscript texts to enhance the meaning of the text. The work
Hoccleve was doing was by no means new; as I mentioned before, the British Isles were home to
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a rich tradition of illuminated manuscripts, particularly those used for ecclesiastical purposes.
One well-known secular illuminated manuscript is MS Hunter 59 (T.2.17) folio 6v, a manuscript
of John Gower’s Vox Clamantis, which depicts Gower shooting an arrow at the earth,
representing the critique he is leveling though his text. In certain manuscripts of The Regiment of
Princes, Hoccleve draws on this tradition and purposefully employs images to complement the
message of his text. The resulting hybrid argument is still text-reliant, but Hoccleve emphasizes
the images’ contribution to the argument to make a larger observation about the usefulness of
multimodal text-image combinations.
Written for Prince Henry when he was well on his way to becoming king, The Regiment
of Princes follows the tradition of royal rule books, known as mirrors for princes. The subject
matter of the text is ostensibly counsel for the young Henry, yet Hoccleve manages to weave in
references to Geoffrey Chaucer on three separate occasions, in lines 1958-81, 2077-107, and
4978-98. Chaucer is named as Hoccleve’s literary teacher, his “maistir deere and fadir reverent”
(ln. 1961), and praised as the one who “fayn would han me taught / But I was dul and lerned lyte
or naght” (2078-9). Despite Hoccleve’s claim to be a poor student, his third invocation of
Chaucer is a masterful hybrid argument that reinforces Hoccleve’s ethos.
Hoccleve mentions Chaucer for the last time towards the end of the text, in a section
entitled “De consilio habendo in omnibus factis,” which discusses the sort of counselors a price
should employ. The section opens with the suggestion that a prince should be willing to take
advice from “a man of symple degree / Or poore of birthe” (ln. 4880-81), if that man also be
wise. A prince should also “[c]heesith men eek of old experience” for his counselors, for “[h]ir
wit and intellect is glorious” (ln 4944-45). Unlike younger men, who will quickly advise war,
older men have temperance, fear God, and offer more experienced counsel. The poet also
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recommends that the prince be careful to respect holy days, for divine obedience translates to
monarchial authority. Hoccleve then makes a seemingly abrupt shift and invokes Chaucer. He
calls upon the “firste findere of our fair langange,” whom he claims has also written similar
advice to princes (ln. 4978). Hoccleve asks “hevenes queene” to bless Chaucer for his devotion,
and petitions her to “lat his love floure and fructifie” (ln. 4991). To help fulfill this petition,
Hoccleve pens the following verse:
Althogh his lyf be qweynt, the resemblance
Of him hath in me so fressh lyflynesse
That to putte othir men in remembrance
Of his persone, I have here his likness
Do make, to this ende, in soothfastnesse,
That they that han of him lost thoght and mynde
By this peynture may ageyn hym fynde. (ln. 4992-98)
In this verse, Hoccleve summons a “liknesse” of Chaucer, and in some versions of the
manuscript, his request is granted with a portrait in the immediate margin (Fig. 3.2).

Figure 3.2. Image of Chaucer in Ms. Harley 4866.
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Three of the existing manuscripts of the Regiment contain the referenced Chaucer portraits:
British Library Ms. Harley 4866, Ms. Royal 17D, and MS Rosenbach 1083. MS Harley is the
earliest of the manuscripts, believed by scholar Michael Seymour to have been created around
1411 (618). It was a presentation copy of The Regiment of Princes, possibly for either the Duke
of York or the Duke of Bedford (Pearsall 395). Seymour, whose comparative assessment of the
Harley portrait remains foundational, asserts that the Rosenbach manuscript was likely a copy of
the Harley manuscript, and that the Chaucer portrait was added as late as the eighteenth century
(621). The Royal manuscript has also been dated later than Ms. Harley, likely having been
created around 1438 (621). Because Harley is the earliest existing manuscript with the Chaucer
image, the placement of the Chaucer portrait was likely the model for the other two. This is one
reason that my analysis will focus on the Harley manuscript (see Fig. 3.2).33
A second reason warranting a close reading of the hybrid argument in the Harley portrait
and text is that Hoccleve was likely involved in designing Ms. Harley. Numerous scholars,
including Seymour, Jeanne E. Krochalis, and John M. Bowers, make this assertion, and it is
supported by the similarities between the Harley portrait and a second portrait of Chaucer that
appears in the Ellesmere manuscript of the Canterbury Tales, Huntington Library MS 26.6.12.
The Ellesmere portrait shows Chaucer on a horse, holding the reigns in his right hand and
pointing with his left. The Harley portrait is nearly a mirror reversal of this image from the waist
up. Chaucer points with his right hand, but holds a rosary in his left. The figures are dressed
somewhat similarly in dark robes and a dark cap. The stylistic similarities between the Ellesmere
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Seymour notes that the placement of the Chaucer portrait in the Rosenbach manuscript was not as exact as in Ms.
Harley. In Ms. Rosenbach, Chaucer’s finger “is pointing to a gap between stanzas seven lines above Hoccleve’s
textual reference to it” (621). It seems, then, that when the portrait was copied into the manuscript, the Rosenbach
scribe missed the full rhetorical import of the portrait’s original placement.
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and Harley images are close enough that Seymour was just the first of many scholars to remark
that they were likely drawn by the same scribe, who perhaps used a third Chaucer portrait as a
model (618).34 John M. Bowers notes that Hoccleve had previously “collaborated” with the
Ellesmere scribe on Trinity College Cambridge R.3.2, a manuscript of Gower’s Confessio
Amantis (353). Such a previous collaboration could have paved the way for Hoccleve to work
closely with the scribe on this presentation copy of the Regiment. At any rate, most scholars
assume that Hoccleve was involved to some extent in the details and placement of the portrait.35
Whether the placement of the portrait was chosen by Hoccleve, the scribe, or in
collaboration between the two, the multimodal visual argument made by this particular
combination of text and image is intriguing. The argument that Hoccleve makes begins in the
text, and the text forms a dissociative framework through which the image should be interpreted.
The details of the portrait even seem to be directly inspired by Hoccleve’s text, and they enhance
its message. If this argument were represented with a dissociative pair, it would thus be an
image/text.
As I mentioned above, the portrait appears in a section of the poem discussing the
importance of choosing counselors who fear God, are not necessarily wealthy, and who are
older. Chaucer holds a rosary, as if to reinforce the text’s praise of his Marian piety.36 His dress
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In the majority of the discussions of the Ellesmere and Harley portraits, scholars do not directly address the dating
of the two manuscripts. If Seymour’s dating is correct, the Ellesmere manuscript was created in 1420, nine years
following Ms. Harley. This would mean that the Ellesmere portrait could have possibly been modeled on the Harley
portrait. Seymour has additionally noted that the illustrations in Ms. Arundel 38, another presentation copy of the
Regiment, are similar enough to the Ellesmere and Harley manuscripts that Ms. Arundel also came from the hand of
the same scribe. Ms. Arundel is, however, missing the leaf that would have contained the Chaucer portrait, so no
direct portrait comparison is possible (618).
35
Even if these scholars are incorrect and Hoccleve was not involved in the design of the manuscript, the placement
of the portrait in Ms. Harley has a clear rhetorical purpose that is worth exploring.
Jeanne Krochalis remarks that this emphasis on piety is odd because Chaucer’s poetry does not show a sustained,
explicit dedication to Mary. She wonders if the text is “simply awkwardly placed” (240).
36

82

does not mark him as an extremely wealthy man; there are no family crests or accoutrements. He
is also shown as distinctly aged, particularly when compared contemporary Chaucerian
portraits.37 In particular, Ms. Harley depicts Chaucer as older than his Ellesmere counterpart.
White hair peeks out of the side of Chaucer’s cap in both portraits, but his beard is decidedly
more grizzled in Ms. Harley. Seen through the criteria presented in the text, the image represents
Chaucer as an ideal counselor. The elder poet was not known as a warmonger, but instead as a
well-established cultural figure. Indeed, the pen case hanging about his neck marks him as a
writer or poet.
These details work along with the text to build Hoccleve’s poetic ethos. Early in the
poem, Hoccleve names Chaucer as his master, father, and teacher, in effect claiming Chaucer as
his personal literary counselor. Because the portrait’s details reinforce Chaucer’s suitability as a
counselor, Hoccleve presents himself as taking his own advice and having sought out good
counsel. In addition, Hoccleve is likened to the ideal counselors that he describes, for he himself
is not a wealthy man. Indeed, the very premise for the poem is that the poet is writing to earn
some additional revenue.
The question may be raised as to why Hoccleve goes to such lengths to argue for his
suitability as a counselor, and the answer lies in his earlier semi-autobiographical earlier poem
“La Male Regle de T. Hoccleue,” which had not exactly predisposed him to the role of a
counselor. I will look at this poem in greater depth in a later section, but it is worth mentioning
here. In “La Male Regle,” Hoccleve’s narrator describes the “misreule” of his dissipated youth
(ln. 56). Despite the counsel of his friends that “my misreule me cause wolde a fit” (ln. 90), the
young narrator persisted eating and drinking in excess, spending intemperately, and earning for
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See Seymour’s discussion of Ms. Landsdowne 851 and Ms. Bodley 868 (621).
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himself an unwholesome reputation. Indeed, he calls himself one “Ƿat mirour am of riot and
excesse” (ln. 330) — a mirror displaying the anti-image of what a prince should become. “La
Male Regle” is thus the antithesis of The Regiment of Princes, for it presents a mirror that princes
should shun.38
After the unstable narrator of “La Male Regle,” Hoccleve’s poetic persona is in need of
an adjustment before his advice can be taken seriously. The first step in redeeming this persona
is aligning himself with the culturally celebrated Chaucer. By including the image of Chaucer,
Hoccleve argues that he himself has looked into the mirror of good counsel and is thus worthy to
hold up a similar mirror to the prince. It is important, though, that Hoccleve prove that he is truly
connected to Chaucer, and the inclusion of the portrait ensures this, particularly in light of its
reference to other medieval visual traditions. The portrait’s connection to these other traditions
increases its efficacy in Hoccleve’s argument.
The Harley portrait of Chaucer can be compared with varying degrees of success to the
medieval visual genres of devotional images and author portraits. Chaucer’s rosary and penner
are the sort of iconic symbols that mark devotional figures, showing their religious piety and
offering clues to their identity. Hoccleve even follows the verse on likeness with a verse
extolling the virtues of “ymages that in the chirches been” (ln. 4999). Devotional images have
the power to direct the viewer’s thoughts, for they “[m]aken folk thynke on God and on his
seintes” (ln. 5000). In the absence of a devotional image, “unsighte of hem causith restreyntes”
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At the same time, despite his conduct, the narrator of the poem displays the beginning of wisdom through his
continual awareness of appearances. He disparages “flauel” because it “Nat wite shal how hir to cheuyce” (ln. 285).
In contrast, he praises “trouthe” who “ful boldely shal…hir heed vp bere” (ln 286). Flattery cannot see clearly, but
Truth is positioned to look out with clear sight, something the narrator is himself now doing as he assesses his past
behavior. Indeed, the narrator positions himself alongside truth, when he acknowledges the foolishness of
disregarding his friends’ counsel. His stance alongside truth shows that he has become wiser and redeems him
somewhat. Nevertheless, it does not recommend him for the role of a royal counselor.
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(ln. 5002), much as Hoccleve wonders if the absence of an image of Chaucer may cause people
to forget him. These lines play the dual role of establishing Hoccleve as an orthodox, pro-image
anti-Lollard (and thus making him a politically acceptable counselor for Prince Henry) and
linking the Chaucer image to devotional imagery.39 Chaucer thus becomes a pseudo-holy figure
who “blurs the categorical distinction between canonic author and canonized saint” (Bowers
355).40 As one who has sat under the counsel of such a man, Hoccleve gains credibility.
At the same time, Hoccleve distinguishes the Chaucer portrait from devotional images by
stressing its “liknesse” to Chaucer (ln, 4995). Nevertheless, Hoccleve’s portrait emphatically has
a “fressh lyflyness” to its prototype (ln. 4993). Chaucer hand points to the word “soothfastnesse”
in the text, emphasizing the truth of the portrait.41 Some of those who had known Chaucer were
still alive and could recognize his likeness, so it was important that the Harley image be accurate.
Because memories are stored in the memorativa as images, Chaucer’s likeness is a material
evocation of the poet’s memory. In this sense, the image is similar to the author portraits that
Jeanne E. Krochalis notes had been appearing in French manuscripts since the thirteenth century
(236). While the early portraits were often generic, Krochalis asserts that intentional likenesses
had begun appearing in manuscripts like the Lovell Lectionary, a contemporary to the Regiment
(237). If the Chaucer portrait is a reference to author portraits, then Chaucer can be seen as a
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John M. Bowers argues that the image also redeems Chaucer for the anti-Lollard movement, expunging his
Lollard connections and thus making him acceptable for Prince Henry’s politics (355).
Pearsall even goes so far as to argue that Chaucer, Prince Henry, and Hoccleve form a “triumvirate” (402). He
stops just short of naming them a British Trinity.
40

I make this assertion in contrast to Louise M. Bishop, who claims that Chaucer points to “liknesse” (340) and
Michael Seymour, who more generally asserts that Chaucer points to the “mention of the resemblance” (618). The
images of the Harley portrait that I have seen seem to point more closely to “soothfastnesse,” which would further
emphasize the truth of the likeness, and not just the likeness itself.
41
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literary inspiration behind the Regiment. This places Hoccleve in a literary lineage with Chaucer,
which again secures the poet’s ethos.
I would like to propose that the Chaucer portrait can also be considered in light of the
gospel portraits common in illuminated insular manuscripts such as the Book of Kells. Found at
the beginning of gospel books in these Bible manuscripts, these portraits depict the writers of the
gospels and are in some ways a combination of author portraits and devotional images. Like
devotional images, they present subjects with generic features, and utilize iconic objects to
differentiate their subjects. For example, St. John’s status as a writer is indicated by a book in the
gospel portrait from the Book of Kells . On the other hand, like author portraits, gospel portraits
call to mind a specific individual connected with a specific piece of writing.42 The gospel
portraits thus invoke a combination of sacred and secular authority. It must be admitted that the
Harley portrait is not in all ways like a gospel portrait. It is not as large and does not have the
same position as a gospel portrait, which is located at the beginning of a gospel text. In a
manuscript like Ms. Harley, that position was reserved for a presentation portrait depicting the
author handing the book to its intended recipient. It is nevertheless worth considering the
Chaucer portrait in light of the gospel portrait tradition because the Chaucer portrait serves a
similar function of reminding the viewer of a great writer. If Hoccleve is invoking the gospel
portrait tradition, the portrait adds a double authority of the secular and the sacred that increases
Hoccleve’s poetic credibility.
In the verse beneath the portrait, Hoccleve writes of images, “Whan a thyng depeynt is /
Or entaillid, if men take of it heede, / Thoght of the liknesse it wole in hem breede” (lns. 500305). It initially seems that Hoccleve is claiming that the sight of the image of a thing will call that
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Granted, the gospels may or may not have been written by the designated authors, but the tradition of linking them
to specific individuals was strongly enforced by the medieval visual tradition.
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thing to the viewer’s mind. In other words, the sight of Chaucer’s image should inspire thoughts
of Chaucer in the viewer. This line comes at the end of a stanza discussing the power of religious
images, and certainly religious images were intended to inspire religious thoughts. But the line
can perhaps also be read a different way: the “thoght[s] of the liknesse” of the image can be
interpreted as thoughts similar to those of the image. For an aspiring court poet, literary thoughts
like Chaucer’s would make Hoccleve even more credible. The sacred connotations of devotional
images and gospel portraits may have also lent these thoughts a loose sense of divine authority.
Even further, if the portrait of Chaucer is akin to a gospel image, Hoccleve is taking a
stance against the Lollard prohibition on religious images. By pairing the image with his text, he
shows the effectiveness of image-text combinations and multimodal arguments. An image can
add additional meaning to a text, so it need not be feared. Indeed, Wyclif’s view that images can
convey knowledge is upheld, and the extreme condemnation of representation that his followers
fell into seems unnecessary. Hoccleve’s use of the Chaucer portrait shows that images can be
both intellectually and financially profitable.
The Chaucer portrait is not the only manuscript illumination that Hoccleve employed to
argue for the value of his advice in The Regiment of Princes. According to Charles R. Blythe’s
“Introduction” to the 1999 critical edition of Hoccleve’s work, there are two presentation
manuscripts of The Regiment of Princes containing illuminations and dating from the early
fifteenth century, around the time of the poem’s composition. The first is Ms. Harley 4866, and
the second is Ms. Arundel 38 (15-16). The manuscripts are similar in size, layout, and content,
and Blythe notes that Hoccleve was likely involved in the creation of both (16). There is,
however, one significant difference between the manuscripts: The leaf with the portrait of
Chaucer has been cut out of Ms. Arundel, while a leaf containing a presentation scene has been
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cut out of Ms. Harley (15-16). Just as the Chaucer portrait is an important part of Hoccleve’s
argument, the presentation scene remaining in Ms. Arundel (Fig. 3.3) works alongside
Hoccleve’s text in a multimodal argument for the poet’s ethos.

Figure 3.3. Presentation scene in
MS. Arundel 38 The Regiment of
Princes
Presentation scenes in illuminated manuscripts serve as a sort of dedication, often coming
at the beginning of manuscripts. Ms. Arundel’s presentation scene is located elsewhere. The
Regiment of Princes opens with a dialogue between the poet and an Old Man, who convinces the
poet to write a rule book for princes in hopes of being compensated. The presentation scene
follows this opening dialogue, coming before the text of the rule book. There are two possible
identities for the figures in the scene. Kathleen Scott argues that the standing figure is Prince
Henry, while the kneeling man is John Mowbray, a lord and later duke. Mowbray’s coat of arms
can be found on the page, so Scott suggests that he may have paid for the production of the
manuscript. The image would then be that of a lord presenting a gift to his prince (Scott 158).
Nicholas Perkins disagrees, arguing that the kneeling figure is clearly older than the standing
figure, and Mowbray was younger than Henry. Perkins proposes instead that the kneeling figure
is Hoccleve himself, presenting the manuscript to Henry (115-17). Perkins suggests that the
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inclusion of Mowbray’s arms is to show that Hoccleve has the support of the lord, and that the
poet “relies on the support of others in order to make his counsel heard” (117).
I have to agree with Perkins’s assertion that the image shows Hoccleve and the prince,
particularly given the placement of the scene. The presentation scene serves as a transition
between the opening dialogue, which explains the rule book’s exigence, and the rule book itself.
The image dramatizes what the poet proceeds to do: offer a gift of advice to the prince. The giftgiver kneels, showing deference to the standing royal figure, just as Hoccleve acknowledges
Henry’s royal position through the rule book. At the same time, the image also dramatizes what
Hoccleve hopes the price will do: gracefully receive the gift. Hoccleve uses the presentation
scene to enact the reception of his advice before he even begins to give it. The image thus works
alongside the text to argue that the poet’s manuscript is valuable, and that it is worthy of being
received by a king.
Ultimately, the presentation scene in Ms. Arundel 38 and the portrait of Chaucer included
in Ms. Harley 4866 operate with multiple valences to help Hoccleve argue that he is a credible
author. When considered in the context of the mirror imagery in “La Male Regle,” these images
part of an attempt to rehabilitate Hoccleve’s own image. The presentation scene depicts the poet
as a humble courtier, presenting his prince with valuable and sage advice. Later in the
manuscript, the details of the Chaucer portrait work alongside the text of the Regiment to
emphasize Hoccleve’s connection to Chaucer, which increases Hoccleve’s own literary worth.
When Hoccleve wrote To Sir John Oldcastle a few years later, he continued to examine the ways
that text and images interact, this time venturing into mental spaces.
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IV. To Sir John Oldcastle: Blurring the Line Between Text and Image
Hoccleve’s most extensive treatment of Lollard views can be found in the 1415 poem To
Sir John Oldcastle, written to a Lollard knight in open rebellion against the king and the church.
The poem is essentially a critique of Lollard doctrine — including their approach to images —
and an overt argument for Oldcastle to return to his senses and end his rebellion. While
criticizing the Lollards’ stance toward images, Hoccleve offers a metaphor for how images might
be used productively.
At the outset of To Sir John Oldcastle, Hoccleve sides with the royal position toward the
wayward knight, asserting that Oldcastle “dronke haast heresies galle / And art fro Crystes faith
twynned & goon” (ln. 7-8). For sixty-four pedantic verses, the poet attempts to correct a range of
Lollard heresies, including prohibitions on pilgrimages and religious images. In his defense of
religious images, Hoccleve evokes the metaphor of a pair of glasses:
Right as a spectacle helpith feeble sighte
Whan a man on the book redith or writ,
And causith him to see bet than he mighte,
In which spectacle / his sighte nat abit,
But gooth thurgh / & on the book restith it.
The same may men of ymages seye,
Thogh the ymage nat the seinte be / yit
The sighte vs myngith to the seinte to preye. (ln. 417-24)
As spectacles can help a reader better see a text, the images of saints can evoke a prayerful
response in the faithful. If the metaphor is extended, images might even be said to better help the
reader understand texts.
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The metaphor is also an example of the ways that texts and images overlap in mental
spaces. As a reader works through Hoccleve’s passage, he or she comes up with a mental picture
of spectacles being used to make a text more clear. The spectacles are evoked by the text, and in
the medieval five-part conception of the brain, the idea of the spectacles circulates in the mind as
a phantasm, which is itself an image. That image becomes a part of the text-based argument that
Hoccleve makes in the poem.
To Sir John Oldcastle is seemingly a statement of orthodox theology to counteract the
Lollard heresies into which Oldcastle had fallen. Hoccleve does criticize the Lollards’ stance
toward images by arguing for the usefulness of images, but he goes much further. The poet
shows how the line between texts and images becomes more blurry in mental spaces, where
ideas evoked by texts become images. The question of mental imagery’s relationship to text is
explored more fully in La Male Regle and “My Compleinte” through the use of the medieval ars
memoriae.

V. “The Substaunce of My Memorie”: Rhetorical Memory in “La Male Regle de T.
Hoccleue” and “My Complainte”
“La Male Regle” is one of Hoccleve’s early poems, written in late 1405 or early 1406;
while “My Compleinte” was written later in 1419 or 1421 (Burrow 14-28). “La Male Regle” is a
petition for the payment of late annuities, and it presents the poet as one who is ill both in person
and in purse. “My Compleinte” deals with Hoccleve’s attempts to reintegrate into society after a
long and embarrassing illness. Both poems are semi-autobiographical, offering details about
Hoccleve’s position in the Office of the Privy Seal, his finances, and his personal health. The
subject matter in the two poems is somewhat related, but when they are paired, we also see
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Hoccleve’s extended reflections on the interactions between text and mental images. Across
these two poems, Hoccleve marshals the resources of medieval rhetorical theory and
mnemotechnic memory to test the limits of mental imagery. He examines the power that words
have to control mental images, both evoking and altering the images once they have entered the
mind.
Monetary imagery pervades these two poems, and this has been the primary focus of
literary critics. Robert J. Meyer-Lee connects the poems’ anxiety over money to Hoccleve’s
anxiety over the ambiguity of his social status and England’s unstable economy: “For Hoccleve,
money was not simply a financial instrument but a natural poetic vehicle for exploring a view of
the world whose cracks and seams were beginning to show” (183). He labels the poet a “moneyobsessed traditionalist” who struggles with a society in flux (190). Lee Patterson offers a similar
reading, claiming that the poet’s concern with health and money is tied to concern over the
health of England itself. Hoccleve’s fractured subjectivity is thus linked to the instability of late
medieval society.
The poems have also been read through the lens of various literary forms. Meyer-Lee
reads “La Male Regle de T. Hoccleue” and Hoccleve’s Series through the form of the begging
poem, linking the poet’s monetary anxiety to his ambiguous social status and England’s unstable
economy (173-214). On the other hand, Eva Thornley has argued that “La Male Regle” takes the
form of a penitential lyric with universalizing and moralizing consequences (295-321). More
recently, Robyn Malo has viewed the Series though the form of confessional (277-305).
All of these are compelling readings of Hoccleve’s works, but I want to approach his
poems from a different perspective in this section. I want to argue that Hoccleve’s concerns with
money and health in “La Male Regle” and “My Compleinte” are more multivalent when
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considered in light of rhetorical figures of thought and the medieval ars memoriae. Specifically,
Hoccleve draws on the medieval theories of memory and rhetorical figures of thought to explore
the ways that texts and images interact in mental spaces.

A. The Classical Roots of Medieval Memory
One of the most interesting facets of medieval memory theory is the way it relies on
connections between words and images, such as those made in classical rhetorical figures of
thought. In her seminal work on rhetorical memory, The Art of Memory, Frances Yates traces the
roots of medieval memory theory to classical rhetoric. She notes that several of Aristotle’s
treatises touch on memory, but the most concentrated classical thought on the subject is found in
Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, Cicero’s De Oratore, and Rhetorica Ad Herennium, which was
mistakenly attributed to Cicero during the Middle Ages (2). Mary Carruthers’s The Book of
Memory details the physical nature that classical thought attributes to remembering. Aristotle
believed that physical health impacted a person’s memory-making ability: “people whose
humors are out of balance are sometimes better at recollecting than remembering or the reverse”
(Carruthers 49). The author of Ad Herennium likened the act of making a memory to a seal
leaving an imprint on wax. Memory was thus seen as somatic and tangible: memorization had
material consequences.
A second popular classical metaphor for memory was that of a divided box, bag, or bin
into which memories were sorted for easy access. Memories themselves were treated as treasures
to be counted and arranged (Carruthers 16-45). Medieval scholars developed this metaphor more
fully. The twelfth-century scholar Hugh of St. Victor began his treatise “The Three Best Memory
Aids for Learning History” with this admonition: “Child, knowledge is a treasury and your heart
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is its strongbox. As you study all of knowledge, you store up for yourself good treasures,
immortal treasures, incorruptible treasures” (33). This comparison is also found throughout the
Biblical books of Psalms and Proverbs, which Hugh would have studied extensively as a teacher
in the reformed Augustinian school of St. Victor (32). Hugh goes on to say, “In the treasure
house of wisdom are various sorts of wealth, and many filing-places in the storehouse of your
heart. In one place is put gold, in another silver, in another precious jewels. Their orderly
arrangement is clarity of knowledge” (33). When Hugh connects the arrangement of knowledge
with the arrangement of treasure, the treasury storehouse that he describes is none other than
memory itself. The knowledge stored in one’s memory is also akin to wisdom. Hugh’s work in
this particular manuscript was unfortunately not well known, for Carruthers observes that the
treatise “sank into oblivion by the early fourteenth century” (81).
Nevertheless, Hugh makes another explicit connection between money and memory in
the preface to a second treatise, the Didascalicon, of which thirty-four partial or complete
manuscripts have survived, indicting significant circulation (Carruthers 81). In the Didascalicon,
Hugh notes, “How many times each day would I extract from myself the daily debt of my bits of
sophomoric wisdom…so that indeed I held in my memory both the payouts and the numerical
order of virtually all the propositions, questions, and objections which I had learned” (Carruthers
92). Wisdom is again likened to money that is ordered and drawn out from the storage place of
memory at will. Hugh was not the only medieval writer to use this imagery.
In The Book of Memory, Carruthers notes that one iteration of the classical box or bin
image of memory was that of a saccula, a “leather moneybag with internal compartments which
sort coins by their type and size” (39). The term appears in various places, including in a
dialogue of the Byzantine church father Gregory the Great. It is also mentioned by the thirteenth-
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century English monk and bishop Richard de Bury (39, 160). In both cases, the saccula is
depicted as a container for both wisdom and money. Hugh of St. Victor was additionally aware
of the saccula image, for he draws on it in “The Three Best Memory Aids.” He likens a student
with orderly memory to a money-changer who “divides his pouch into several
compartments…Then, having sorted the coins and separated out each type of money in turn, he
puts them all in their proper places” (33). If knowledge is money and the memory a money-bag,
then the student with an orderly memory is an efficient money-changer.
There is an interesting corollary to Hugh of St. Victor’s money-changer illustration that
bears mentioning. John Cassian, a fourth-century monk, used the image of a money-changer to
illustrate discretion in his Second Conference of Abbot Moses. Cassian writes that a man with the
discretion to “tell whether it [a thought] is genuine and from God, or whether it is spurious and
from the devil” is akin to a money changer who is “able to see the figure of the true king stamped
on the coin and to detect what is not stamped on coin that is current” so that “we may reject it as
counterfeit” (89). Spiritual discretion is here likened to monetary discretion. The moral weight
that Cassian lends to the image of a money-changer is important. Discretion is indirectly related
to the cardinal virtue of Prudence, which gave moral weight to the act of memory.43
Medieval theorists thus added a moral emphasis that was largely missing from the
classical tradition. Yates attributes this development to the lack of classical material in

I have not yet been able to find a direct link between Cassian’s discretion and Prudence, but one may exist by way
of Thomas Aquinas. Stories of Aquinas’s vast reading and nearly photographic memory are found in the work of
both Yates and Carruthers. Aquinas also clearly cited from Cassian numerous times when writing about moral
theology in the Summae Theologica (Ramsay 7). Yates reports that when Aquinas defined Prudence in the Summa
Theologica, he wrote that it had eight parts, drawn from Aristotle, Cicero, and Macrobius: memoria, ratio,
intellectus, docilitas, solteria, providential, circumspection, and cautio (73). Although it does not directly correlate,
discretion seems akin to these parts of Prudence. Discretion and Cassian’s money-changer analogy may have been
in the back of Aquinas’s mind. They were certainly stored somewhere in Aquinas’s immense memory, along with
nearly every other text that he encountered! It seems likely, though, that the connection between discretion and
prudence was made in the patristic tradition.
43
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circulation while medieval theories were developing, giving the medieval theorists space to
expand on the classical ideas. She notes that Aristotle’s works carried over some of the classical
ideas about memory, as did Martianus Cappella’s De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii.44 Beyond
these, the Ad Herennium was the most commonly known text. “It is of great importance to
emphasize that the mediaeval artificial memory rested so far as I know, entirely on the memory
section of Ad Herennium studied without the assistance of the other two sources for the classical
art” (55), Yates writes, referring to the temporary loss of Quintilian’s and Cicero’s works during
the medieval period.45 These classical works were able to convey the somatic and monetary
associations with memory, but they were not the only influences on medieval memory.
Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski observe that medieval ideas of memory were
strongly affected by monastic traditions of meditation, for many of the scholars concerned with
memory, such as Hugh of St. Victor, were either monks or connected to monasteries. Their
concern was primarily with memorizing scripture and the writings of the church fathers (2).
When the thirteenth-century friars Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas theorized memory,
Yates notes that they placed both Aristotle’s work on the subject and the Ad Herennium “in the
service” of Christian tradition (62). Thomas Aquinas’s Secunda Secundae of the Summa
Theologica makes memory even more explicitly religious and moral, for Aquinas draws on
Cicero and lists memory as a necessary aspect of Prudence, one of the four cardinal virtues

Cicero’s De Inventione was also known during the Middle Ages, but it does not discuss memory explicitly. Yates
notes, however, that the work was instrumental in associating memory with the virtue of Prudence (20).
44

45

Yates and other scholars distinguish between natural and artificial memory. Natural memory is the short-term
memory that allows us to function as we go about our days. Artificial memory, on the other hand, is a cultivated
rhetorical art that requires training and aids individuals in organizing and committing immense quantities of
information to easily-accessible memory. The rhetorical art of memory deals primarily with artificial memory.
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(Yates 73). The result of this intellectual genealogy was thatnmedieval memory had a strong
moral and ethical imperative.
By the time Hoccleve was writing in the early fifteenth century, the medieval conception
of memory thus had accumulated somatic, pecuniary, and moral implications, all of which had
roots in classical rhetoric. These connections were made through image-based similies,
metaphors, and other figures of thought: writing on wax tablets, counting and organizing money,
and storing up treasure. Memory had additional visual properties in the mnemotechnic system.

B. Figures of Thought and Mnemotechnic Memory
Classical texts like Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria and the Ad Herennium developed an
extensive system for image-based mnemotechnic memory. Because the Ad Herennium was one
of the primary sources for medieval memory theory, I will focus on it in this section. Book III of
the Ad Herennium suggests that in order to memorize large sections of text, an orator should
create mental images that index those texts, and then place the images in imaginary landscapes.
To recall the texts, the orator would then mentally walk through the landscapes and view the
images; the texts would subsequently come to mind (III.XVI-XXIII). In a sense, the text is
housed in these mnemotechnic images. The Ad Herennium provides guidelines for crafting
acceptable landscapes: they should be well-lit, free of clutter and crowds, and known to the
orator (III.XVI-XIX). Guidelines are also offered for crafting acceptable images. Because “when
we see in everyday life things that are petty, ordinary, and banal, we generally fail to remember
them,” mnemotechnic images should be “striking and novel,” of “exceptional beauty or singular
ugliness” (III.XXII). The author offers the example a lovely figure clothed “with crowns or
purple cloaks,” or conversely, a garish figure disfigured with red paint (XXII).
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Interestingly, a reference to the lovely purple-clothed figure appears again in Book IV of
the Ad Herennium in a list of figures of thought, a subgroup of rhetorical figures that use
language to evoke mental images. The purple-robed figure is the Ad Herennium author’s
example of similitude, a figure of thought that creates a mental image for the purpose of
comparison (IV.XLVII):
Let us imagine a player on a lyre who has presented himself on the stage
magnificently garbed, clothed in a gold-embroidered robe, with purple mantle
interlaced with various colors, wearing a golden crown illumined with various
jewels, and holding a lyre covered with golden ornaments and set off with ivory.
Further, he has a great personal beauty, presence and stature which impose
dignity. If, when by these means he has aroused a great expectation in the public,
he should in the silence he has created suddenly give utterance to a rasping voice,
and this should be accompanied by a repulsive gesture, he is the more forcibly
thrust off in derision and scorn. In the same way, a man of high station…if he yet
lacks virtue and the arts that treat virtue, will so much the more forcibly in all
derision and scorn be cast from all association with good men. (IV. XLVII)
Although this comparison is composed of words, it relies on the vivid mental image of the
disappointing purple-robed musician created by the words. The audience’s revulsion at the lyrist
is transferred to the rich man, but that revulsion is evoked in the image of the lyrist’s repulsive
performance. In other words, the strength of the similitude lies in the mental image it can evoke.
Several of the other figures operate similarly. Descriptio, or vivid description, is “the
name for the figure which contains a clear, lucid, and impressive exposition of the consequences
of an act,” and is particularly useful for exciting emotion (IV.XXXXIX). The figures of simile
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(imago), character delineation (notatio), personification (conformation), and ocular
demonstration (demonstratio) function the same way. In fact, demonstratio “occurs when an
event is so described in words that the business seems to be enacted and the subject to pass
vividly before our eyes” (IV.LV). In these figures of thought, words and the images that they
generate are indeed inextricable. Like the mental image of the spectacle in Hoccleve’s To Sir
John Oldcastle, the figures of thought create dissociative image/text pairs, for the images are
evoked by the words that describe them.
If we follow the suggestion of the Ad Herennium’s author and use images to help us
remember passages of text, then the reappearance of the purple figure indicates that there may be
a connection between these passages on memory and figures of thought. Figures of thought are
certainly more effective when the images they evoke follow the guidelines for mnemotechnic
images. The author also seems to suggest that drawing on both words and images makes an
orator’s argument more memorable. This link will become important when we turn back to
Hoccleve in the next section.46
As a whole, medieval treatises followed the classical mnemotechnic approach to storing
items in one’s memory through images. Thomas Bradwardine, a fourteenth-century scholar and
cleric who briefly served as the Archbishop of Canterbury, drew from the Ad Herennium and
advocated the mnemotechnic approach in his treatise “On Acquiring a Trained Memory.”
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It is interesting that the discussion of figures of through and memorial images is drastically limited in Geoffrey of
Vinsauf’s Poetria Nova, the prominent medieval rhetoric manual. Geoffrey mentions figures of thought, including
similitude, but does not invoke the purple-robed performer. He also cautions agains the mnemotechnic technique:
“Cicero relies on unusual images as a technique for training the memory; but he is teaching himself; let the subtle
teacher, as if were in solitude, address his subtlety to himself alone…Therefore have no faith in these or other
signposts if they are difficult for you, or if they are unacceptable. But if you wish to proceed with greater security,
fashion signs for yourself, whatever kind your own inclination suggests. As long as they give you pleasure, you may
be taught through their means” (89). Even though Hoccleve would likely have been familiar with this work, his
references to mnemotechnic images shows that he was also familiar with the classical techniques of the Rhetorica
ad Herennium.
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Concerning background landscapes, Bradwardine expounded on the classical guidelines, noting
that “the places should not be made so dark that they cannot be recovered easily or quickly from
memory…Second, your background should not be made in a crowded place, such as a church,
the market, and so forth, because the images of the things crowding such places…may block
other images of things that you intend to place there” (208). He recommended the following
guidelines for the images themselves:
Their size should be moderate…but their nature should be wondrous and intense,
because such things are impressed in memory more deeply and better retained.
However, such things are for the most part not moderate but extreme, as
something greatly beautiful or ugly, joyous or sad, worthy of respect or derision, a
thing of great dignity or vileness…The whole image also should have some other
quality such as movement that thus it may be commended to memory more
effectively. (208)
Bradwardine places an overt emphasis on images that evoke an emotional reaction, an emphasis
that Carruthers observes was common in medieval theory. She notes that “successful [medieval]
memory schemes all acknowledge the importance of tagging material emotionally as well as
schematically, making each memory as much as possible into a personal occasion by imprinting
emotional associations like desire and fear, pleasure or discomfort” (60). This emotional reaction
is not unlike that which the author of the Ad Herennium wished to evoke through the dissociative
image/text pairs in certain of the figures of thought.
The application of guidelines like Bradwardine’s is evidenced by the astonishing array of
medieval images used to store and trigger memories, such as the six-winged seraphs that appear
in Alan of Lille’s twelfth-century “On the Six Wings of the Seraph” (Carruthers and Ziolkowski
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88). Frances Yates even speculates that guidelines for memory images might be connected to the
medieval “love of the grotesque, the idiosyncratic. Are the strange figures to be seen on the
pages of manuscripts and in all forms of medieval art not so much the revelation of a tortured
psychology as evidence that the Middle Ages, when men had to remember, followed classical
rules for making memorable images?” (104). While memorable images are certainly not the only
impulse behind cathedral gargoyles and the Book of Kells, the implications of Yates’s query are
worth considering and applying to medieval literature. With this frame in mind, I want to now
turn back to Thomas Hoccleve’s poetry.

C. “La Male Regle”: Memory and Money
“La Male Regle” and “My Compleinte” are highly somatic poems. While “La Male
Regle” centers on illness and money troubles, “My Compleinte” focuses on the problem of social
reintegration following a frightening illness. If we approach these poems through the lens of
medieval theories of memory, however, we see that the poems use mental images to examine the
wide-ranging impact of memory and memory failure.
As I mentioned before, “La Male Regle” deals with the themes of money and health.
Burrows notes that the poem was composed after Hoccleve had missed an entire year of annuity
payments, stretching from late 1404 through early 1405 (14-15). The poem takes the form of a
petition addressed to the “Eerthely god, piler of lyf, thou helthe” (ln. 8), who has taken his favor
away from Hoccleve. The reader soon learns, however, that Hoccleve has brought this fate upon
himself through a failure to “ete and drynke in tyme attemprely” (ln. 106). Hoccleve is not a
first-time offender, but a seasoned glutton. He confesses, “Nat two yer or three, / But xxti wtntir
past continually, / Excesse at borde hath leyd his knyf with me” (ln. 110-12). Yet Hoccleve does
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not portray himself as a heartless glutton; he’s just a bon vivant who relishes treating his friends
to a glass of wine. He shows remarkable restraint with women, satisfied with simply “a kus” (ln.
155). The poet enjoys the status and companionship that come with spending money, and knows
that “[l]ak of coyn departith conpaignie” (ln. 133). He basks in the flattery that comes from the
“cookes” and “tauerners” (ln. 179-80), although he recognizes its dark side: that it is elicited by
his status as a paying customer and is not true. The poet sharply criticizes the false power of
“faueles tonge” (ln. 211), but admits, “And yit ther can no man in this contree / Vnnethe eschue
this confusioun” (ln. 215-16). When men are under the influence of flattery “[a]nd with
pleasance so fostred and fed / … they forgete hemself” (ln. 229-30). Flattery leads to confusion,
which engenders poor memory and forgetfulness. It is significant that throughout Hoccleve’s
account of his misrule, he speaks in generalities and not in specific details. Perhaps the excess
that he blames for his poor health has impacted his own memory, and he has only a vague
recollection of the past twenty winters. Such forgetfulness would not be surprising in light of the
somatic properties of medieval memory. Gluttony takes a physical toll, which would manifest in
forgetfulness.
The poet then links his health to his financial situation. Hoccleve laments his “seeknesse /
As wel of purs and body” (ln. 337-38), for now his purse is empty. He confesses, “O God! O
helthe!.../I am contryt and of ful repentance / Ƿat euere I swymmed in swich nicetee / as was
dispelesaunt to thy deitee” (ln. 401, 403-05). The poem then abruptly switches audiences and
makes a plea to Lord Furnivall, the Treasurer, for the payment of overdue annuities that the poet
believes will get him “swich medecyne” to “voide me of pyne” (ln. 446, 448). The reason that
the poet forgets is that Furnivall has forgotten him.
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As Meyer-Lee argues, Hoccleve’s connection between health and money does index
social anxieties, but the poem also exhibits an anxiety over memory. Hoccleve links poor control
over one’s purse to flattery, which leads to forgetfulness. Because the purse was a common
metaphor for the memory itself, poor regulation of the purse is, in fact, poor regulation of
memory. Mismanaging money showed a lack of discretion, and mismanaging one’s memory is a
moral failure of prudence. The “seeknesse / As wel of purs as body” (ln. 337-38) that Hoccleve
rails against is also a sickness of memory. Even the title of the poem has a double meaning
connecting it to memory. “La male regle” can be translated as the “poor rule” or the “misrule” of
a life. “Male” is also a term for a compartmentalized leather strong box, the sort of divided
container that medieval writers like Hugh of St. Victor and Richard de Bury compared to a mind
or a memory. “La Male Regle” could thus also refer to the organization or management of the
poet’s purse, mind, and health. 47 Hoccleve’s proposed solution to his sickness — an infusion of
cash — is then a metaphor for replenishing the storehouse of his memory.
The argument of Hoccleve’s poem clearly relies on the network of images linked to
medieval conceptions of memory, but it is also interesting to consider the form that Hoccleve’s
request takes — that of a penitential lyric. The poet textually confesses the misrule of his life to
the god of health, hoping to find a solution for the problem that he presents through images. The
text-based nature of confession is significant, and I will return to it later in this section after
discussing the role of memory in “My Compleinte.”

47

I have Matthew Giancarlo to thank for this connection.
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D. “My Compleinte”: The Trouble with Memory
Written over a decade after “La Male Regle,” “My Compleinte” is the first in a group of
poems known as The Series. The Series is an odd collection of loosely related works, beginning
with Hoccleve’s discussion of a recent illness in “My Compleinte.” It is followed by a dialogue
with a friend, in which Hoccleve decides to return to writing as a way of proving his recovered
health. Subsequent poems are retellings of fables and a purported translation of advice on how to
die well, called “Ars Vtillissima Sciendi Mori.” The poems in the Series are all nevertheless
framed by the poet’s recent illness as laid out in “My Compleinte.” The poet writes that this
sickness “me oute of mysilfe caste and threwe” (ln. 42), leaving him “al brainseke” (ln. 129) so
that “the substaunce of my memorie / Wente to pleie as for a certain space” (ln. 50-51). For a
time, his memory was gone. The poet’s friends were so concerned about his condition that they
even took pilgrimages to pray for his recovery. Their touching anxiety is certainly due to
Hoccleve’s poor health, but perhaps it is also linked to the moral implications of forgetfulness: if
Hoccleve cannot remember, he cannot be prudent, and he thus fails to uphold one of the four
cardinal virtues. His status as an moral person is thus at stake. The poet asserts, however, that he
is now healed: “My wit and I haue bene of suche accord / As we were or the alteracioun” (ln. 5960). A healthy memory is the index for his recovery, and as evidence, the poet offers a specific
date for that recovery: five years prior at “Alle Halwemess” (ln. 55). This would seemingly be
sufficient proof, but Hoccleve’s efforts to exonerate himself are foiled by the impressionable
memories of his audience.
Hoccleve’s sickness filled his friends’ memories with strange and grotesque images.
“Men seiden I loked as a wilde steer / And so my looke aboute I gan to throwe,” he admits (ln.
120-21.), also recalling his friends’ observation that “‘here and there forǷe stirte I as a roo” (ln.
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128). Hoccleve remembers that during his illness, “[m]y feet weren ay wauynge to and fro /
Whanne Ƿat I stoned shulde and wiǷ men talke,/ And Ƿat myn yen souʒten euery halke” (ln. 13133). Hoccleve becomes for his friends a wild steer, a roe. His head, hands, feet, and eyes are out
of control, waving about. These images are extreme, emotional, and incorporate movement —
exactly the sort of memorable mental pictures Bradwardine advised his students to create.48 Even
the author of the Ad Herennium would have had difficulty creating a more memorable picture.
With such wild images of Hoccleve stamped in their minds, it is no wonder that the poet’s
friends are unable to accept his recovery! Knowing the rhetorical power of such images, it seems
strange that Hoccleve would evoke them. His use of these images, however, draws on several
figures of thought for a rhetorical purpose.
Hoccleve invokes the figure of thought called exemplification, or the “citing of
something done or said in the past along with a definite naming of the doer or author” (Ad
Herennium IV.XLIX), when he depicts himself during his illness. It seems, however, that he
wants to use those disturbing images as grounds for contrast, so he offers a new image of himself
in a healthier state. These images nevertheless have their own problems. The poet describes
himself going into “my chaumbre at home whanne Ƿat I was / Mysilfe aloone ” (ln. 155-56), an
uncrowded setting that medieval memory theorists would have found ideal for creating new
mental images. He depicts the scene as follows: “[m]y spirites labouriden euere ful bisily / To
peinte countenaunce, chere and look” (ln. 148-49) and “I streite vnto my mirror and my glas, /
To loke howe Ƿat me of my chere Ƿouʒt” (ln. 157-58). “Many a sauté made I to this mirror,”

There is a chance that Hoccleve would have been directly familiar with Bradwardine’s advice, despite the fact that
Bradwardine died nearly twenty years before Hoccleve was born. Bradwardine had gained some prominence in
England as the confessor of Edward III and, briefly, as the Archbishop of Canterbury. He was known primarily for
his work in logic, math, and theology, but his treatise on memory was also preserved. Even if Hoccleve had not
come across these works directly, he was likely exposed to medieval theories of memory at some point during his
education.
48
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Hoccleve admits (ln. 162). These images are hardly the contrast that readers were expecting.
Pictures of Hoccleve repeatedly jumping in front of the mirror, laboring to compose a sane and
healthy visage, leave his sanity even more in question. Hoccleve actually complicates his
problem by imprinting even stranger images on his readers’ memory. This new image is charged
with pathos and anxious movement, and would have pleased Bradwardine greatly. The poet’s
friends are not present for the scene, but it plays out in living color before the reader, making us
wonder how Hoccleve can possibly reestablish his sanity.
Hoccleve seems to be aware of the conundrum into which he has fallen. Under the rules
of memory, there seems to be no way out. Any image memorable enough to replace the thoughts
of his sickness must itself be even more troubling. The poet’s surprising next move is to attack
the very basis of memory by calling into question the images of which memory is built. “Man by
hise dedis and not by hise looks / Shal knowen be,” he charges (ln. 202-203). He again asserts,
“Uppon a look is harde men hem to grounde / What a man is. Therby the sothe is hid” (ln. 21112). Indeed, “som man lokeǷ in foltissh manere / As to Ƿe outward doom and iugement, / That,
at Ƿe prefe, discreet is and prudent,” he claims (ln. 243-45). Hoccleve argues that impressions are
not reliable because the meaning that we assign to them can be false. If this is the case, the very
system underlying memory is not trustworthy. Our minds are cluttered with hollow pictures.
Hoccleve here pushes mental images to the brink of collapse. Up to this point in the
poem, he has used text to create mental images, relying on those images to support his argument.
But now the poet questions the essential nature of the images stored and created in the mind,
suggesting that they do not provide firm grounds for making judgments or decisions.
Rather than leaving his readers floating in a sea of empty signifiers, Hoccleve offers a
solution. As in “La Male Regle,” he turns to confession. Reason counsels him, “‘But Ƿus Ƿou

106

shuldist Ƿinke in Ƿin herte, / and seie, “To Ƿee, lorde God, I haue agilte…Lorde, I me repente,
and I the mercy crie”’” (ln. 366-67, 371). The poet takes Reason’s advice, and as a result of the
confession, he is freed from worrying about what his friends think: “For euere sithen sett haue I
the lesse / By the peoples ymaginacioun” (ln. 379-80). In Carruthers’s description of the
medieval mind, the imagination is the part of the mind where information is first transformed
into images. When the poet doubts his friends’ “ymaginacioun,” he doubts their ability to form
correct memories. The act of confession doesn’t change the image of Hoccleve in his friends’
memories; instead it undermines the authority of those images, leaving Hoccleve to end the
poem on a note of praise to God. The reader is left with a peaceful impression of the poet to help
counter the bizarre mirror-gazing image from the prior stanzas. This final impression, however,
does not seem specifically designed to replace the earlier image. It is not detailed, extreme, or
emotionally charged. Indeed, the poet no longer seems particularly motivated to change his
readers’ memory, just as he claims to no longer care about his friends’ opinions. Somehow, it
seems that this change is connected to confession, which is based in text. Why, as in “La Male
Regle,” does Hoccleve again turn to confession? What is the source of its power? To answer
these questions, we need to look at the relationship between confession, rhetoric, and memory,
and then return once again to the mental images in Hoccleve’s poems.

E. Medieval Confessional Practices
In 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council mandated that all Christians confess at least once per
year, on pain of excommunication. Thomas N. Tentler notes in Sin and Confession on the Eve of
the Reformation that while the faithful obeyed the mandate, they generally limited their
confessions to once per year, partly due to the custom of paying alms after giving a confession
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(70). Confession could thus be equated with expenditure. Most people simply couldn’t afford to
confess more frequently. Despite the limited response of the faithful, after the 1215 mandate
went out, it became apparent that the church needed to train its priests in how to handle annual
confessions. Over the next few centuries, the genre of confession manuals flourished to meet this
need, with a version of a manual even appearing in Chaucer’s “Parson’s Tale.” Tentler notes that
by the fifteenth century, St. Antonius of Florence’s Confessionale and Andres de Escobar’s
Modus Confitendi were “among the most frequently printed books,” with over one hundred
editions of Antoninus’s work printed in thirty-two European cities (39). These manuals covered
all aspects of confession, ranging from the physical posture that the penitent should take
(kneeling down before or beside the priest and not making eye contact) to the organizing
principle that a confession should conform to (often the seven deadly sins or the Ten
Commandments) (Tentler 82-3, 86). There were even short verses that priests and penitents
could memorize to help them remember how to make a proper confession (117).
As a citizen in good standing and a clerk in the court, Hoccleve would certainly have
participated in confession and been aware of its requirements. Tentler observes that an effective
confession required three things of the penitent: that he or she performs well before the priest,
demonstrates true sorrow, and shows a change in behavior (104). A confession was, in essence, a
rhetorical and memorial performance. A full discussion of the rhetorical underpinnings of
confession and penance would be an essay in itself, but I do want to make a few brief
connections between confession and memory.
Confession was an exercise in rhetorical compilatio, which A.J. Minnis notes is the
“orderly arrangement of materials” (97). Looking back over his or her life, the penitent chooses
which sinful events to present, and then arranges them in a particular order to show a trajectory
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of repentance and a willingness to amend his or her ways. This act of arrangement is important,
because Minnis notes that auctoritas was bestowed on editors and compilers (100). Auctoritas
came with a certain amount of gravitas and authority. Medieval penitents assumed this authority
when they compiled and edited the events of their lives into confessions.
In “Christianity and Confession,” Michel Foucault does not use rhetorical terminology in
his discussion of confession and penance, but he does note that Christian confession is a
“hermeneutics of the self” (200), a way of making truth. Foucault highlights the role that
discretion plays when a penitent chooses what to confess. Not surprisingly, he calls up John
Cassian’s image of the money-changer (219-21). When penitents sort through their memories,
they employ discretion to identify which events require confession, and the exercise of compiling
those events is hermeneutical. Rita Copeland also points to the hermeneutical power of
compilation in her discussion of Chaucer’s Legend of Good Women. Copeland links intentio
auctoris to compilatio, as a medieval author’s stated intention often pointed to the meaning being
generated in the compiled text. When composing a confession, medieval penitents engaged in
compilatio with the intent of presenting their sins in a way that would earn the priest’s absolution
and forgiveness — hopefully accompanied by the minimum penance. Penitents thus entered into
a rhetorical act with a distinct outcome, and in a sense, they assumed the same auctoritas that
manuscript authors claimed.49

Although, as Chloe Taylor notes, Foucault ignores St. Augustine’s Confessions in his discussion of penance, it
seems obvious to turn to Augustine’s work as an example of a rhetorical confession. Augustine self-consciously
reflects on his life, composing a confession that is directed to God: “Hear my prayer, O Lord,” he cries early in the
treatise (I.XV). At the same time, Augustine is aware of the compositional process that he undertakes. This becomes
most evident in Book X, when just after describing the death of Monica, he abruptly turns to a discussion of
memory. “And so I come to the fields and vast palaces of memory, where are stored the innumerable images of
material things brought to it by the senses” Augustine writes, inviting the reader to enter his memory with him
(X.VIII). This section of the Confessions is a sort of behind-the-scenes tour of the confession composition process.
Augustine sorts through his memories, looking for the ones that should be included in his confession: “When I turn
to memory, I ask it to bring forth what I want: and some things are produced immediately, some take longer as if
they had to be brought out from some more secret place of storage; some pour out in a heap...[when] we are actually
49
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The success of the rhetorical process of confession is dependent on having an organized
memory. Carruthers and Ziolkowski find a similar spiritual imperative behind medieval accounts
of memory. They claim that the moral emphasis placed on memory by Albertus Magnus and
Thomas Aquinas is also linked to the fact that “[i]n medieval times, memoria had also to do with
fashioning a soul” (27). The state of a penitent’s memory directly impacted the state of his or her
soul by way of confession. Being able to navigate the images stored in the mind and translate
them back to words was a skill necessary for spiritual health.
This is perhaps the reason that Hoccleve turns to confession when faced with crises of
memory in “La Male Regle” and “My Compleinte.” Confession is both dependent on memory
and an exercise to strengthen memory. Eva M. Thornley’s analysis of “La Male Regle” as a
penitential lyric has been downplayed by critics like Lee Patterson, who oversimplifies her work
as “claiming that Hoccleve’s autobiographical protagonist is simply an everyman adopted to
prove a moral point” (438). Thornley’s point, however, is important and more complex than
Patterson allows. Thornley offers a close analysis of the poem to show how it meets all the
requirements of a penitential confession following the organizational principle of the seven
deadly sins. While the poet’s confession in “La Male Regle” is not detailed and perhaps
insufficient, like all confessions it is an exercise in remembering, an attempt to set the memory in
order by sorting through it, much as a money-changer would sort through his coins, setting his

wanting and looking for something quite different” (X.VIII). As he confesses some memories and leaves others
buried in the storehouse, Augustine is aware of the processes of selection and compilation. When he engages in
composing the confession, he finds the truth about himself: “And in my memory too I meet myself — I recall
myself” (X.VIII). To return to Foucault, confession is, then, a true hermeneutics of the self.
It is worth noting that Dave Tell’s “Beyond Mnemotechnics: Confession and Memory in Augustine” argues
that Augustine’s approach to memory is not strictly mnemotechnic, even though it contains some aspects of the
theory. While Tell’s article is interesting, whether or not Augustine falls completely in line with mnemotechnics is
not essential to my argument. What is essential is the connection between confession and memory.
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male in order. The penitential genre that Hoccleve chooses is an effort to heal the sickness in his
memory. Confession orders the images in his mind and uses language to make sense of them.
In “My Compleinte,” confession has similar redemptive properties. It enables the poet to
renarrate his past disease as an individual punishment from God: “He ʒaf me wit and he tooke it
away / Whanne that he sy that I it mis dispente” (ln. 400-01). Again, wit is equated to money, to
be spent and misspent.50 Hoccleve may not be able to change the images stored in the minds of
the people around him, but he reframes his own memory of the sickness through confession. To
use Foucault’s terms, the poet uses confession as a hermeneutic to recreate himself and to
fashion a new, hopeful outlook on life. The confessional genre thus gives the poet control over
his narrative. Claiming a new level of auctoritas is Hoccleve’s way of gaining rhetorical control
over the social and economic instability that he faced. In both poems, confession ultimately has
healing and empowering properties for the penitential narrator.
Chloe Taylor theorizes that confessions also intend to elicit a response of some sort from
the confessor. “We confess in intimate conversation and then await the other’s reciprocation, not
in all cases because we are interested in her life, but because the other’s response recognizes our
own confession and allows us to go on confessing,” she observes (173). This is certainly true in
Hoccleve’s poetry. In “La Male Regle,” the poet takes a begging stance, figuratively on his knees
before both the god of health and Lord Furnivall. Hoccleve confesses the misrule of his youth
with the intent of eliciting payment from the Lord. With this payment, he will find healing and,
we presume, continue his poetic endeavors. In a sense, he will be able to keep confessing
through his pen. The poem is also an attempt to act on the confessor by reversing the monetary
flow involved in a typical medieval confession; the poet hopes to divert resources from his

50

Once again, I have Matthew Giancarlo to thank for this connection.
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reader/confessor to his own penitential purse. “My Compleinte” does not make such a direct call
for cash, but the poem is certainly intended to be read and, Hoccleve undoubtedly hoped, to elicit
admiration from the reader. The ideal reader would then go on to financially support Hoccleve’s
efforts to establish his poetic reputation, reinforcing confession as a catalyst for economic
exchange.
When we consider Hoccleve’s turn to confession after his exploration of mental imagery,
it seems that the poet recognizes the power of text to create, control, and recreate images in the
mind. Through confession, either spoken to a priest or written in a penitential lyric, the speaker
(or poet) gains rhetorical control over his or her life. Listening to or reading such a confession
can change the mental images of the speaker impressed on the mind of the reader/listener, or it
can render those images obsolete. The dissociative interaction of images and texts in mental
spaces shows that texts --- particularly confessions and poems --- can be a means of limiting how
mental images are interpreted. “La Male Regle” and “My Compleinte” reveal the effectiveness
of pairing words and texts in multimodal arguments, but they show the preference given to
images in Hoccleve’s particular context. Later in the Series, in the “Ars Vtillissima Sciendi
Mori,” Hoccleve attempts to find the limits of text’s power over the image.

VI. “My myndes yen Þat cloos wer and shit”: “Ars Vtillissima Sciendi Mori” and the
Mind’s Eye
The “Ars Vtillissima Sciendi Mori,” also called “Lerne to Dye,” is the fourth of five
entries in the Series. This poem is sandwiched between two morality tales, and it borrows
heavily from Henre Seuse’s Horologium Sapientiae, a popular medieval devotional book
(Simpson Under 79). It recounts a dialogue between Arsenius and Sapience, in which Arsenius
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asks Sapience to teach him “wisdam and the konnynge / Of seintes” (ln. 8-9). Sapience replies
that the first thing he should learn is how to die (ln. 24). Instead of offering direct guidance,
Sapience tells Arsenius to “Beholde now the liknesse and figure / Of a man dyynge and talkynge
with thee” (ln. 85-6). In reply, Arsenius
considere he gan and see
In himself put the figure and liknesse
Of a yong man of excellent fairnesse
Whom deeth so ny ransakid had and soght
Þat he eithynne a whyle shoulde dye. (ln 89-93).
The image that appears in Arsenius’s mind begins to speak and tells him how to prepare to die,
so that he might live a better life. Even though he does not actually exist, the image proposes,
“let me by your ensaumple and your mirour / Lest yee slippe into my plyt miserable” (ln. 295-6).
He sets himself up in opposition to the world, which is a “mirour of deceit” (ln. 455). It seems
that the imaginary mental image offers a more true view of life than the tangible world
surrounding Arsenius. Indeed, at this point in the poem, it appears that images are better bearers
of the truth than the physical world, for Sapience has turned the lesson over to a mental
apparition instead of verbally delivering it.
Arsenius and the mental image engage in a relatively one-sided conversation, in which
the image asks him to imagine a variety of additional speakers, including Death and souls in
purgatory. The image is extraordinarily lifelike, for it even has the ability to itself imagine,
remarking, “But now Y see with myn yen mental / Th’estat of al anothir world than this” (ln.
666-7). Once its lesson is conveyed, however, the image abruptly dies, and Arsenius is left
puzzling over the nature of reality:
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This sighte of deeth so sore me astoneth
Þat wite Y can vnnethe, in soothfastnesse,
But am in doute wher the soothe woneth —
Tht is to meene, if this be in liknesse
Or in deede, which is my mazidnesse. (ln. 750-54)
The lifelike nature of the image and the image’s subsequent death blur the line between
appearance and action, between images and the words that create them. This state of aporia is
transformative, for Arsenius declares himself changed, promising to remove his featherbed and
soft pillows and eschew laziness (ln. 778-81). He proclaims, “My myndes yen Þat cloos were
and shit / I opne” (ln. 821-22), and he ends the poem with a declaration to live better now that he
is prepared to die.
In his analysis of “Ars Vtillissima,” James Simpson contextualizes the poem with
reference to the Lollard debates. He asserts that Hoccleve’s work pays homage to the tradition of
material, image-based spirituality exemplified by Nicholas Lobe’s Mirror of the Blessed Life, a
tradition that allows images to speak and thereby gives them power (Under 74-5). The Lollard
opposition to images is also an opposition to this material spirituality, for it was motivated by the
desire to prove that images were not living (75). The existence of the loquacious mental image
from the “Ars Vtillissima” seems at the outset to be a defense of images, an argument that they
can provide a pathway to wisdom otherwise unattainable. But, as Simpson argues, Hoccleve
instead pushes the image to its limit and finds it lacking: “The lonely, sick, and overburdened
image of this text disappears, unaided by friends, unaided by any sacramental system. Like the
orthodox texts that express the exhaustion of the image, Lerne to Dye teaches us that this version
of the image must also learn how to die” (83). Simpson argues that the image’s demise
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foreshadows the Refomation iconoclasm, and while I agree, I also believe that when this poem is
taken in the larger context of the Series and Hoccleve’s consideration of text and image in his
other works, there are more personal matters at stake.
The death of the image in the “Ars Vtillissima” comes so that words might be given
ultimate power over images. When Sapience turns the lesson over to the image, his ultimate
intention is that Arsenius be changed. Through a mental image, Arsenius’s mind’s eye is opened,
and he learns to see clearly. But this is a poem, so that change will be expressed in words.
Indeed, the medium of poetry is words, and the events of the poem are themselves — like the
image — mental images in the mind of the reader. Hoccleve is banking on the ability of his
words to evoke these mental images, and like Sapience, he is looking for a change in the minds
of those who imagine them.
As I mentioned earlier, Hoccleve’s purpose for the Series is to reestablish his poetic
reputation after a bout of mental illness. “My Compleinte” puts forth this premise, and the later
poems in the Series represent the poet’s efforts to show that he is fit for literary work. The “Ars
Vtillissima” is thus part of a larger attempt to alter the poet’s friends’ mental images of his
illness. When the image dies, Arsenius embarks on a more full life, just as Hoccleve hopes to
return to his literary career after mental images of his illness die. Simpson is right to say that the
poet pushes images to the breaking point, but Hoccleve does not do this for disinterested
theoretical purposes. His poetic reputation depends on the fact that mental images can, and
sometimes should, die. Even further, these images have to die so that the poet’s words can live.
Sometimes, images need to be sacrificed to text.
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VII. Conclusion
Dissociative relationships are highly contextualized, with the values of terms I and II
deriving from the rhetor and audience’s unique circumstances. The dissociative relationship
between texts and images in Thomas Hoccleve’s poetry is no exception. Hoccleve’s preference
for texts is certainly economically motivated. As a clerk in the Office of the Privy Seal, he made
a living with words. Crafting language consumed much of his time: Hoccleve spent much of his
adult life writing petitions, and he even compiled an extensive formulary. His hobby was
composing poetry. Images were of secondary concern, supplementing texts in places like the
illuminated manuscripts of The Regiment of Princes.
But Hoccleve also had a personal stake in understanding how combinations of texts and
images make meaning. When mental images of his illness threatened these pursuits, it is no
wonder that he argued for the power of words over such images. The poet’s mental breakdown
led him to consider the problems of how mental images are created and how they might be
changed, because he needed to argue for his recovered sanity.
The mental images that Hoccleve was preoccupied with are a unique type of multimodal
argument when they are evoked by texts and controlled by texts. Dissociatively, mental images
are often part of image/text pairs. Hoccleve’s works show us that texts can be the means of
restricting — and sometimes even killing — mental images, and that battleground for the two
media is often in the mind. The poet recognized that the relationship between the texts and
images is powerful, and his conclusion looks forward to the Reformation preference for texts and
suspicion of images. In the next chapter, I will look more closely at how the medium given
preference in an image-text argument can control the argument’s circulation and reproduction.
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Chapter Four
Reproducing Heaven: Dissociation and Byzantine Icons

Figure 4.1. Pantocrator icon of the
panel type. Photo by the author.
I. Byzantine Icons: A Working Definition
Sitting on the desk in my study is a Byzantine-style panel icon of Christ Pantocrator. The
image is wooden and small, about 4 inches high, and it has a golden glow (see Fig. 4.1). Christ
gazes out from the center, solemn, making an Eastern Orthodox Christian sign of blessing. The
Greek text to the left reads “παντοκράτορ” meaning “the Almighty” or “The All-Governing
One.” To the right is the Greek word “θεός,” meaning “God.” The haloed Christ bears a book
inscribed with words of scripture, which a year of Greek has not fully prepared me to translate.
The Pantocrator icon was purchased in a Jerusalem bazaar by my father when he was there on a
business trip, and was later given to me as a gift.
On the bulletin board to the left of my desk is another Byzantine-style icon, this one
printed on a sheet of paper (see Fig. 4.2). The printed icon depicts the baptism of Christ, who
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stands astride a sea monster that has somehow invaded a dark Jordan River. John the Baptist is
perched on the left bank, arms outstretched, quizzically peering at a dove, which is descending
from on high in a pointy ray. A friend found this icon in an online image search that led her to
the website of Tamara Rigishvili, an Orthodox icon painter in Tblisi, Georgia. She downloaded
the image, printed out the icon, and gave it to me.

Figure 4.2. Icon of Christ's baptism,
printed on paper and given to me by
a friend. Photo by the author.
Both of these icons traveled a long way before arriving in my study: one came many miles by
plane, the other by way of the digital frontier. These icons are not original designs -- they are
copies of much older works, which were themselves intended for Eastern Orthodox Christian
religious practice and not for the home office of an American Protestant. What are we to make of
images like these? As an interesting nexus of the material and the spiritual, text and image, art
and religion, Byzantine icons can take on a range of meanings. We can better navigate these
meanings when we examine how texts and images interact dissociatively in icons, as well as how
the relationship between the two media changes through time and in different rhetorical spaces.
This chapter considers icons at various stages in their history, from legends about the
appearance of the first icons to modern treatment of the images in museums, churches, and
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digital spaces. In different times and contexts, the dissociative relationship between images and
texts changes: sometimes images are the privileged medium in term II of the philosophical pair,
and sometime texts are privileged. I draw on Walter Benjamin’s theory of mechanical
reproduction to show how the privileged medium impacts the circulation and reproduction of
icons. When texts are the privileged medium, icons have a limited range of circulation and
reproducing icons becomes time-consuming. On the other hand, circulation is wider and
reproduction happens much more quickly when images are the preferred medium. I also draw on
Roxanne Mountford’s approach to rhetorical space to consider how different contexts shape the
way that an icon is perceived and which medium is given preference. Examining icons in a
variety of spaces, both physical and digital, shows that dissociative multimodal relationships are
heavily influenced by their context.
A discussion of Byzantine icons seems destined to begin with a brief examination of the
Greek word εικον, from which the name for these images is derived. The Greek word can take on
a variety of meanings. Anna Kartsonis notes that these include “likeness, image, [and]
representation. But eikon could also refer to a living image, an image in a mirror, a phantom and
imaginary form, or an image in the mind; that is, a vision” (58). The numerous facets of the root
word are important because they point to the complicated nature of these Byzantine Christian
images. Icons are likenesses, images, and representations: from an art historical perspective, they
are a unique genre of religious art. Kartsonis observes that icons can take a variety of forms,
from the panel icon -- an image painted on a wooden board -- to the elaborate mosaics found in
Byzantine churches. They can also be crafted from a number of materials, including wood, ivory,
tiles, paint, and precious metals (60). The subjects of these images are depictions of Jesus Christ,
His mother Mary (known as the Theotokos, or God-bearer, in the Eastern Orthodox Christian
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tradition), a number of saints, angels and certain religious events (60). Icons are, however,
defined by more than their material form and subject matter.
The practices surrounding an icon are as much a part of the image as the material of
which it is composed. Robin Cormack defines icons as “paintings on wood panels made for
public use in the rituals and decoration of the Byzantine and Orthodox church and for private
devotions and prayers at home. This means that it was (and still is) a form of art that both
promotes and supports Christian faith and worship, and which communicates the ways in which
believers may understand their world” (8). Cormack asserts that it is problematic to define icons
through their material characteristics and treat them simply as art, for many Orthodox viewers
see them primarily as religious objects (20). Cormack’s caution gestures to one of the most
fascinating properties of icons: their location on the edge of the material and the spiritual. A
material, art-historical definition of the icon gives us a useful place to begin a discussion about
the images, but their spiritual dimension is also important. In this chapter, therefore, I will rely
on Kartsonis’s definition of an icon’s form, materials, and subject matter, while taking into
account Cormack’s description of their use.
Just as icons straddle the line between the material and the spiritual, they also straddle the
line between images and texts. Materially, icons are images -- images of Christian religious
figures and religious events. Yet these images are connected to a labyrinthine collection of
stories and theology that explain both what they mean and how they are to be handled. The bulk
of the theological texts that defined icons were composed between the fourth and ninth centuries.
Treatises from theologians contained stories about miraculous icons and explicted the role of the
images in religious life. These most frequently cited theologians include Basil the Great, Gregory
the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, Epiphanius, Nikephoros, and St. John of Damascus. The
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Byzantine Orthodox Church’s official statements on icons were developed during church
councils, including the Quinisext Council in 692 and the Seventh Ecumenical Council in 787. In
turn, the iconophile theology and church council proceedings are themselves grounded in various
Biblical passages. Significantly, the Bible does not say a great deal about how Byzantine icons
should be treated: the genre of image developed long after the scriptures were canonized in the
fourth and fifth centuries. For this reason, most of the theology surrounding icons comes from
the writing of iconophile theologians and church council proceedings. The theological treatises
and proceedings are thus the texts that I refer to when I talk about the texts connected to icons.
Obviously, the church council proceedings and theological treatises are not directly
written onto the icons. Icons contain two possible types of text: a passage of scripture in an open
Bible held by the figure, and more commonly, the name of the figure or figures in the image.
Following Iconoclasm, icons were often labeled with the names of their prototypes so that the
images could be properly understood within the theological context that had developed by the
ninth century. Labeling the icons connects them to the larger body of treatises and church council
proceedings. Even though these texts are not directly visible on Byzantine icons, they are an
inextricable part of the image. Icons are thus a nexus of texts and images, and this is the reason
that I consider them multimodal arguments
The relationship between icons’ images and their texts is complicated and shifts over
time: sometimes the images are given preference, and other times the texts become more
important. If we examine the images in the period prior to Byzantine iconoclasm, during
Iconoclasm, and in our current digital age, it becomes clear that the medium that is given
preference impacts the images’ circulation and replication.
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II. Pre-Iconoclasm Icons: The Rise of a Religious Image
Icons began to proliferate early in the Christian tradition, and these images often
possessed miraculous powers. Competing Eastern and Western legends date the first icon back to
the life of Jesus. Hans Belting juxtaposes these Eastern and Western legends to show that the
ideal icon is an achieropoietos image, or one made without hands (208-24). Belting recounts the
Eastern legend of the first icon in a story about King Abgar, who believed that seeing an image
of Jesus could cure his serious illness. Abgar sent a messenger to Jesus with a request that the
Teacher sit for a portrait. When the messenger was unable to accurately paint him, Jesus instead
washed his face with a towel, miraculously imprinting his features on the cloth. The cloth
became known as the Mandylion, and is also called the Image of Edessa. Upon beholding the
image, King Abgar was reportedly healed. The Mandylion performed later miracles, including
toppling a pagan idol mounted nearby, producing oil which was used to set fire to an enemy
army, and leaving its imprint on a tile behind which it was hidden (Belting 211). Eventually, the
image made its way to the city of Edessa, where it was hung on the city gate and protected the
people when they were under siege from the Persians in 544, before being taken to
Constantinople in 944 (Belting 211, Kitzinger 103). Although records of the Mandylion cease
following Iconoclasm, replicas can be found as panel icons in Rome and Genoa (Belting 208,
210).
The Western legend of the first icon is perhaps more familiar, for it is the story of the
Veronica cloth. Belting notes that this achieropoietos icon was created when Jesus wiped his
face on a cloth either on the Mount of Olives or on the way to his crucifixion. Veronica was the
name of the woman who owned the cloth, so the resulting icon was titled in her honor. As in the
Eastern story, Jesus’ features were preserved on the cloth, which itself later performed signs and
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miracles. In other variations of the Western legend, Veronica is the woman Jesus healed from
perpetual bleeding. She had the Teacher’s image painted in honor of the miracle, and that image
was purportedly summoned by and healed the ailing Emperor Tiberius. During the Middle Ages,
the Veronica cloth was a popular pilgrimage destination, and replicated images of the cloth were
a common souvenir. The cloth currently resides at St. Peter’s in Rome (Belting 209, 215-21).
Clearly, there are similarities between the Eastern and Western stories, and Belting even
mentions a Syrian monk who confused the two in 1237 (218).
Significantly, the claims to holiness made for the Mandylion and the Veronica cloth are
based in theie achieropoietic genesis. Because they were not made by the hands of men, the
images are believed to be direct creations of the divine and therefore authentic representations of
Christ. The lack of connection to a human artist justifies their special powers, yet even icons that
were not deemed achieropoietos occasionally behaved miraculously. Glen Peers notes that a
seventh-century text attributed to Athanasius tells the story of an icon of Jesus in the city of
Beirut that bled when stabbed by the spear of a Jew. Peers reports that this story also appears in
the Letter of the Three Patriarchs to the Emperor Theophilos, which has been dated to the midninth century. In the Letter, the Beirut icon appears alongside two other bleeding icons. One of
these, a mosaic of the Theotokos and child, was located in a church on Cyprus. After being
pierced by the arrow of a non-believing Arab, the Theotokos bled. The other, an icon of Jesus in
the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, also bled when attacked by an unbeliever (Peers 45-6).
The legends of these early icons accord the images a great deal of power: power to heal
the sick, intervene in a military clash, and even duplicate themselves. The images also take on
human characteristics, bleeding when attacked. Indeed, these icons were no ordinary pictures.
Today, we know about these images because their stories were recorded in texts, and yet it seems
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that the texts were merely reporting the legends that had grown up around the images and not
creating the legends. In this period, the images themselves bore the real power. Historian Ernst
Kitzinger even reports that parts of the legend around the Mandylion were originally based on a
letter and not an image at all. The ancient historian Procopius wrote about the Persian siege of
the city of Edessa in the sixth century, within fifty years of the actual siege. Procopius noted that
the city was supposedly protected by a letter sent by Christ to King Abgar centuries before,
which had been written on the city gates. Later accounts of the siege turn the letter into an image,
and Kitzinger writes that this change “points up the rise of the belief in the magic power of
images better than any other miraculous tale” (103). During this period, it could thus be said that
the images and their texts were related dissociatively as a text/image pair. The images were the
more valued medium, and the texts from the period reflect the power these images possessed.
The power given to these images also impacted the ways that they were copied and
circulated. The sacred nature of achieropoietos images was sometimes reinforced by their ability
to self-replicate. For example, the Mandylion’s legend claims that the cloth left an image on a
tile with which it came into contact, with no help from human hands.51 On the other hand, once
the Veronica cloth had proven its sacredness through miracles, craftsmen made replicas to
commemorate the image (Belting 221). In this case, human replication is a result, perhaps a
consequence, of the image’s holiness. Replication -- either human or divine -- therefore played
an important role in establishing and maintaining the reputations of these early icons.
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This same idea of divine replication also appears in the legend of the Kamouliani icon of Christ, as reported by
Kartsonis. This icon appeared to a wealthy woman in Cappadocia, when she said that she could not worship Christ
because she could not see him. One day, she found a cloth with an imprint of his image in her fountain. Taking it
out, and finding it to be miraculously dry, she placed it in her head-scarf and took it to her spiritual advisor. When
she arrived, she found that the image had replicated itself on the head scarf. These two images have a rich history in
the Byzantine empire. One was carried throughout various cities to raise money for a new temple. One became a
palladium for Constantinople, protecting it through sieges and being taken to battle to rally the troops. The
whereabouts of the images were lost following Iconoclasm (60-64).
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Figure 4.3. Icon of a Male and
Female Martyrs (sic), showing two
unidentified martyrs and dating from
the sixth or seventh century.
Replicating icons nevertheless had some problematic implications. After the power of the images
was established, art historian Henry Maguire notes that during fifth and sixth centuries, leading
up to Byzantine iconoclasm, images of saints were treated in a superstitious manner directly
associated with practices of household magic. Like magic symbols, images of saints were
reproduced indiscriminately under the belief that “the greater the number of devices, the greater
was their effect on unseen forces” (120). These images appeared on amulets, textiles, tiles,
bowls, and other household goods, as well as in paintings and mosaics (118-32). This was
problematic because, as Maguire notes, “the Christian images became ambiguous and obscure,
rather than well defined” (120). Frequently, the saints were vaguely drawn and unidentifiable,
like some of the saints in Figure 4.3. This painted Byzantine icon, titled Icon of a Male and
Female Martyrs (sic), dates from the sixth or seventh century, and contains the images of two
martyrs. Keeping with Maguire’s argument, the specific identities of these figures are not known.
It is true that not all icons during this period were ambiguous. Figure 4.4 is the Virgin and
Child with Two Saints, a painted icon dating from the second half of the sixth century from St.
Catherine Monastery in Mt. Sinai, Egypt. While the saints are not directly identifiable, the
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figures of the Theotokos and Child are distinctive. The portrait type of these two figures was
established early on, as the Theotokos is the only haloed woman to be depicted holding a child in
an icon. Other identifiable figure types were also beginning to develop in the period prior to
Iconoclasm. Figure 4.5, the Icon of Saint Peter, dates from the first half of the seventh century.
Although the featured saint and the figures in the upper medallions are not labeled, some of them
can be named. The featured saint carries a set of keys, which is a convention of images of St.
Peter; the icon is thus an early example of the portrait type of St. Peter. The figure in the middle
top medallion is also identifiable thanks to the cross behind his head, a convention associated
with images of Christ. If you look closely the at Christ child in Figure 4.4, the outlines of a cross
can be also seen in his halo. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show that there were exceptions to Maguire’s
observation, and that not all icons were ambiguous.

Figure 4.4. Virgin and Child
with Two Saints, from St.
Catharine Monastery in Mount
Sinai, Egypt

Figure 4.5. Icon of Saint
Peter, from the first half
of the seventh century

As a whole, the power that religious images gained in the centuries leading up to Iconoclasm was
a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it made icons a religious force to be reckoned with: they
were widespread and popular. On the other hand, the precise meaning of the images was
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sometimes ambiguous. The development of the distinguishable portrait types that began prior to
Iconoclasm points to the growing importance of connecting the images with their prototypes.
This also foreshadows some of the changes that took place during and following Iconoclasm.

III. Byzantine Iconoclasm: Equating Texts and Images
Byzantine Iconoclasm was a period of intermittent conflict that rocked the Byzantine
Empire between the eighth and ninth centuries, impacting both the religious and political forces
in the realm. While it can be argued that Iconoclasm also had roots in political, economic,
religious, and philosophical debates, the conflict came to a head over Orthodox Christian
religious images.52 From 726, when the Byzantine emperor Leo III removed an icon of Christ
from the Chalke Gate in Constantinople,53 until icons were restored to the Hagia Sophia in 843,
iconoclasts and iconophiles disputed whether or not it was acceptable -- or even possible -- to
make an image of Jesus Christ and how such images should be handled.54 The conflict between
the iconoclasts, who were adamantly opposed to the use of icons, and the iconophiles, who
approved of using the images in religious practice, played out in a series of theological treatises
and church council decrees. As iconophile and iconoclast rulers cycled through the Imperial

See Brock, “Iconoclasm and the Monophysites;” Cameron, “The Language of Images: The Rise of Icons and
Christian Representation;” Dagron, “Holy Images and Likenesses;” Kolbaba, Inventing Latin Heretics: Byzantines
and the Filioque of the Ninth Century; Mango, “Historical Introduction;” and Ouspensky, “The Meaning and
Language of Icons.”
52
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The Chalke Gate was the main entrance to the Imperial Palace in Constantinople. Displaying icons above the gate
indicated imperial acceptance of the images.
54

Some historians, such as Cyril Mango, suggest that the events leading to the removal of the Chalke Gate images
began in 724, when the Byzantine city of Ikonion fell to Arab invaders. Mango notes that during the same year,
Caliph Yazid II, a neighboring Arab leader, had ordered the destruction of all images in his lands. Byzantines linked
the defeat of Ikonion to divine displeasure, and Yazid’s destruction of images to divine favor. In 726, there was a
huge underwater eruption in the Aegean Sea, which Byzantine Emperor Leo III interpreted as another symbol of
divine discontent. Leo III removed the icons from the Chalke Gate, beginning Iconoclasm (Mango 2-3). See
Appendix A for a more detailed list of the events leading to and during Iconoclasm.
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Palace, competing decrees were issued in an attempt to define the images and their role in the
church. The cumulative result of these decrees was that icons were given equivalent spiritual
standing to texts.
Histories are usually written by the victors, and the iconophiles were ultimately the
victors in the Byzantine struggle. What we know of the iconoclast position is thus preserved in
iconophile documents, including the proceedings of the Sixth Session of the Seventh Ecumenical
Council, held in 787. The proceedings are recorded as a dialogue in which Gregory the Bishop
reads from passages of a “Definition” purportedly created by the iconoclast Council of Hiereia in
754, and Epiphanius the Deacon and Chamberlain offers the iconophile Council’s theological
rebuttal. The Council’s defense of icons centers on the foundational Eastern Orthodox doctrine
of the incarnation, or the idea that Jesus Christ was simultaneously God and man. When Gregory
presents the iconoclasts’ argument that it is impossible to make an icon of Christ because his
divine nature could not be circumscribed by lines and paint, Epiphanius counters with a
reference to the incarnation, proclaiming, “If the divine nature was circumscribed with the
human nature, so is his uncircumscribable divinity together with the depicted icon of the human
nature” (“The Sixth Session” 253E, pg 86). An icon is thus a doctrinal claim: if the incarnation
occurred, it was possible for an icon to depict both the divine and the human. Iconophiles
consequently viewed the iconoclasts as heretics who rejected essential doctrine. The use of the
images was thus directly linked to an acceptance of a particular theology, which was itself
preserved in texts.
Iconoclasts also questioned the Orthodox practice of kissing and reverencing icons,
accusing iconophiles of breaking the Old Testament prohibition on worshipping idols.
Epiphanius firmly denies the charge and explains why the images received special treatment:
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“As for the icons, Christians do not call them ‘gods,’ nor do they worship them as gods…They
have kissed them and have ascribed to them a veneration of honour, only for the sake of recalling
and of being reminded, and out of zeal for their prototypes” (225A, 64). Iconophiles justified
their behavior by claiming that the prototype represented in an icon received the honor or
dishonor bestowed on the image. Epiphanius links this to the classical custom of reverencing
images of rulers, pointing to the common assumption that the emperor himself would receive the
treatment given to his portrait (273A-B, 101). Like those who showed respect to royal portraits,
the iconophiles saw themselves as remembering and offering due worship to Christ and
reverence to the saints who were fully represented by the images.
In their defense of the iconophile position, the Seventh Ecumenical Council borrowed a
great deal from both early church fathers and contemporary icon apologists. One such apologist
was St. John of Damascus, an Eastern Orthodox monk who wrote from a monastery outside the
Byzantine Empire during the first half of the eighth century. The following lines from his On the
Divine Images sum up the essence of the iconophiles’ stance:
In former times God, who is without form or body could never be depicted. But
now when God is seen in the flesh conversing with men, I make an image of the
God whom I see. I do not worship matter; I worship the Creator of matter who
became matter for my sake, who willed to take His abode in matter; who worked
out my salvation through matter. Never will I cease honoring the matter which
wrought my salvation! I honor it, but not as God. (section 16)
Both John of Damascus and Epiphanius emphasized the difference between honoring material
things and worshiping them because it opened the possibility that matter could be integrated into
spirituality without the danger of idolatry. Material objects — including images and icons —
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could be a part of worship without being worshiped themselves. Indeed, the interiors of
Byzantine churches were frequently covered with golden mosaic icons, often in scenes stacked
two or three high so that the entire interior of the church glittered. Slobodan Ćurĉić notes that the
resulting ephemeral atmosphere reminded congregants of the divine light, allowing even the
architecture of the churches to play a role in Eastern Orthodox practices (9). The iconophile
theology essentially sanctified all aspects of the material world.
Another effect of the iconophiles’ theology was that icons were elevated to the level of
sacred Biblical texts. Leslie Brubaker’s Vision and Meaning in Ninth-Century Byzantium: Image
as Exegesis in the Homilies of Gregory of Nazianzus contains a fascinating discussion of the
relative authority of texts and images during the period leading up to and comprising
Iconoclasm. Brubaker surveys numerous Byzantine Orthodox theologians who argued that
images could bear the same spiritual doctrine as texts, including John of Damascus, Photios, and
Nikephoros, who posited that “through calligraphic genius the teachings of divine history appear
to us…by the excellence of painting, those same things are shown to us” (cited in Brubaker 47).
Nikephoros argued that language and image alike could convey religious teachings. Even the
iconoclast emperors Michael II and Theophilos noted the equivalence of images and texts when
they wrote that icons “displayed in higher places” were “permitted to remain so that the picture
might serve as scripture” (cited in Brubaker 47). St. John of Damascus elaborated on the same
principle: “For just as words edify the ear, so also the image stimulates the eye. What the book is
to the literate, the image is to the illiterate. Just as words speak to the ear so the image speaks to
the sight; it brings us understanding” (section 17). Icons were seen as a sort of living Scripture,
able to communicate to the many congregants who could not read, and so were given an
equivalent status to texts.
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This equivalence can be seen in the language used to talk about icon creation and writing
that developed during Iconoclasm. The Greek word “γραφη” is used for both writing and
painting icons (Sahas 14). Even further, Daniel J. Sahas notes that “the icon is traditionally called
historesis (which means both written narrative and painting), iconography is called historia
(history or narrative), and the iconographer historiographos (painter or narratives) or historistes
(narrator)” (14). If images and texts could convey the same spiritual doctrine, writing and
painting were similar enough acts that they blended together linguistically.
Brubaker points out that alongside this argument for equivalence was a tendency to
privilege images over texts, which may have been connected to problems with manuscript
forgery during the period. She notes that Byzantine Orthodox Christians highly valued tradition,
so both iconophiles and iconoclasts sought to ground their arguments in the writings of venerated
theologians and authorities. This was a complicated process because, as Brubaker notes, forgery
was practically “a closet industry by the seventh century” (49). Manuscripts were easily forged,
and along with them the authority that the supposedly ancient texts bore. Indeed, accusations of
quoting from doctored texts were common in the debates between the iconophiles and
iconoclasts. Because of this, Orthodox theologians ranging from St. Basil to Anastasios of Sinai,
Nikephoros, Theodore of Stoudion, and Photios all argued for the “superiority of visual over
written witnesses” (48). In his Homily 17 from 867, Photios compared written accounts about
martyrs to visualizations of their trials and concluded that for audiences, “the comprehension that
comes through sight is shown to be far superior” (cited in Brubaker 48). If images were both
more reliable and more comprehendible than texts, then the medium was more powerful.
While the arguments for privileging images did not prevail, the two media were
ultimately deemed equal. The iconophiles’ theology accorded images the same degree of
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reverence as the Biblical scriptures, a standing that continues in the Orthodox Christian church
even today. Contemporary Orthodox scholar Leonid Ouspensky writes that there is “a complete
correspondence between verbal image and visual image…This formulation shows that the
Church sees in the icon not a simple art, serving to illustrate the Holy Scriptures, but a complete
correspondence of the one to the other, and therefore attributes to the icon the same dogmatic,
liturgic and educational significance as it does to the Holy Scriptures” (“The Meaning and
Language of Icons” 30). Divorced from Eastern Orthodox theology and rituals, icons might be
seen as a mere genre of art. Within the context of this tradition following Iconoclasm, however,
the images become much more.

IV. Post-Iconoclasm Changes: Reversing the Text/Image Pair
The equality of images and texts established during Iconoclasm had a significant
consequence: icons fell under the same prohibition on alteration that guarded scriptural texts. In
an article on the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America’s website, John Yiannias shows how
this prohibition continues even today, warning that “[a]n image changed to suit an individual's
taste is as dangerous as a doctored Scriptural text” (“Orthodox Art and Architecture”). Just as
altering a passage of Scripture is sacrilegious, altering the subject matter of an icon distorts
divine doctrine. To protect this doctrine, it became necessary to separate icons from other forms
of art. Following Iconoclasm, a number of conventions and limitations thus developed around
the images. The eventual result of giving equality to texts and images was that the theological
texts defining icons actually came to dominate and control the images.
In the introduction to his translation of the Seventh Ecumenical Council’s proceedings,
Sahas notes the outcome of iconophile theology: “[T]he Byzantine icon is not a specimen of
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aesthetic art but an expression of spirituality. For the iconographer everything becomes an
instrument of spirituality, even the tools, the colours, the walls, the brushes, and the boards in
their crude material form” (9). It is the context and conventions surrounding an icon that give the
image its spiritual weight, transforming it from an art object to a religious object. When the
theological context is removed, the icon loses something integral. As Philip Sherrard observes,
“[A]n icon divorced from its framework ceases to be an icon. An icon divorced from a place and
act of worship is a contradiction in terms” (58). For an icon to be an icon in the terms laid out
during Iconoclasm, its means of production and replication must be limited to protect the
religious framework. The conventions developed following Iconoclasm do just this.
There was a distinct shift in the way that icons were treated after Iconoclasm ended.
Maguire notes that icons became more detailed and specific. Saints were given distinct portrait
types, and their images were often labeled with the name of the prototype (16-17, 38). Although,
as I have shown, these tendencies began prior to Iconoclasm, they were codified during and after
the period. Following Iconoclasm, Eastern Orthodox tradition also limited the subject matter of
the images to Christ, the Theotokos, certain saints, and particular religious scenes. Iconography
is practiced by Orthodox Christians around world today, far beyond the borders of the ancient
Byzantine Empire; nevertheless, new subjects are rarely added, and scenes repeated over the
centuries preserve the same general details. The new practices ensured that icons could not be
treated superstitiously, but instead emphasized their role as unique reminders of the divine. They
also tied the images more closely to their prototypes and made indiscriminate reproduction more
difficult (Maguire 120).
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Figure 4.6. The Pantocrator icon
in my study. Photo by the author.
Although there are certainly exceptions to Maguire’s argument, the development of
portrait types is exemplified by the Pantocrator icon in my study (see Fig. 4.6). The icon is
labeled with the titles “the Almighty” and “God” so that the subject is unmistakable. Christ’s
nimbus is also inscribed with the outline of a cross and includes the letters omicron, omega and
nu (ο, ω, ν), which Eastern Orthodox scholar Vladimir Lossky notes is a reference to the Greek
rendering of God’s name as revealed to Moses in Exodus 3:14: ό ών, meaning “The Being”
(“The Saviour Archieropoietos” 72). In addition, most Pantocrator icons include the letters “IC
XC’ written on either side of Christ’s head in reference to His abbreviated Greek title (72), but
this convention is incomplete in my icon. The letter X appears in a red circular design in the
upper right of the image, but the subsequent C is cut off. Gone also is the IC, which ought to
appear to the left. Nevertheless, there is a gesture toward the labeling conventions of the
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Pantocrator type. The gesture of blessing that Christ makes with His right hand is frequently
repeated in other icons of the Pantocrator type, ensuring consistency across versions of the same
type.

Figure 4.7. Apse mosaic of the
Cappella Palatina in Palermo,
Italy. Photo by the author.
Figure 4.7 is another example of a Pantocrator icon showing the persistence of these
same conventions over time, place, and different artistic media. This image shows the twelfthcentury Pantocrator apse mosaic of the Cappella Palatina in Palermo, Italy. This mosaic was
likely created by Byzantine-trained artists brought over for the chapel’s decoration (Lowden 31617), indicating how strong the figure type remained even after iconoclasm.
The image of Christ in the baptism icon in my study (Fig. 4.2) is remarkably similar, for
the portrait type of Christ persists beyond Pantocrator style icons. Like the Pantocrator Christ,
the baptized Christ bears a nimbus inscribed with the outline of the top of a cross and an omega,
omicron, and nu. Although the order of the letters differs, there is no mistaking that these two
figures represent the same person. In addition, both Christs have neatly trimmed beards and
longer brown hair, parted in the middle and fuller over the right shoulder. The baptism icon was
created by Georgian Orthodox icon painter Tamara Rigishvili in 2009, quite distant from the
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Cappella Palatina mosaic. Nevertheless, the similarities between the figures testify to the strength
of the portrait types.
Just as there is consistency between figure types over time, there is also a remarkable
consistency in depictions of religious scenes. Icon painters on Greece’s Mt. Athos, the monastic
heart of Eastern Orthodoxy, possessed a manual describing the approved saints and religious
scenes by the end of the eighteenth century (Belting 17-19). Ouspensky writes that there are even
guidelines surrounding the composition of panel icons, including the preparation of the wood,
composition of the paint, color palate, and the order in which the colors are applied (“The
Technique of Iconography” 53-55). While there isn’t a record of icon manuals during the
Byzantine period, the conventions that later manuals recorded were descriptive of a tradition that
had developed over centuries. The existence of these manuals shows that the content of icons has
been determined by larger Orthodox traditions and not left to individual artists.
A comparison of the baptism icon in my study (see Fig. 4.2) with a sixteenth-century
Russian icon verifies the continuity in depictions of religious scenes. Lossky and Ouspensky
describe and catalog a number of icon types in The Meaning of Icons, including the baptism icon
type. When Lossky discusses a sixteenth-century Russian icon of Christ’s baptism held by the
Temple Gallery in London, he observes that the icon depicts the Holy Trinity: God the Father is
represented by a blue half-circle near the top of the icon, the Holy Spirit descends in a blue ray as
a dove, and Christ is seen as a man in the center of the image (164-65). The icon in my study
shows the Christ figure and a dove descending in blue ray, although the divine half-circle is
missing. In Lossky’s Russian icon, Christ stands on waters that represent the Jordan River, which
appear to cover him like a cave, linking the baptism scene to Christ’s later death and burial.
Christ also holds out His right hand over the waters in a gesture of blessing, symbolizing His
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acceptance of the future. John the Baptist stands to one side and reaches out his right hand in a
blessing over Christ’s head, while angels witness the scene and hold their cloaks in a posture of
servitude (Lossky 164-65). These details are all present in my icon, including the figures making
the same gestures and taking the same stance. Even small details like the angels’ offered cloaks
are reproduced faithfully.
It is true there are some important differences between the icons. Lossky mentions the
figures of a fleeing woman and man in the water, representing the sea and the waters of the
Jordan River (165). The Jordan River in my icon only contains fish and a sea monster. On the
other hand, my icon adds an image of a stump with a green shoot and an axe, which does not
appear in Lossky’s description of the Russian icon. Although these elements differ, they actually
serve the same function of referencing other scripture verses that add theological meaning to the
image. The stump is likely a reference to Matthew 3:10, where John the Baptist testifies about
the coming Messiah, while Lossky writes that the fleeing woman and man refer to a
prefiguration of baptism in Psalms 113 (165). Both symbols situate the baptism scene within a
larger scriptural narrative, pointing to prophesies that are fulfilled in the scene. Even these small
differences between the icons have a remarkably similar purpose.
A Google image search for “Byzantine baptism icon” turns up images of countless icons
of Christ’s baptism, ranging from the Byzantine era to images by modern icon paintings like
Tamara Rigishvili. Ultimately, there is not a great deal of difference between the major elements
in this wide range of icons, once again emphasizing the remarkable consistency among icon
types. The exception to this is the missing divine half-circle in my icon, which I will address
later.
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I have gone to such great lengths to show the similarities in figure types and scenes
because the remarkable consistency over time is indicative of the limitations on icons’
production and subject matter that resulted from Iconoclasm theology. Even though the images
were given the level of authority as texts, the theological texts that gave them this authority also
controlled the images. What seemed to be an equivalence was actually a reversal of the
dissociative relationship connecting the two media before Iconoclasm: the relationship between
religious texts and images following that tumultuous period privileged texts over images.
The reversal in the pair is in accordance with what Chaim Perelman and Lucie OlbrechtsTyteca had to say about dissociative definitions in The New Rhetoric. When a definition “claims
to furnish the real, true meaning of a concept as opposed to its customary or apparent usage,”
that definition is the result of a dissociation (444). When iconophile theology separated the
proper uses of icons from those which were popular and customary, that theology became the
term II used to define the images. Uses of the images and image designs which were not in
accordance with the theology were dissociated from the icon genre. The iconophile argument
could itself be represented through a series of dissociative philosophical pairs, but analyzing the
argument strays beyond the bounds of what I want to consider. I want instead to focus on the
consequences of moving theological texts to term II of the image/text dissociative pair. The
codification of icons as a genre of art is the result of privileging the theological texts. There are
numerous examples of paintings, sculptures, drawings, and other representation of Christian
religious figures, but these figures are not all Byzantine icons. It is only the figures that fall
within the descriptions (and prescriptions) of the theological texts that are classified as Byzantine
icons. In other words, the texts make it possible for us to talk about Byzantine icons as a genre of
art.
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Thus far, I have shown how the relationship between texts and images changed over time,
but I want to now consider how that same relationship can be impacted by spaces, both
architectural and digital.

V. Icons in Architectural Spaces
Byzantine icons do not exist in a vacuum. They are intended to be seen, and so are often
displayed in architectural spaces like museums and churches. Because icons are a nexus of art
and religion, text and image, they can take on a variety of meanings that are influenced by their
surroundings. In this section, I want to examine a continuum of spaces where these images can
be found, beginning with churches and ending with museums, and consider how these spaces
influence the dissociative text-image relationship that shapes icons.
We often discuss the role that context plays in the creation of rhetorical meaning, but
material spaces are not always given the attention that they deserve. Roxanne Mountford
attempts to remedy this in her discussion of rhetorical space:
Rhetorical space is the geography of the communicative event and, like all
landscapes, may include both the cultural and material arrangement, whether
intended or fortuitous, of space. The cultural is the grid across which we measure
and interpret space but also the nexus from which creative minds manipulate
material space. The material — a dimension too little theorized by rhetoricians —
often has unforeseen influence over a communicative event and cannot always be
explained by cultural or creative intent. (17)
Rhetorical space calls attention to the ways that cultural and material elements influence
rhetorical meaning. In the case of Byzantine icons, these elements of rhetorical space work
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together to emphasize one medium or the other in the image-text relationship, changing the
meaning of the images as we move across the spectrum from churches to museums.

A. National Gallery of Art; Washington, DC

Figure 4.8. Byzantine icon room
at the National Gallery of Art in
Washington, DC. Photo by the
author.
The National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC, one of America’s foremost museums,
has a small collection of Byzantine icons. Amidst displays of paintings by Pablo Picasso,
Thomas Cole, James McNeill Whistler, and other artistic luminaries, are two rooms dedicated to
these complicated images. The material dimensions and layout of these rooms prescribes a
certain attitude toward the images, and suggests how they should be viewed. The icon gallery is
off to the side of the museum’s main hall, painted white, and brightly lit thanks to a skylight. The
icons are hung along the walls, spaced out, with a small accompanying plaque giving a brief
description of the icon and dating it to a particular time period. Small spotlights suspended on the
ceiling provide extra illumination of the artwork. The room is stark. There is little to distract the
viewer from the images on the walls, so we know that they are important. The material
arrangement of the room also directs the viewers’ movements. There is nowhere to sit, so
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contemplation of the images must be undertaken while standing (Fig. 4.8). The lack of benches
or chairs encourages movement, suggesting that the icons are to be examined for a short period
of time before the viewer continues on to other rooms, perhaps in search of a place to sit and rest.

Figure 4.9. An icon of the Theotokos
and Child displayed in the National
Gallery of Art in Washington, DC.
Photo by the author.

Beyond the material arrangement of the room, the cultural associations through which the
space can be understood also prescribe a certain attitude toward the images. Byzantine icons
attain a certain amount of cultural cache by being housed in a building with other art objects. In
the first place, their inclusion means that they are defined as and valued as art, placed in the same
category as a Picasso. Visitors to a museum like the National Gallery know that the art on the
walls is there for contemplation and visual examination.
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Figure 4.10. Plaque beneath
an icon at the National
Gallery of Art. Photo by the
author.
The material and cultural dimensions of the National Gallery’s rhetorical space
emphasize the image in icons. There are no descriptions of Iconoclasm or the theological texts
that defined the images. Figure 4.9 shows an icon of the Theotokos and the Christ Child which
appears in the gallery, and Figure 4.10 is the accompanying plaque. Note that the plaque only
offers information about the material creation and dimensions of the image (Fig. 4.10). Even
more significantly, the plaque refers to the subject of the icon as the “Madonna and Child.” As I
mentioned previously, in the Byzantine tradition, the Mother of God is referred to as the
Theotokos. The Madonna is a more Westernized term for the same figure. By labeling the
subject of the painting with Western terms, the plaque passes over the complicated history of
these Eastern Orthodox images and the religious texts that defined them. Ironically, even though
these texts make it possible for us to think of Byzantine icons as a genre of art, they are effaced
by the rhetorical space in the National Gallery. Viewers are instead directed to the material,
visual side of the icons.
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B. The Benaki Museum; Athens, Greece

Figure 4.11. An iconostasis in
Gallery 11 of the Benaki Museum.
Photo by the author.

A second example of a museum displaying icons is the Benaki Museum in Athens,
Greece. Greece is the heart of the Eastern Orthodox Christian church, the location of Mount
Athos which houses numerous monasteries preserving the traditions of Byzantine iconography.
Much of Greece’s population is connected to the culture of the Greek Orthodox Church, so many
of the visitors to the museum are already familiar with icons. The Benaki has four rooms, or
galleries, containing the images. Gallery 11 is the largest. Like the icons at the National Gallery,
Gallery 11’s images are arrayed around the edges of the room and lit by spotlights. The room,
however, is otherwise dim.
Along one wall is a large, ornate iconostasis, a wooden frame used to display icons at the
front of an Orthodox church (Fig. 4.11). The iconostasis holds two large icons: one in the
Hodegetria type showing a seated Theotokos holding the Christ Child, and the second in the
Pantocrator type, similar to the icon of Christ in my study. Similar to the National Gallery, the
visual aspects of the images are brought to the fore by the layout and lighting of the room. The
plaque accompanying the iconostasis also highlights the material composition of the iconostasis,
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reading, “Mid 16th c. From a workshop of Epirus. The motifs on the relief halos recall the
decoration of Iznik pottery in the first half of the 16th c. Gift of the Lilian Vandouri Foundation.”
The reference to the sponsoring foundation further emphasizes the material and economic factors
involved in the circulation of images.

Figure 4.12. Iconostasis at the
Benaki Museum

Although the Benaki focuses viewers’ attention on the visual aspects of icons, it also
acknowledges their religious dimensions in a way that the National Gallery does not.
Candlesticks stand on either side of the iconostasis, and although the candles are unlit, they are
reminiscent of the candles that burn in front of icons in Orthodox churches. A bench is stationed
a few feet away, positioned so that viewers can sit and contemplate the images. Many Eastern
Orthodox churches do not have pews, but for those that do, the pews provide a space for
contemplating the iconostasis in the front of the church. The placement of the bench in the
museum gestures toward the religious contemplation of the images, an allusion that many of the
museum’s visitors would likely understand. It even offers visitors the opportunity for
contemplation, should the inclination strike. The dim lighting in the room contributes to the
subdued atmosphere appropriate for such thoughts. The Benaki Museum certainly does not
privilege the religious side of icons — in Gallery 25 on the second floor, a display of a
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redesigned toilet paper holder blocked the view of an iconostasis (Fig. 4.12). But in Gallery 11,
the museum created a small rhetorical space that acknowledged the images’ religious heritage, be
it ever so obliquely.

C. Cappella Palatina; Palermo, Italy
Icons need not be in traditional museum settings to be treated as art objects. The Palatine
Chapel in Sicily, known as the Cappella Palatina, exemplifies a rhetorical space where icons are
treated as art objects, despite a strong recognition of their religious connections. This chapel is a
room in what was once the palace of the early twelfth-century Norman King of Sicily, Roger II.
Sicily stood at the crossroads of the East and West, where Catholicism, Byzantine Orthodoxy,
and Islam all came together. When Roger became king, he built the chapel to incorporate
elements of all three religions. Glittering gold mosaics cover the walls, depicting stories from the
Old and New Testaments. A gigantic Pantocrator figure gazes down from the apse dome, hand
raised in a gesture of blessing over the visitors. Byzantine artists were likely brought in, for the
mosaics are mostly in Byzantine style with Greek inscriptions. Yet the ceiling has a distinctive
Arabic style, and Latin inscriptions run alongside the Greek. Roger II’s chapel united the three
cultures in the room, proclaiming the ruler’s domination (Lowden 310-17).
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Figure 4.13. The Cappella
Palatina in Sicily. Photo by the
author.
Figure 4.14. Visitors entering the
Cappella Palatina near the
"Respect the Holy Place" sign.
Photo by the author.

For a visitor, the cumulative effect of the mosaics can be overwhelming (Fig. 4.13). The sixthcentury historian Prokopios’s reaction at seeing the Hagia Sophia during its dedication in 537
captures the effect of the Cappella Palatina: “[T]he vision [of the viewer] constantly shifts
suddenly, for the beholder is utterly unable to select which particular detail he should
admire…though they turn attention to every side…still unable to understand…they always
depart from there overwhelmed by the bewildering sight” (cited in Ćurĉić 23). Ćurĉić quotes
from Prokopios to argue that the mosaics in Byzantine-style churches are more than artistic
decoration. Instead, they point to the “incomprehensibility or ‘absolute beauty’ of God’s abode.
Man-made architecture, despite its material presence, has been transformed into a symbol” (23).
Byzantine tradition not only gives religious meaning to individual icons, but it also gives these
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icons the power to transform a material building into a spiritual symbol. But only if these
traditions are acknowledged.
Today, the Cappella Palatina is part of a Sicilian government building, and you must pay
a fee to get in. Near the entrance is a shop where you can purchase pamphlets or books about the
chapel. The chapel itself is an odd mixture of a church and a museum. There is a sign by the door
reminding visitors to “Respect the Holy Place.” Entering tourists pause next to it to recalibrate
their cameras (Fig. 4.14). The chapel contains chairs, as do most places of religious worship, but
they are gathered in the center and roped off. On the day that I visited during the summer of
2013, a woman in uniform was scolding visitors who attempted to sit down on the floor to get a
better glimpse of the mosaics covering the undersides of the arches. (Yes, I received a scolding.)
Tour groups swarm through the chapel. All the while, recorded chanting plays in the
background.
Despite the fact that the Cappella Palatina has the architecture and decoration of a chapel,
the rhetorical space causes the images to be primarily treated as art. The religious traditions that
give meaning to the images are acknowledged, yet the use and design of the space indicate that
visitors are spectators who can examine the material side of the icons. There are no provisions
for exploring the religious practices surrounding them.

D. The Monastery of Hosios Loukas; Distomo, Greece
In contrast to the Cappella Palatina, the chapel at the Eastern Orthodox monastery of
Hosios Loukas is a rhetorical space emphasizing the religious traditions surrounding icons.
Hosios Loukas dates from the tenth century, when church construction began in honor of a local
saint. The church’s cycle of mosaics and unique cross-domed octagon architecture have caused it
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to be included on UNESCO’s World Heritage List. A sign outside the building proclaims this
distinction (see Fig. 4.15). At the same time, the church is still a highly religious site.

Figure 4.15. The UNESCO
plaque outside of the Monastery
of Hosios Loukas. Photo by the
author.
When I attempted to visit during the summer of 2013, I was staying in Athens. Hosios
Loukas is a two-hour drive outside the city, off the beaten tourist track. I hired a driver willing to
make the trek out to the monastery, but the route was not well-marked. We got lost at least twice,
and had to stop numerous times to ask for directions. When we finally arrived, there were a few
tourist groups on the monastery’s grounds, but their cameras were smaller than those of the
tourists at the Cappella Palatina. There is a small shop selling lots of icons and olive oil made by
the monks. Inside the church, however, there was mostly silence instead of clicking camera
shutters.
The interior of Hosios Loukas’s church contains both panel and mosaic icons. Mosaics
cover many parts of the walls, although the dome overhead is painted. An iconostasis with large
panel icons stands at the front, with burning oil lamps hanging before the images. Smaller panel
icons are propped up at the bottom of the iconostasis images. Candles burn before the icons. An
alcove off to the left holds the relics of the church’s eponymous saint. While some of the visitors
take pictures (Fig. 4.16), the majority stand in quiet contemplation (Fig. 4.17). Although the
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Figure 4.17. A visitor
reverencing an icon at Hosios
Loukas. Photo by the author.

Figure 4.16. Tourists taking
pictures at Hosios Loukas. Photo
by the author.

church closes during set hours for Orthodox worship services, it does not contain pews or chairs.
This doesn’t stop people from lingering, meditating on the icons on the iconostasis and walls.
There are no guards to regulate visitors’ behavior, and only occasional robed monk passes
through the room.
The religious practices surrounding icons are given a high priority at Hosios Loukas, and
the rhetorical space is organized to encourage these practices. Mountford observes that
“rhetorical spaces carry the residue of history within them, but also, perhaps, something else: a
physical representation of relationships and ideas” (17). The church at Hosios Loukas materially
depicts the connections between icons and religious practices, for here the images are understood
through the lens of Orthodox tradition.
The four rhetorical spaces that I have just described -- the National Gallery of Art, the
Benaki Museum, the Cappella Palatina, and the church at the Monastery of Hosios Loukas --
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present a continuum of how icons can be understood in material spaces. When the visual and
material aspects of the images are emphasized, icons are seen as art objects; when the religious
practices surrounding the images are given precedence, icons are seen as religious objects. The
relationship between the texts and images that make up Byzantine icons 10 clearly dynamic,
changing in response to rhetorical spaces. It should come as no surprise that in order to preserve
the images’ spiritual significance, the Eastern Orthodox church has developed such restrictive
traditions. It is important to note, however, that the Orthodox limitations on icons were codified
in a time when the images were made by hand — painstakingly painted, tiled, or drawn. Today,
digital technology is redefining how images are circulated and reproduced. How icons’
dissociative image/text relationship fares in digital spaces will be the subject of the next section.

VI. Icons in the Age of Digital Reproduction
The ease of replicating and circulating images in the digital sphere is unparalleled,
making it increasingly difficult to maintain the limitations placed on icons following Iconoclasm.
To better understand the impact of the digital reproduction of icons, it will be helpful to turn to
the theorist Walter Benjamin, who was concerned with the mechanical reproduction of art during
the 1930s. The consequences of reproduction that concerned Benjamin are remarkably similar to
those that concerned iconophile theologians, and they help us highlight the difficulties with icon
reproduction in digital spaces.
When Walter Benjamin wrote “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction,” he was concerned about the effects of large-scale art reproduction. Benjamin
asserts that such reproduction can never fully recreate the original artwork: “In even the most
perfect reproduction, one thing is lacking: the here and now of the work of art — its unique
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existence in a particular place. It is this existence —and nothing else — that bears the mark of
the history to which the work has been subject” (253). Benjamin notes that the history of an art
object encompasses the physical traces of where the object has been and also the stories of past
owners. This history is unique to the object and gives it an “authenticity,” which cannot be
transferred to a reproduction, no matter how accurate the copy (253).
Even more, the unique existence of an individual work of art is connected to what
Benjamin terms the “sphere of tradition,” a particular set of rituals that surround an art object and
create the object’s “aura” (254-56). He writes, “The uniqueness of the work of art is identical to
its embeddedness in the context of tradition…And it is highly significant that the artwork’s
auratic mode of existence is never entirely separated from its ritual function. In other words: the
unique value of that ‘authentic’ work of art has its base in ritual, the source of its original use
value” (256, italics original). The aura which makes an artwork authentic comes from the work’s
singular position in a context of rituals and tradition. Not only is this context irreplicable, but
mass reproduction actually undermines it. Benjamin observes that “the technology of
reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition. By replicating the work
many times over, it substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence” (254). Even though mass
reproduction makes the art object available to a wider audience, it takes away the singularity of
the original work of art.
While Benjamin was not writing about Byzantine icons, his concerns are easily applied to
the images. When the Eastern Orthodox scholar Fr. Silouan Justiniano critiques mechanically
and digitally reproduced icons, he draws directly from Benjamin: “Mechanically reproduced
icons are inherently ambiguous. They share certain features with the original icon but are also
radically different from it. The slippery, neither here-nor-there status of these mechanical
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reproductions makes them hard to grasp conceptually… They are at once real and somehow less
than real icons” (par. 1, italics original). Justiniano posits that when icons are reproduced on a
large scale, “the importance of the artistic and material side of the icon tends to be ignored and
even undermined…The icon then becomes another image among thousands. It lacks any need of
proper embodiment, a situation that erodes our awareness of it as a sacred object” (par. 3).
Although Justiniano does not carry his Benjaminian critique further, it may be said that the loss
of the religious traditions surrounding the creation of an icon is similar to the loss of an artwork’s
aura. Justiniano’s work implies that the theological weight of an icon is compromised by a mass
existence.
Benjamin also worried about the ultimate purpose of mass-produced artwork, and his
concerns are again germane to icons. He says, “[A]s soon as the criterion of authenticity ceases
to be applied to artistic production, the whole social function of art is revolutionized. Instead of
being founded on ritual, it is based on a different practice: politics” (256-57). When authenticity
is disregarded and the sphere of tradition is lost, artwork can be assigned a new purpose, one
potentially far distanced from the original rituals which surrounded it. Benjamin was writing in
the aftermath of World War II and the unspeakable destruction inspired by the Nazi propaganda
machine, so his concerns about the political uses of art are directly connected to the spread of
fascism. Art that is designed with the intention of mass reproduction disturbs him even more, for
he asserts that this type of art is explicitly political (257).
Benjamin’s thoughts are again applicable to icons, for these images were reproduced for
political purposes long before twentieth-century fascism. The Eastern Orthodox Church was
heavily involved in the Byzantine society and state, and rulers at times appropriated icons to
justify their reign. Belting records that following Iconoclasm, the Empress Theodora ordered a
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portrait of Christ inscribed on one side of the empire’s coins, celebrating the triumph of the
iconophiles and indicating her divine authority to rule. Coins minted under her son Michael III
followed suit. The subsequent ruler, Basil I, again used a Christ image on his currency, but
inscribed around the image “Rex regnantium,” meaning “Ruler of rulers.” Basil’s portrait was on
the other side of the coin, and Belting posits that the proximity of the two portraits and the
inscription drew a parallel between the divine ruler in the heavens and the Byzantine ruler on
earth, who drew his power from the divine source (164-65). These icon images were overt
propaganda intended to solidify political power through the currency-based economic system.
Benjamin’s later concerns about the potential political uses of reproduced images were thus not
unfounded.
Benjamin further warns that mechanical reproduction opens up two potential avenues for
altering an artwork. First, the perspective of art could be technologically changed: photographs
could be enlarged or films slowed down, modifying the viewpoint presented in the original.
Beyond this, he observes that “technological reproduction can place the copy of the original in
situations which the original itself cannot attain” (254). In other words, the process of
mechanical reproduction can disrupt both the content and the context of the original work. These
are the very aspects of a Byzantine icon that the church’s traditions and regulations attempt to
preserve, and the same aspects that are difficult to control in a digital space, where images can be
changed, decontextualized, and recontextualized with the tap of a key.
At the same time, Byzantine icons are more complicated than the artistic images that
Benjamin wrote about. Unlike many art objects, icons were not designed to be unique images.
The images were intended to be reproduced and used in Orthodox Christian religious practices.

153

The existence of portrait types testifies to this: there would be no need for a portrait type of Peter
if there was only one image of the saint.
Icons exist at the nexus of the material and the spiritual, art and religious practice,
because of the dissociative relationship between the images and the texts that define them. When
we consider them through the lens of Benjamin’s theories, the artistic, visual side of the images
is privileged. But the religious practices surrounding icons point back to the theological texts that
define the images. While these texts place limitations on the icons, they also assume a level of
circulation and replication.

VII. The Rhetorical Velocity of Byzantine Icons
The ease with which images are circulated and manipulated can be explained by the
concept of rhetorical velocity. In “Composing for Recomposition: Rhetorical Velocity and
Delivery,” Jim Ridolfo and Danielle Nicole De Voss draw on the ideas of motion, vectors, and
speed to theorize how information travels (par. 4). They write, “The term rhetorical
velocity…means a conscious rhetorical concern for distance travel, speed, and time, pertaining
specifically to theorizing instances of strategic appropriation by a third party” (par. 4). In other
words, rhetorical velocity accounts for information that is made to be dispersed and reused,
mashed up and remixed. It is useful for explaining how information travels in a digital landscape,
but it is also concerned with the information’s telos, its ultimate destination and use (par. 4).
Rhetorical velocity is a useful lens for considering the reproduction of digitized images because
it accounts for their mobility and recontextualization.
Benjamin’s work highlights the difference between images designed prior to the digital
age and images created with digital reproduction in mind. The irreplicable aura that the German
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theorist identified makes it impossible to exactly copy a work of art, but this is because the art he
had in mind was designed with low rhetorical velocity. Da Vinci did not intend the Mona Lisa to
hang in every sixteenth-century Italian drawing room, so it is no surprise that something is lost
when the painting is reproduced. On the other hand, digitally reproduced images are often
designed with a high rhetorical velocity in mind, so they do not necessarily suffer from
reproduction. In particular, memes are created with high rhetorical velocity: their content is
effortlessly altered and reposted through meme generators and social media sites. These images
are intended to have a mass existence and never possess Benjamin’s aura, so the process of
reproduction does not do them any violence.
Unlike the singular works of art that Benjamin discusses, Byzantine icons are designed
with a certain measure of rhetorical velocity in mind. The reproduction of icons is admittedly
tightly controlled, but icons are nevertheless intended to be reproduced. Indeed, the limitations
placed on icons are only necessary because reproduction is assumed. Portraits of saints and
depictions of religious scenes will undoubtedly be created; the question the theologians faced
was how to ensure that their content was not drastically altered or their spiritual context lost.
Undoubtedly, icons have an incredibly low rhetorical velocity; they are not destined for mashups or remixes, as are images with high velocity, like memes. The traditions around icons protect
against such revision, because the moment an icon is altered from its prototype, it ceases to be an
icon. But the reverse is also true. Because the validity of an icon rests on its resemblance to the
prototype, if the image is not significantly altered, the doctrinal message of the icon remains
unchanged. This is the reason that icons can exist in a variety of media: wood, paint, tile, metal,
and more. If the images are valid in these media, why not in pixels as well?
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Even more, the theological context that gives an icon its spiritual weight is not
necessarily linked to a physical location, but is partially dependent on the attitude of the viewer.
If an icon’s viewer acknowledges and continues the Eastern Orthodox traditions and practices
surrounding the image, the image remains tied to them. Justiniano’s concern that a mechanically
reproduced icon becomes simply “another image among thousands (par. 2) can perhaps be
slightly allayed if the viewer sees it as a deeply significant religious object. Icons thus straddle
the line between Benjamin’s theories and those of Ridolfo and De Voss. The result is that the
images circulate online in some surprising ways.

VIII. Digitizing Heaven: Icons in Digital Spaces
The Greek Orthodox archdiocese has plunged icons into the digital age by offering the
Iconograms webservice. Iconograms are similar to e-cards: the user selects an icon from a
predetermined group, adds a personal message, and designates a recipient. The emailed
Iconogram also contains an appropriate scripture verse and a description of the saint or scene.
This webservice packages icons so that they can digitally travel, giving them a measure of
rhetorical velocity. At the same time, their context is tightly controlled. The sender is allowed to
include a message of up to 500 characters, but the majority of an Iconogram’s content must be
chosen from preset options (Fig. 4.18). After picking the icon from the website’s library, the
sender assigns the message a Category from a list that includes Eastern Orthodox holidays and a
few general occasions such as Birthday or Thinking of You. The selected Category then opens
up two or three choices for the emailed Iconogram’s subject line, all of which reflect Orthodox
traditions. For example, the Baptism category only allows the subject line “Congratulations on
Your Child’s Baptism,” because the Orthodox prefer to baptize children instead of adults.
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Figure 4.18. A screenshot of the
Iconograms website taken by the
author.

In case a viewer has any notion of misusing the images, the Iconograms website bears a
copyright notice beneath the description of each icon, emphasizing that the images “may not be
further reproduced, in print or on other websites or in any other form, without the prior written
authorization of the copyright holder” (“Quick Picks”). The same text is included with each
delivered Iconogram, along with a link back to the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America’s
web page to verify the image’s religious connection. These measures attempt to limit the
reproduction of the images beyond the controlled context in which they appear.
The existence of the Iconograms site acknowledges that icons can and will circulate
digitally, but the limited options and surrounding text are there to preserve the religious meaning
of the images in the digital realm. Indeed, the website states, “Each Iconogram functions as both
an e-card and a teaching tool” (“About”). The restrictions placed on the images through this site
help to preserve their integrity as teaching tools, while still acknowledging that for such tools to
be effective, they must circulate.
Iconograms is not the only place that icons are digitally replicated: there is also a thriving
online marketplace for the Eastern Orthodox images. A quick Google search for “buy Orthodox
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icons” turns up over two million hits, ranging from ebay to the site of a small monastery gift
shop. Many of the sites sell hand-painted works from professional iconographers, but the degree
of contextualization provided by the sites is often far less rigorous than that offered by the
Iconograms. For example, the site run by the Georgian iconographer Tamara Rigishvili is
relatively simple, but it emphasizes that her images are “Christian Orthodox handpainted icons.”
I am familiar with Rigishvili’s site because it is the source of the icon of Christ’s baptism
hanging in my study. Images of this and other icons on the site are titled to indicate their contents
and the year they were painted: “St. Sabbas the Sanctified. 2009,” “St. George the Great Martyr.
2009,” and “Baptism of Jesus. 2009,” are just a few. That, however, is the extent of the context
provided. Either viewers fill in the theological background themselves, or it remains absent.
Icons on these commercial sites are thus often far more open to interpretation than those on the
Iconograms site.
It is certainly possible that the nature of the marketplace is somewhat responsible for
reducing the amount of context given to these images. While visiting Athens, Greece, last
summer, I stopped in a Byzantine icon shop and had an enlightening conversation with the
proprietor. The exuberant man told me about the different styles of icons for sale: some were
hand painted, others made from printed images affixed to wooden panels, and still others
combined computerized images with hand-painted details. When I asked him if these material
differences changed the religious validity of the images, he shook his head and proclaimed: “An
image is an icon because it touches your heart, not because the church says it is an icon.” Perhaps
the shopkeeper’s approach to icons stemmed from religious liberalism — or perhaps he thought
that downplaying their theological context would make the images more attractive to a larger
range of buyers. He was certainly less concerned about preserving the theological meaning of the
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images than he was about preserving his own bottom line. The presentation of the icons in the
shop also did not lend them a particular Eastern Orthodox interpretation. The images were hung
on walls and shown in glass display cases, much as art would be displayed in a gallery.
Commercialism is not necessarily the sole motivation behind the decontexualization that
takes place in online icon sales portals or shops like the one in Athens, but it is worth considering
the impact economics might have on the replication of images. While Benjamin was concerned
that art intended for reproduction would be inherently political, this same art can also be
commercial. Granted, Benjamin’s Marxist approach would argue that the political and the
commercial are linked, but overt commercialism seems to have a stronger influence than politics
on the way that icons are digitally circulated today. Rigishvili and other iconographers reproduce
images of their work online in the hopes of selling the material icons. Like many iconographers,
Rigishvili also posts a copyright notice at the bottom of the site: “All images are copyrighted by
Tamara and cannot be reproduced in any manner without her written permission” (Tamara
Rigishvili) — permission which I had to obtain before using the image of the baptism icon in this
essay. Much as an artist maintains physical control over a work of art before it is sold, copyright
notices are an attempt to maintain control over the image of art by limiting its reproduction.
Although this copyright clause happens to protect the religious heritage of the icons by limiting
their use, its main purpose is commercial.
In the digital realm, copyright clauses are difficult to enforce because digital images are
simply too easy to copy and reproduce. The nature of the web interface gives digitized Byzantine
icons a higher degree of rhetorical velocity than icons that exist in material form, regardless of
any attempts to control the images. The baptism icon in my study is a testament to this. It is also
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a testament to how digital images with high rhetorical velocity are open to the alterations in
content and context that Benjamin warned against.
When I began this project and decided to research the origins of the baptism icon my
friend gave me, I found the original on Rigishvili’s site. A comparison of my version to the
original revealed something startling: the blue half circle representing God the Father is missing
from the top of my image. Given the religious background of the friend who gave me the image,
I am sure that this was an oversight. When the image was downloaded and resized onto an 8x11
sheet of paper, the top was inadvertently cropped. Nevertheless, the entire theological meaning
of the image was altered when the Holy Trinity was reduced to a Holy Duo. The absence of God
the Father from the baptism of Christ at best reduces the event’s theological significance and at
worst makes it a challenge to Christ’s divinity. The cropped image vividly demonstrates
Yiannias’s warning that an altered image is akin to altered scripture, and it shows how easily
such alterations can take place in digital reproduction. There is little wonder that Eastern
Orthodox theologians have gone to such great lengths to protect the content of these images. In
addition, the baptism icon in my study exemplifies Benjamin’s observation that reproduced art
can be placed in contexts where the original would never go. The material dimensions of
Rigishvili’s original icon would prevent it from being tucked in a folder or notebook, but my
digital reproduction could be. The original icon could not be included in this chapter, printed and
accessible to readers, but a digital reproduction can.
The baptism icon hanging in my study has indeed been changed by its digital journey.
Despite the best efforts of the iconographer to guard the image, and despite the respect that I
have for the image’s theological context, digital reproduction altered the icon in ways that
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neither of us intended. Digital reproduction does not leave material icons untouched, either. Even
though my Pantocrator icon is made of wood, it has also been marked by digital reproduction.
The Pantocrator icon possesses a few of the material artistic conventions of the panel icon
genre: the image is centered on a gilded wooden base with a carved frame. At the same time, this
icon is a strange amalgamation of the traditional and the digital. A closer look shows that it is not
hand painted, but instead a printed image affixed to the wood. The image itself bears
unmistakable signs of digital reproduction because the printing is misaligned and incorrectly
sized. As I mentioned before, the circular red emblems in the upper right and left corners are
oddly broken off. They are too large for the frame of the icon. On the left side, the first two
letters in the word “Pantocrator” have also been cut off. This icon was likely mass produced, and
not by the world’s most careful craftsmen.
An intriguing “certificate” is glued to the back of the icon (Fig. 4.19). It reads in four
languages, “Precise copy of a Byzantine icon on canvas with agingraphy colors, inalterable in
time. Worked by traditional artisants. Free for exportation” (sic). Beyond using the rich primary
colors common to hagiography, the certificate’s claims are somewhat debatable. While there
might be a precise copy of the original Byzantine icon somewhere in the world, it is not the icon
that I own. And the creators of the icons are certainly not “traditional artisants,” for a traditional
iconographer would never have allowed the image to be so poorly reproduced. Although the
original Pantocrator icon type has been codified and unaltered over time, the digital
manufacturing process altered the content of my icon.
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Figure 4.19. The "Certificate" on the
back of the Pantocrator icon. Photo
by the author.
The last line of the certificate is perhaps the most significant: “Free for exportation.” The
Pantocrator icon was designed to be a souvenir. It was purchased by my father in Jerusalem, a
location which gives the icon some theological context, but the image was found in a
commercialized street bazaar along the Via Dolorosa, a popular area for religious tourists. The
icon is primarily a commodity, intended to be exported from the country. My father was in
Jerusalem on business, so the circulation and production of this icon are even more closely tied
to commercial goods. Just as Benjamin warned, when artworks — or icons — are created for
reproduction, they are easily repurposed. Indeed, the Pantocrator icon is just one tiny piece of a
vast international economic system of material and personal exchange that brings together the
political and the commercial. This system is capable of undermining the theological context and
content of the image. The hurried digital and mechanical reproduction processes that created the
icon are behind the mistakes in its content, and the commercial forces driving the process could
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have easily divorced the image from its theological context. Yet all is not lost. My respect for
and (albeit limited) knowledge of Byzantine iconography preserve the icon’s spiritual
significance. Even poorly executed processes of mechanical and digital reproduction do not
completely separate the image from its religious heritage.

IX. Conclusion
Byzantine icons are fascinating multimodal visual arguments because they unite texts and
images in an unparalleled way. Depending on which medium is emphasized, the meaning of the
images shifts over time and in various types of rhetorical spaces, both architectural and digital.
The dynamic relationship between the media not only influences how an icon is understood, but
also impacts the image’s replication and circulation. Replication and circulation in turn are
connected to economic objectives, as the Pantocrator and baptism icons displayed in my study
show. The contextualized nature of the dissociative relationship between text and image in a
multimodal argument thus has wide-ranging consequences for how that argument can be
deployed.
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Chapter Five
Conclusion: A Pedagogy of Dissociative Multimodality
This project began by looking at the relationship between texts and images in visual
arguments and considering what dissociation can show us about the interaction between the two
media. The focus so far has been on how dissociation can be used beyond argumentation studies
to make visual rhetoric more nuanced. I’ve examined the rhetorical canon of memory during the
medieval period, considering what theories of mnemotechnic memory show about the connection
between texts and images and why one medium can be privileged over another. I’ve studied
1950’s advertisements to see how a privileged medium can limit the interpretation of a secondary
medium. I’ve also used Byzantine icons to demonstrate that rhetorical context can determine
which medium is more important in a visual argument, and how changing the preferred medium
can control the rhetorical velocity of the entire argument. In each of these case studies, I’ve been
working out the implications of combining two media in a dissociative relationship, and I’ve
limited my scope to texts and images so that the dissociative relationships can be studied more
closely. But this project has much larger implications that go beyond Perelmanian studies and
visual rhetoric, and I turn to those implications in this conclusion.
Using dissociation as a framework for understanding interactions between different types
of media allows us to consider visual arguments in a new light, but it also helps us to better
understand and teach multimodal arguments. In this final chapter, I lay the groundwork for a
dissociative multimodal pedagogy. I begin by discussing how dissociation augments the
multiliteracies pedagogy of the New London Group, Next, I offer some classroom activities to
teach dissociative multimodality, before concluding with a discussion of the limitations and
possibilities of a dissociative multimodal pedagogy.
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I. What Dissociation Can Teach Us about Multimodal Pedagogy
W.J.T. Mitchell claimed that we are in the middle of a “pictorial turn,” with images
becoming increasingly prevalent (9), and he was correct. But he was correct because we are also
in the middle of a digital turn that makes images easier to create, manipulate, and circulate than
ever before. Images, however, aren’t the only type of media that the digital turn is highlighting.
Thanks to digital technologies, audio and video media are also becoming more accessible.
Alongside texts and images, these two media are playing a larger role in our communication and
argumentation processes, making them more multimodal. The field of rhetoric and composition
is taking notice of this shift.
“Multimodality” has recently become a buzzword in the rhetoric and composition
community. A search through the program of the 2014 Conference on College Composition and
Communication reveals no less than forty-two panels with the term “multimodality” or
“multimedia” in the panel title, panel description, or a speaker’s paper title –and those were just
panels that included the exact words. Numerous others dealt with digital composition and
multimodal or multimedia theories. This interest in multimodal communication and
argumentation shows the changing nature of the composition classroom and the importance of
developing pedagogy that prepares students to participate in a digital, multimodal world.
The multiliteracies pedagogy of the New London Group is a productive place to begin
thinking about multimodal pedagogy, because the multiliteracies approach calls attention to the
roles that different media play in communication and argumentation. When the New London
Group published their 1996 manifesto “A Pedagogy of Multiliteracites: Designing Social
Futures,” their emphasis was on the different types of comprehension required by different types
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of media. They argue that text-based literacy is not sufficient for participating in a world where
communication takes on written, aural, and visual dimensions. Instead, students should be
trained in a variety of literacies based on the different types of media – hence the term
“multiliteracies” (78). The pedagogy proposed by the manifesto addresses the challenge of
teaching students to engage with and create multimodal texts, but it does not provide a
framework for considering how different media interact. This same blind spot can be seen in
some of texts produced later by London Group members who were building on the
multiliteracies approach.
Gunther Kress, one of the original ten members of the London Group, worked alongside
Theo van Leeuwen to further develop the idea of media-based literacies in their 1996 monograph
Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design. Here, they lay out basic principles for visual
composition, asserting that visuals arguments can create both social constructs and social action.
Their work makes the ideas in the New London Group’s manifesto more concrete and begins to
establish a framework for analyzing multimodal compositions, which they define as “text[s]
whose meanings are realized through more than one semiotic code” (177). Kress and van
Leeuwen identify two possible approaches to multimodal compositions, and they make their
preference clear: “[T]he question arises whether the products of the various modes should be
analyzed separately or in an integrated way; whether the meanings of the whole should be treated
as the sum of the meanings of the parts, or whether the parts should be looked upon as
interacting with and affecting one another. It is the later path we will pursue” (177). For Kress
and van Leeuwen, this means considering the overall design of a multimodal composition.
Rather than splitting out individual modalities and looking at the text or image elements within a
visual argument, they examine the composition as a whole. Referencing a drawing of a train
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beneath a description of the train, they offer this practical application of their approach: “In
considering, for example, the picture of the train…we do no (sic) seek to see the picture as an
‘illustration’ of the verbal text, thereby treating the verbal text as prior and more important, nor
treat visual and verbal text as entirely discrete elements. We seek to be able to look at the whole
page as an integrated text” (177). Although they claim to look at how different types of media
interact, in reality Kress and van Leeuwen take a holistic approach to multimodal compositions.
Their focus on the integrated nature of the combined media actually subsumes the differences
between the different modes and so is not able to discuss how the two media affect each other.
More recently, Mary Kalantzis and Bill Cope, two other members of the New London
Group, have expanded the idea of multiliteracies pedagogy in their 2012 text Literacies. Written
to be a handbook for teachers, Literacies juxtaposes multiliteracies pedagogy with past
approaches to education. Like Kress and van Leeuwen, Kalantzis and Cope emphasize the
interconnectedness of the different modes: “No matter how hard we may try to separate out the
written mode for the purposes of didactic literacy teaching…all representation and
communication is intrinsically multimodal” (192). Unlike Kress and van Leeuwen, however,
their focus is on how the modes interact in the creation of meaning:
[W]hen using written language, there is a stage of visualizing things and talking to
oneself about what one is writing…This switching from one mode to another is
integral to our process of re-representation and transformation in our designs of
meaning…This is why instead of ‘literacy’ (reading and writing), our focus in a
Multiliteracies approach is ‘literacies’ (meaning-making multimodal processes of
representation and communication). (192)
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Kalantzis and Cope acknowledge that the composition process is always multimodal, switching
between written, visual, and aural ways of making meaning, but they do not extend their
multimodal approach when assessing products of the composition process. Instead, they separate
the different modes and the types of literacies needed to work with them: “For all the crossovers
and connections, however, we have classified the different modes into distinct categories because
each represents a place where discrete human meaning-making systems occur” (194). These
categories include written meaning, visual meaning, spatial meaning, tactile meaning, gestural
meaning, audio meaning, and oral meaning (193). Individual chapters are dedicated to these
modes of meaning, detailing the mental processes used for composing and understanding them.
Significantly, Kalantzis and Cope never extend their discussion into how these modes impact
each other when they are combined, either in the process of understanding or of composing.
The multimodal pedagogy inspired by the New London Group lays the groundwork for
understanding multimodal compositions, but it stops just short of explaining how different types
of media, literacies, or modes can influence and change each other. While Kress and van
Leeuwen merge different types of media, seeking an “overarching code” that will explain
multimodal visual compositions (177), Kalantzis and Cope emphasize media-specific literacies.
Multimodal pedagogy thus displays some of the same weaknesses seen in visual rhetoric: the
different media are often either conflated or separated.
I argued in Chapter 1 that dissociation offers a productive middle ground between
conflating and separating texts and images in visual arguments, and I believe that it can serve the
same function in multimodal pedagogy. As my earlier chapters have shown, understanding the
interaction between texts and images is crucial for understanding how a visual argument makes
rhetorical meaning. The same is true of multimodal arguments. When two media are combined –
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be they text and image, image and audio, video and audio, or others – the meaning of the entire
argument is often rooted in how those two media interact. Placing two media in a dissociative
pair acknowledges that the media have been combined in a multimodal composition. At the same
time, it reveals that sometimes the media contribute unequally to the argument. One medium can
become more dominant, changing the way that the secondary medium is understood and
controlling the overall argument. Any examination of a multimodal argument must therefore take
this interaction into consideration. In fact, I argue that any theory of multimodal argumentation
and pedagogy that does not account for the relationship(s) between various media will not
provide a nuanced understanding of argumentation. Applying this pedagogical approach in the
classroom is not difficult, particularly because most students are already familiar with
multimodal arguments.

II. Teaching Dissociative Multimodal Pedagogy: Some Example Lessons
As a result of the digital turn, students coming into college composition classrooms are
fluent creators and consumers of multimodal arguments. They download digital media, create
video mashups, remix mp3s, develop websites, tweet, facebook, and blog. Despite their
familiarity working across and between media, they tend to be uncritical creators and consumers.
Often, these students don’t realize the arguments implicit in the digital content that surrounds
them, and they are not consciously aware of the rhetorical strategies that these arguments
employ. A dissociative multimodal pedagogy gives them the tools to examine these arguments
more closely so that they can be both more critical consumers and more informed producers.
A dissociative multimodal pedagogy takes a two-pronged approach to creating and
analyzing multimodal arguments. First, it takes into consideration the overall effectiveness of a

169

multimodal composition. This sort of analysis asks about the composition’s argument, the genre
employed, the context in which the argument is situated, and the intended audience. In other
words, it begins with a holistic, integrated view of the composition, much like Kress and van
Leeuwen. But it then moves into a consideration of how the various types of media shape the
argument and influence each other. This type of analysis asks if one medium is more dominant
than another, and it considers how the dominant medium might shape or control both other
medium and the overall argument. A dissociative multimodal approach thus takes both a bird’seye view and an up-close look.
In some cases, a bit of work is required to identify the medium influencing a multimodal
argument. Byzantine icons are a great example of this problem: the theological texts controlling
the images are not overtly visible. Their existence and importance are nevertheless revealed with
just a bit of research, as I have shown in my fourth chapter. The same goes for brand logos like
the Nike swoosh. These images appear on a variety of products, but their use and context are
determined by extensive corporate brand books. A full analysis of a brand logo isn’t possible
without taking into account the role that brand books play. Considering these media both
separately and together yields a more complete picture of the multimodal argument. A
dissociative multimodal approach to analysis therefore requires research into the argument being
studied so that links to other types of media are uncovered.
Implementing dissociative multimodal pedagogy in the composition classroom begins
with discussing the overall rhetorical impact of a multimodal argument, something most rhetoric
and composition instructors are already doing. Focusing on the relationships between different
types of media is where the extra effort comes in. I often start by asking students to think about
the relationship between texts and images in picture captions. Because many of the students are
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already active on social media sites with visual elements, such as facebook and Instagram, they
begin on familiar ground.
One activity that I use to draw out how texts and images interact dissociatively involves
asking groups of students to go online and find an image that could be captioned with the word
“challenging.” In one class, a group came back with image of a mountain climber dwarfed by a
majestic peak, and another brought back an image of a chess board with a lone black pawn
standing before a full set of white pieces. Each group presented their image to the class and
explained why they found the images to be “challenging.” The climber’s ascent was described as
challenging, as was the daunting chess set-up. In both cases, the caption “challenging”
highlighted an element of difficulty in the images.
I then asked students to trade pictures with another group. Once they had the new image,
they were tasked with creating a caption that lead to a new interpretation or called attention to a
different part of the image. Just as with the original images, students shared their new captions
and explained how they reinterpreted the images. For example, the image of the mountain
climber was re-captioned “Nature’s Beauty.” With this title, the mountaineer practically
disappeared from the image. Our eyes were instead drawn to the magnificence of the mountains
and the cloud bank. The image of the chess board was re-captioned “Rosa Parks,” entirely
transforming the image. A chess game was no longer the focus: it became a metaphor for civil
rights, personified by an African-American woman refusing to give up her seat on a city bus. Recaptioning the image showed the class the power that a caption has to drive the interpretation of
the image.
This exercise led to a discussion about the ways that media interpret each other, and how
a privileged medium can impact the overall argument. I introduced the concept of dissociation
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and philosophical pairs, showing how a dissociative image/text pair models the picture-caption
interactions we had already explored. We then expanded the discussion to different combinations
of media, focusing on multimodal arguments and compositions that students are already familiar
with. For example, after the third series of Sherlock was released, I used a scene from the first
episode, “The Empty Hearse,” to discuss how audio can drive video interpretation. Sherlock has
been gone for several years in this scene, and John Watson presumes he is dead. Having
mourned his friend, Watson is moving on and is now in a fancy restaurant about to propose to his
girlfriend. Sherlock appears out of nowhere and surprises Watson, who is not amused. He attacks
Sherlock and begins choking him. In the background, light-hearted carnivalesque music begins
to play, signaling that the audience is supposed to laugh at Watson’s reaction. As a class, we
discussed how different genres of music – and even different songs – might lead to different
interpretations of this scene.
Once this groundwork has been laid, students are ready to tackle a range of digital
arguments, including social media profiles and internet memes. Students consider how the words
and images in their facebook and Twitter accounts interact to create a digital identity, as well as
which medium is more dominant. They soon realize that text posts about studying for tests can
be easily overshadowed by pictures of drunken partying. We also look at the ways that the
images in the background of internet memes become a framework through which the words are
understood. For example, the determined baby in the back of the Success Kid meme signifies a
certain pattern of text: the top text presents a difficult situation, while the lower text details
successfully overcoming the situation. Quickmeme.com, a website displaying collections of
memes, offers numerous examples of the Success Kid focusing on a range of topics, from
wearing a tie (see Fig. 5.1) to running into a school bully working at McDonald’s (“Success
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Kid”). Different internet memes have different text patterns, and the key to knowing which text
pattern is at work, and thus what kind of argument is being made, is knowing how to read the
background image. Once again, the meaning of this multimodal form of communication lies in
the relationship between the media.

Figure 5.1. “Have to Wear
a Tie” Success Kid meme

After students gain a concrete understanding of the dissociative relationship between
different types of media, their analyses are more nuanced and their own multimodal
compositions are stronger. When they create audio slideshows, they are more aware of how the
soundtrack helps the audience understand the images. They choose powerful images for their
websites, cognizant of how the images influence the surrounding text, and vice versa. Their
social media posts are (at times) less hasty. Even the captions that they give the images in their
rhetorical analysis essays are more thoughtful. Paying attention to the interactions between the
media empowers them to participate more effectively in the multimodal discourses surrounding
them.
III. Limitations of Dissociative Multimodal Pedagogy
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Figure 5.2. "1942 Lovers" advertisement
for Ray-Ban sunglasses.

While dissociation is a powerful tool for interpreting multimodal arguments, it also has
limitations. The first of these is that dissociation is not particularly useful for understanding
multimodal interactions where one medium is not clearly more valued than the other. A 2011-12
advertisement for Ray-Ban sunglasses entitled “1942 Lovers” is one example of a multimodal
argument without a clear hierarchy (Fig. 5.2). The advertisement depicts two men walking down
a 1940’s-era street, holding hands. The phrase “Never Hide” and Ray-Ban’s logo appear in the
bottom left corner. Considered alone, the image portion of the ad makes an argument for
standing out. During the 1940’s, it was not generally socially acceptable for two gay men to
display their relationship in public. Centering the image on two men holding hands calls
attention to the disruption of social taboos, arguing that a homosexual relationship should not be
hidden. Considered alone, the text in the bottom left portion of the ad argues that Ray-Ban is a
brand supporting openness. If the audience is familiar with the brand and can fill in the brand’s
affiliation with sunglasses and other eyewear, the ad also plays on the idea of refusing to hide
behind sunglasses. Ray-Ban glasses are not for people who want to hide. When the image and
the text are considered separately, both make coherent arguments without relying on the other for
interpretation.
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When the two media are considered together, however, they augment each other. The text
and logo emphasize the brazen way the two men break a social taboo in the image, encouraging
them to not hide their relationship. On the other hand, the image of the two men enhances the
text by reminding viewers that hiding comes in many forms and is not limited to wearing
sunglasses. When paired with the image, the tag line implicitly suggests ‘coming out,’ and the
image concretely links the Ray-Ban brand to the bravery it takes to “Never Hide.” Taken
together, the text and image that comprise the ad gain additional meaning without one medium
serving the key to the ad’s meaning.
In cases like the “1942 Lovers” ad, it is thus not possible to represent the interaction
between the two media as a dissociative philosophical pair. Dissociation is inherently
hierarchical: Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca developed the concept to model how unequally
valued concepts interact, so it does not make sense to apply a dissociative framework where
there is no hierarchy.
Another limitation of dissociation was pointed out to me by Jason Helms sometime
during the Spring 2012 semester. I was just beginning to work through the implications of
applying the concept to visual arguments, when Helms asked me whether or not there was a
model for integrating more terms (Helms). Dissociation is, indeed, a binary system, and this is
another one of its limitations. As conceived by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the dissociative
process always involves pairs of unequally valued terms. These pairs may become more
complex, splitting apart into what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call “fan-type” dissociations
(TNR 431), like the one below:
I
I < II
II
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In this type of dissociation, either the top or the bottom term can be divided into two additional
terms, which themselves have a dissociative relationship. My analysis of the argument in DDB’s
advertisements for Levy’s rye bread makes use of these fan-type dissociations when “Levy’s rye
bread lovers,” which is term I, is split into a new dissociative pair: not-an-EA-Jew/Jew. Fan-type
pairs make the dissociative system more flexible by enabling it to involve more than two terms,
but fan-type dissociations still necessitate dividing the terms into pairs.
Philosophical pairs are unable to model what happens when there is not a clear hierarchy
between the terms, enabling them to be placed into pairs. If three concepts (I, II, and III) are
brought together and two (II and III) are equally privileged, there is no way to represent this in a
philosophical pair. The only option is to create two philosophical pairs, both with term I on the
top and differing bottom terms:
I
II

and

I
III

The three terms can only be united in a philosophical pair if terms II and III are brought into a
hierarchical relationship, as in
I
II/III
As long as the two terms (II and III) are valued equally, it is not possible to represent all three in
a dissociative philosophical pair.
A practical example of a non-dissociative relationship between three media would be a
subtitled film bringing together video, audio, and text. If the film is in a foreign language, the
subtitles (text) are an important tool for understanding the meaning of the audio, although at
times the tone of the voices and soundtrack will speak for themselves. During a scene with
dialogue in a foreign language, the subtitles and soundtrack will likely be the key to
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understanding the video. Depending on the particular scene and movie, one medium may
become more important than the other, but often the viewer interprets the video by drawing on
both the accompanying text and audio soundtrack. Trying to map out these interactions in
dissociative pairs would require us to split the media into two different pairs:
video
soundtrack

video
text

and

It is possible that considering the multimodal interactions separately would give important
insight into the scene’s rhetorical power, but the complexity of the multimodal interaction
between the audio and text is lost. Dissociation is thus not equipped to handle more than two
terms when there is not a clear hierarchy. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca would probably
suggest a form of associational argument to explain that interaction.

IV. Opportunities for Future Research
Despite these limitations, dissociation can be of use for visual and digital rhetoricians.
The work that I have begun here has also opened up several additional avenues for future
research. Despite its deep potential, dissociation has not received a great deal of attention from
rhetoric and composition scholars, and we have yet to fully explore its implications. In particular,
much work remains to be done on Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s contributions to the theory. Barbara
Warnick and David Frank and Michelle Bolduc have called attention to Olbrechts-Tyteca’s role
in the development of The New Rhetoric,55 but her individual scholarship has gone largely
unstudied. Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 1979 article “Les Couples Philosophiques” is a more in-depth
examination of dissociation, yet thirty-five years later, the article is only available in the original

See Warnick’s “Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Contribution to the New Rhetoric” and Frank and Bolduc’s “Lucie
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric.”
55
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French.56 In this article, Olbrechts-Tyteca references a connection between dissociation and the
comic, noting that dissociation is sometimes the occasion for laughter (81). She footnotes this
remark with a reference to her 1974 monograph Le Comique du Discourse, which has itself not
been translated from the French. The details of how she linked the two concepts would make for
a fascinating article. Frank and Bolduc believe that Olbrechts-Tyteca might be considered a
“first-rate theorist” after her ideas are further studied (149), and I have to agree.
In addition, further exploration is needed of the types of dissociative pairs that OlbrechtsTyteca lays out in “Les Couples Philosophiques.” These types link terms I and II in a variety of
relationships: term I can be dependent on term II by a liaison based in the structure of the real
(exemplified by the pair consequence/cause), term I may be an application of term II (as in the
pair application/general), term I can be a relativization of term II (as in the pair opinion/truth),
term I might be a fragment of term II (as in the pair subjective/global), term I could be the
banalization of term II (as in the pairs quantitative/qualitative and normal/unique), term I may be
an alteration of term II (as in the pair alien/natural), term I can be the expression of term II (as in
the pair myth/meaning), and term I could be the representation of term II (as in the pair
substitute/reality) (83-85). The differences between these types of pairs and how they function in
argumentation is certainly grounds for future study, but these types share an interesting link with
Greek and Eastern Orthodox Christian theories of theological representation that is also worth
exploring.

As a mark of how limited work on Olbrechts-Tyteca’s article has been, her Wikipedia page does not even list “Les
Couples Philosophiques” among her publications (“Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca”). Granted, Wikipedia is not necessarily
an accurate measure of academic importance, but the limited information on Olbrechts-Tyteca is indicative of how
much she has slipped through the cracks. Warnick’s 1997 article “Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Contributions to The
New Rhetoric” is mentioned in the Wikipedia entry, but Olbrechts-Tyteca’s own work is unlisted.
56

178

In Figure and Likeness, Byzantine art historian Charles Barber recounts the types of
images that John of Damascus lays out in his iconophile treatise First Oration. John notes that
there are natural images, which are “must exist prior to all other categories of image” (76). There
are also conceptual images, which “address God’s foreknowledge of things that are…imply[ing]
an eternal existence for things in God’s mind” (76). Mimetic images are like “man, who is made
in the image and likeness of God and who can participate in the divine through imitation” (76). A
figurative image represents “that which is immaterial,” and pre-iconic images “prefigure the
Incarnation – for example, Aaron’s rod as a figure for the Theotokos” (76). Finally, there are
commemorative images which are “either a text or an icon of a thing that has happened” (76).
The connections between John of Damascus’s image types and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s pairs are not
precise, but there are some similarities. For example, John’s pre-iconic images are perhaps
similar to dissociative pairs where term I is an expression of term II. Mimetic images and
commemorative images could be likened to dissociative pairs where term I is a representation of
term II. Figurative images might share something in common with dissociative pairs linked by
fragmentation. Bringing dissociation to bear on icon theology may bring new insights into Greek
theories of representation, and considering dissociative relationships in light of Greek image
theories may help us better understand how those relationships are constructed.

V. Looking Out
As we pivot further into the digital turn, we will need new ways of understanding how
multimodal relationships work so that we can more effectively teach students to engage in the
discourses surrounding them. Dissociation is a place to begin. The fields of visual and digital
rhetoric will benefit greatly from using dissociation as a framework for understanding these
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relationships. As further scholarship is done on dissociation, the theory may prove to be useful in
ways we have not yet begun to see. There are a range of questions for future scholars to consider,
beginning with how we can use dissociation to understand relationships involving three or more
terms. Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work may hold some clues to this. Scholars can also consider the
nature of the relationships between Olbrechts-Tyteca’s philosophical pairs, and how these pairs
might act as rhetorical commonplaces. Dissociation is a promising framework for understanding
multimodal relationships — what we need are scholars willing to fill it out.

Appendix A: A Timeline of Important Events in Iconoclasm
Taken from:
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Mango, Cyril. “Historical Introduction.” Iconoclasm: Papers Given at the Ninth Spring
Symposium of Byzantine Studies. Ed. Anthony Bryer and Judith Herrin. Birmingham: Centre for
Byzantine Studies/University of Birmingham, 1977. 1-6. Print.
674-78 AD – siege of Constantinople by Arabs; Arabs defeated; Byzantine Empire feels like it
has God’s favor
680-81 – Sixth Ecumenical Council – determined that Christ had both human and divine natures,
but united them inseparably
692 – Quinisext Council – “encouraged the manufacture of icons of Christ while criticising the
use of symbolic representations” (Mango 2)
715-30 - Germanos is Patriarch of Constantinople
713(?)-740 Leo III is Byzantine Emperor
720-? – Constantine V (Leo's son) is associated to throne
723-24 – Byzantine city of Ikonion falls in a second Arab offensive
724 – Arab Caliph Yazid II decides to destroy all images in his lands
727 – Arabs besiege the Byzantine city of Nicaea, less than 60 mi from Constantinople. A
Nicaean defender named Constantine smashes an icon of the Theotokos in the city, and the city
is saved (Mango 2). Combined with the fall of Ikonion to a Caliph who banned the use of
images, this event sparks iconoclast sentiment. (There is an opposing story of the event:
Constantine died soon after smashing the Theotokos as punishment. Nicaea was instead saved by
portraits of 318 Holy Fathers who had been at the First Nicene Council (Mango 3).)
726 – An underwater eruption occurs in the Aegean Sea. Leo III decides it's a sign of divine
displeasure resulting from sin of idolatry. He declares that icons can no longer be venerated, and
he takes down the image of Christ displayed over Chalke (Bronze) Gate at the main entrance to
the Imperial Palace. A few casualties result from confrontations. Iconoclasm can be said to begin
here, although a formal edict may not yet have been released.
730 – Germanos resigns in protest as Patriarch of Constantinople. Sometime after, Germanos
wrote De haeresibus et synodis and reported that at this time, panel icons, church murals, altar
covers, and saints’ relics were destroyed; and iconophilepriests, laymen, and monks were
persecuted and driven into exile.
740-75 – Constantine V ascends the Byzantine throne and supports iconoclasm
741-2 – Artavasdos (Constantine V’s brother-in-law) claims the throne and re-introduces image
veneration
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742 – Constantine regains power and begins to establish a doctrinal basis for Iconoclasm
747 – A great plague comes on the Byzantine Empire. The iconophile monk Theophanes claims
it was brought on by Leo III’s heresy and Iconoclasm.
754 – Council of Hiereia: 338 iconoclast bishops meet, develop a doctrinal definition against
icons, and declare anathemas against John of Damascus (a theologian writing in defense of
images from monastery in Arab territory) and the former Patriarch Germanos. At the same time,
the Empire’s army is bound by oath to uphold iconoclast ideals, and the destruction of some
images begins.
760 – Persecution of iconophiles picks up, more heavily on monks
765 – The iconophile St. Stephen the Younger martyred
766 – Iconophile monks are forced to parade in the hippodrome of Constantinople holding
women’s hands
768 – Several iconophile monasteries in Constantinople are secularized or destroyed
775-80 – Leo IV ascends the throne and persecution lessens. Some iconophile exiles are allowed
to return home
780-802 – Eirene (Leo IV’s widow) comes to power with an iconophile agenda. She restores the
image on the Chalke Gate at some point during her reign
786 – Eirene calls a church council to codify iconophile doctrine, but iconoclast bishops and the
military put up a fight. The council is disbanded
787 – Eirene tries again, moving the council to Nicaea. The Seventh Ecumenical Council makes
an iconophile doctrinal statement and icons are officially reintroduced.
802 – Nikephros I overthrows Eirene (It turns out that she wasn’t well-liked anyway because she
took her son out of succession to become the sole ruler, and was a poor economic and military
leader.)
802-11 – Nikephros I rules until he dies on battlefield. (He wasn’t well-liked either because of
his military reforms.)
811-13 – Michael I rules until he dies in a military defeat.
813-20 – Leo V takes comes to power and announces an official return to iconoclast policies.
814 – Leo V asks Patriarch of Constantimople Nikephoros to remove the low images from
churches (images that were reverenced); Nikephoros refuses.
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December 314 – Leo V removes the image of Christ from Chalke Gate
815 – Nikephoros abdicates as Patriarch of Constantinople and an iconoclast patriarch is
appointed. A council is held in St. Sophia to approve iconoclasm.
815-20 – Amidst some persecution of iconophiles, St Theodore the Studite organizes an
underground movement to oppose iconoclasm.
820 – Leo V murdered by Michael II
820-29 – Michael II rules. He stops the official persecution and recalls exiles, but doesn’t do
anything else.
826 – Theodore the Studite dies
829-42 – Theophilos, last iconoclast emperor, comes to power. He revives some iconophile
persecution, but not as seriously in the past – perhaps because his own wife, Theodora, was a
know iconophile who kept icons in the palace.
837-43 – The iconoclast John the Grammarian is Partiarch of Constantinople.
843 – Triumph of Orthodoxy – Led by the Empress Theodora, the icons are returned to Hagia
Sophia and iconophile theology is officially adopted.
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